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Abstract 
This edited Working Paper addresses three fundamental questions concerning EU External Action 
after the Lisbon Treaty: the institutional position a d allegiance of the newly-established European 
External Action Service, the future of the ‘left out’ Directorate-General for Trade and the Common 
Commercial Policy, and the protection of EU citizens abroad. These enquires are prompted by both an 
institutional innovation – the launch of the EEAS – as well as by a number of substantive changes to 
the legal framework of EU External Action. An ambitious agenda has been inserted into the primary 
law, around which the Union institutions and Member States are to rally. It is in turn the raison d’être 
of the EEAS to foster the ensuing need for consistency, as well as to provide impetus to the EU’s 
external action. Structurally, it is in itself a sui generis institution composed of officials from the 
Commission, the Council and the Member States. Thisraises a number of fundamental questions that 
go well beyond those concerning which person is going to be the new EU ambassador in Washington 
or Beijing. Above all, can these substantive and institutional innovations live up to the grand 
ambitions of the peculiar entity that is the EU? What old problems does it purport to solve, and what 
are the new problems it is likely to create? Essentially, to which extent does bundling the external 
objectives in the Treaties as well as pooling together the institutional resources in Brussels and the 
delegations actually render the EU an ‘ever-closer’ actor in the world?  
Keywords 
Lisbon Treaty – EU external action – European External Action Service (EEAS) – Common 
Commercial Policy 
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1 
Introduction: Ever-Closer in Brussels – Ever-Closer in the World? 
 
‘We can now move forward to build a modern, effectiv  and distinctly European service for the 
21st century. The reason is simple: Europe needs to shape up to defend better our interests and 
values in a world of growing complexity and fundamental power shifts.’1 
 
With those words, the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Catherine Ashton 
welcomed the Council’s decision to establish the European External Action Service (EEAS) on 26 
July 2010.2 At that point, the Lisbon Treaty envisaging this in t tutional innovation had already been 
in force for more than half a year. The institutional reform coincides with a number of substantive 
changes to the legal framework of EU external action, both of which have as their overarching 
rationale the achievement of an ‘ever-closer Union’ in the world. The necessity to strengthen the 
external identity of the Union in its relations with third countries was among the principal 
considerations that underpinned the latest amendment of the founding Treaties.  
Consequently, an ambitious agenda has been inserted into the primary law, calling on the EU in its 
relations with the world to ‘promote its values and i terests’, ‘contribute to the protection of its 
citizens’ and to ‘contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity nd 
mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human 
rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of 
international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter’ (Art. 3(5) TEU). 
These principles are not to be pursued in isolation, but in a consistent manner and are to be ‘guided by 
the principles which have inspired [the EU’s] own creation’ (Art. 21 TEU). As becomes evident from 
the quote above, it is the ambition of the EEAS to foster both consistency in the EU’s external action 
and to provide impetus in order to effectively pursue these goals. Looking at its structure, one can see 
that it is in itself a sui generis institution: Headed by the High Representative, who is at the same time 
Vice-President of the Commission and Chairperson of the External Relations Council, and composed 
of officials from the Commission, Council and the Mmber States. This overhaul of both the substance 
and institutional framework of EU external action raises some fundamental questions that go well 
beyond those concerning which person is going to be the new EU ambassador in Washington, Beijing 
or Moscow. Above all, can this institutional innovation live up to the ambitions of the sui generis 
entity that is the EU? What old problems does it purport to solve, and what are the big new question 
marks that it raises? In essence, to which extent does bundling the external objectives in the Treaty as 
well as pooling together the institutional resources in Brussels and the delegations render the EU 
actually an ever-closer power in the world? 
In order to address these questions, the Working Group on EU External Relations Law t the European 
University Institute (Relex Working Group) hosted a two-day workshop on 21 and 22 January 2011, 
which brought together academics and practitioners specialized in various areas of EU external 
relations. The present edited EUI Law Working Paper compiles and elaborates upon the ideas 
presented at this event. While all contributions tackle different aspects of the Lisbon reform with 
regard to the external action of the Union, three gneral themes were identified around which to 
structure the discussion, i.e. the institutional positi n and allegiance of the sui generis EEAS (Part I ), 
the future of the ‘left out’ Common Commercial Policy (CCP) and its institutional protagonist, the 
Commission’s Directorate General for Trade (DG Trade) (Part II ), and the protection of EU citizens 
abroad as a task for the Member States and the newly-founded EEAS (Part III ).  
                                                   
1  High Representative Catherine Ashton, quoted in: Council of the European Union, Council establishes the European 
External Action Service, press release, Brussels, 26 July 2010, 12589/10, PRESSE 218, 
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/genaff/115960.pdf. 
2  Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External 
Action Service [2010] OJ L 201/30. 
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The theme of Part I , the institutional position and allegiance of the EEAS, is of general importance 
for the entire Working Paper and touches upon many fu damental questions of EU external relations. 
The link between law and policy, as well as Treaty reform in terms of substance and institutions 
becomes immediately visible in Steven Blockmans’ contribution. He assesses the future role of the 
EEAS in shaping the Union’s decisions in its external action. Departing from the political motivations 
to launch the EEAS and its legally enshrined mandate, he delves into the service’s potential in 
strategic planning and programming. Essentially, the contribution deals with the question to which 
extent the EEAS can contribute to the oft-evoked ‘coherence’ in EU external relations, a goal that is 
emphasized repeatedly in the reformed primary law. The issue of coherence and the EEAS’ 
contribution thereto is explored further in the piece by Bart Van Vooren in terms of the so-called 
‘security-development nexus’. In light of the fact that the Lisbon reform formally ended the pillar-
structure of the EU, which caused a tense relationsh p between the Community’s development policy 
and the intergovernmental Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) often resulting in legal 
disputes before the ECJ, Van Vooren addresses the question to which extent the institutionally 
amalgamated EEAS can ease this tension and avoid future litigation. An equally crucial concept, the 
duty of sincere cooperation (Art. 4(3) TEU), is discu sed by Kristin Reuter in the context of the EEAS 
as an institutional innovation. The duty has played an important role in the EU external relations and
has been the subject of numerous seminal ECJ decisions. Against this background, she tackles the 
question of how the creation of the EEAS and the conclusion of inter-institutional agreements can 
result in reinforced procedural obligations between the Union institutions and the Member States when 
acting on the international scene. 
While it is true that the EEAS bundles different inst tutional capacities that used to be separate, the 
contributions in Part II  address the ‘odd one out’ in this reshuffle, i.e. DG Trade, which remains 
entirely outside of the EEAS. This is a likely source of tension, as in terms of substance, the post-
Lisbon primary law now specifically states that the‘common commercial policy shall be conducted in 
the context of the principles and objectives of the Union’s external action’ (Art. 207(1) TEU). Valeria 
Bonavita argues that in the context of the EU’s overall strategy on dispute resolution in the WTO, the 
pursuit of the now combined Union objectives, as well as the safeguarding of its reinforced 
fundamental rights commitments, represent significant challenges for the Union institutions. For her, 
this both recalibrates and narrows the political institutions’ scope of action, and requires a rethinking 
of the pre-Lisbon ‘strategy’ in commercial disputes. The fact that the Union pursues its trade goals not 
only within the multilateral WTO, but is – in parallel – also in the course of concluding a series of new 
free trade agreements (FTAs) around the world, is underlined in the contribution by Boris Rigod. In 
scrutinizing this policy shift away from multilateralism, he sketches out a view of policy coherence 
beyond normative substance, re-emphasizing also the Union’s economic goals and responsiveness to 
its competitors. Moreover, he posits that coherence is better understood as a matter of ‘institutional 
choice’ and decision-making procedures. From a trade practitioner’s perspective, Joanna Miksa shows 
how in the area of market access the Lisbon reform affects not only the institutional and policy 
framework in Brussels, but importantly also on the ground in the Union delegations (which host both 
EEAS and DG Trade staff). She argues that by including the European Parliament as well as important 
stakeholders of the EU business community and actors within third-countries in the decision-making 
process, a ‘post-modern’ form of (trade) diplomacy is emerging.  
In Part III , the contributions delve into the question of how the Lisbon reform tackles the challenge of 
protecting EU citizens abroad. This is an objective that was absent from the failed Constitutional 
Treaty, but has been introduced for the first time by the Lisbon Treaty (Art. 3(5) TEU). While EU 
citizenship is a powerful concept that has been gradually developed from the Maastricht Treaty within 
the Union legal order, its external dimension raises a number of important questions of both 
international and EU law that have so far been left largely unexplored. Patrizia Vigni focuses in her 
paper on these questions, in particular the public international law implications of the EU model of 
consular and diplomatic protection of Union citizens. She scrutinizes to which extent public 
international law, which still mainly relies on states as the primary entity to which individuals are 
linked through nationality, allows a supranational organization such as the EU, and its Member States, 
to exercise these traditional forms of State-like protection. In Madalina Moraru’s contribution, the 
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diplomatic and consular protection of Union citizens is assessed through the lens of EU law. She 
addresses the question of which rights can the Union citizens rely on under EU law when they find 
themselves in distress abroad and points out the problems concerning the effectiveness of these rights. 
Additionally, the role of the Union itself in the field of consular and diplomatic protection of its 
citizens abroad is assessed in light of the Lisbon reform. Lastly, Joris Larik applies the objective of the 
protection of EU citizens abroad to the specific case of the EU’s anti-piracy operation ATALANTA off 
the coast of Somalia. Beyond consular and diplomatic protection, he points out the international and 
EU law constraints on the use of military force against this particular type of non-state actor for this 
purpose. He argues that by focussing on universal humanitarian and economic considerations and not 
on the protection of its own citizens, the Union fails to live up to the reformed primary law’s promise 
of protection of the cives europaei around the world.  
The editors would like to thank Professor Marise Cremona for her kind support in organizing and 
financing the workshop, in the absence of which this paper would not have been possible. 
Furthermore, we thank both Professors Marise Cremona and Francesco Francioni for their support at 
the editorial stage. 
 
Joris Larik and Madalina Moraru 
Coordinators of the EUI Working Group on EU External Relations Law 2010/11 
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Beyond Conferral: 
The Role of the European External Action Service in Decision-Shaping 
  
Steven Blockmans* 
Abstract 
In a rapidly changing world, the success of the European Union’s institutions in effectively addressing 
challenges and seizing opportunities is helped by the constant revision of EU strategies, as well as the 
focused support of and provision of resources by the Member States to make a difference. Arguably, 
when these elements are absent, EU external action flou ders. The Union’s mixed performance in 
external action over the past few years illustrates the importance of the Lisbon Treaty, which was 
intended to create the tools for the EU to develop a more coherent, effective and visible foreign policy. 
One of the institutional innovations provided for in the Treaty on European Union to meet those 
ambitions is the creation of a European External Action Service (EEAS), which is intended to support 
the EU external action heroes. This contribution deals with the question whether the new European 
External Action Service is likely to enhance inter-institutional coherence in the Union’s external 
action. Specific attention is paid to the cooperation and coordination in strategic planning and 
programming. 
Keywords 
Lisbon Treaty – European External Action Service – coherence – strategic planning and programming 
 
 
‘The ambition to build a strong EU foreign policy received a major boost with the launch of the 
European External Action Service – the EEAS – on the 1st of January this year. The service will 
act as a single platform to project European values and interests around the world. And it will act 
as a one-stop shop for our partners. 
The aim of all this is to forge a better, more coherent policy, developing European answers to 
complex global problems, working with our partners around the world. It's something I know 
countries have long asked for - and that we can nowdeliver.’1 
1. Introduction 
European leaders in Member State capitals and at EU headquarters were caught completely by surprise 
by the unfolding of history in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya in early 2011. In its first-ever evaluation of 
Europe’s performance in pursuing its interests and promoting its values in the world, the European 
Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) found that, while 2010 was not a great year for European 
foreign policy, the performance of EU institutions and Member States was ‘not uniformly mediocre’.2 
                                                   
*  Head of the Department of Research, TMC Asser Instituut, The Hague; Special Visiting Professor, University of Leuven; 
Academic Coordinator of CLEER. The author wishes to thank Marja-Liisa Laatsit, researcher assistant at the Centre for 
the Law of EU External Relations (CLEER) for her comments to earlier drafts of this essay. 
1  Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on Europe Day, press release, Brussels, 7 May 2011, A 177/11, 
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/121895.pdf. 
2  J Vaisse and H Kundnani (eds), European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2010 (London: ECFR 2011). The assessment is of 
the collective performance of all EU actors rather t an the action of any particular institution or country – either the High 
Representative, the European Council, the European Commission, a group of states like the EU3 (France, Germany and 
the UK), or an individual Member State. 
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Among the most united EU responses in 2010, the ECFR counted stabilisation and state building in 
Iraq, relations with the US on climate change, relations with the Eastern neighbourhood on trade and 
energy, relations with China on Iran and proliferation, European policy in the World Trade 
Organization, and relations with the US on terrorism, information sharing and data protection. 
Unfortunately for the EU, the list of its most divisive issues in 2010 is both longer and more pertinent. 
The list includes European policy on the rule of law and human rights in China, bilateral relations with 
Turkey, relations with the US on NATO and NATO reform, relations with the US on global economic 
and financial reform, European policy in the G20 and G8, and the diversification of gas supply routes 
to Europe.3 If anything, these lists show how plentiful and wide apart the foreign policy issues are that 
the EU has to deal with. To a certain extent, these challenges and opportunities have been outlined in 
the European Security Strategy of 2003, which was reviewed in 2008.4 But in a rapidly changing 
world, the success of the Union’s institutions in effectively addressing challenges and seizing 
opportunities is helped by the constant revision of EU strategies, as well as the focused support of and 
provision of resources by the Member States to make a difference. Arguably, when these elements are 
absent, EU external action flounders. 
The EU’s slow and timid response to the dramatic events of the Arab Spring of 20115 – as indeed the 
Union’s mixed performance in external action more widely – illustrate the importance of the Lisbon 
Treaty, which was intended to create tools for the EU to develop a more coherent, effective and visible 
foreign policy.6 One of the institutional innovations provided for in the Lisbon Treaty to meet those 
ambitions is the creation of a European External Action Service (‘EEAS’).7 This contribution deals 
with the question which role the new European External Action Service is likely to play in shaping the 
EU’s decisions in the field of external action. In order to answer this question, the paper will examine 
both the raison d’être (section 2) and the mandate of the EEAS (section 3), in particular the potential 
role of the EEAS in strategic policy-planning (section 4) and programming (section 5). In essence, this 
paper seeks to answer the question whether the EEAS is likely to enhance coherence in EU external 
action. This contribution will therefore not deal with the other two overriding aims for the creation of 
the EEAS – effectiveness and visibility.8 
Before embarking on the analysis, it is worth offering one further conceptual clarification. Rather 
confusingly, the Treaty on European Union speaks of the need to enhance onsistency in EU external 
action.9 Whereas legal scholarship is more or less united in drawing a distinction between the 
                                                   
3  Vaisse and H Kundnani (eds), European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2010, 11-12. 
4  European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World, Brussels, 12 December 2003, as complemented by the 
High Representative’s Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a 
Changing World, doc. 17104/08 (S407/08), 11 December 2008, endorsed by the European Council, Presidency 
Conclusions, doc. 17271/08 (CONCL 5), 12 December 2008, pt. 30. 
5  Compare, e.g., Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton and European Commissioner for Enlargement 
Štefan Füle on the situation in Tunisia, Press release A 010/11, Brussels, 10 January 2011; ‘EEAS’ senior officials 
mission to Tunisia’, Press Release A 029/11, 26 January 2011; and Statement by the EU High Representative Catherine 
Ashton on Tunisia, Press Release A 034/11, Brussels, 28 January 2011. See also T Garton Ash, ‘If this is young Arabs’ 
1989, Europe must be ready with a bold response’ The Guardian, 2 February 2011: ‘What happens across the 
Mediterranean matters more to the EU than the US. Yet so far its voice has been inaudible’. 
www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/feb/02/egypt-young-arabs-1989-europe-bold 
6  See Europe in the World – Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility’, COM(2006) 
278 final; the pre-Lisbon Draft IGC Mandate, annexed to the Presidency Conclusions of 22-23 June 2007; and the 
Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Main Aspects and Basic Choices of the CFSP (2008). 
7  Art. 27(3) TEU. 
8
  See, inter alia, E Drieskens and L Van Schaik (eds), The European External Action Service: Preparing for Succes, 
Clingendael Paper No. 1, December 2010; M Emerson et al., Upgrading the EU’s Role as Global Actor: Institutions, Law 
and the Restructuring of European Diplomacy (Brussels: CEPS 2011). 
9  See Arts. 18(4), 21(3) and 26(2) TEU. 
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principles of coherence and consistency,10 the drafters of the Treaties seem to have mistaken th  one 
principle for the other. In the functional approach to the topics at hand, the notion of consistency i 
primary law is understood here to mean the assurance that the different EU policies do not legally 
contradict each other. Moreover, synergies are sought in the implementation of these policies. The 
multi-layered concept of coherence is wider and relates to the construction of a united whole. For ease 
of distinction, the focus here will only be on the level of synergy between norms, actors and 
instruments, a synergy which the EU system (in Arts. 21(3), 4(3) and 13(2) TEU) aspires to promote 
through principles of cooperation and complementarity. For the purpose of this essay, and in spite of 
the Treaty language, the term coherence is here used to gauge the potential impact of the EEAS on the 
level of coordination and cooperation in the formulation of EU external relations policy. 
2. Reculer Pour Mieux Sauter: Lisbon Treaty Changes 
In order to develop a more coherent, effective and visible EU foreign policy, the Lisbon Treaty has 
introduced changes at two levels. Firstly, the objectiv s of the Union’s external policies, from security 
over development to trade and environment, were merged in Art. 21 TEU. Secondly, the institutional 
architecture and procedural framework for EU external action were fundamentally amended. All these 
changes were introduced, however, without the simultaneous streamlining of the distribution of 
competences or decision-making procedures in EU external relations.11 As has been observed, the 
Lisbon Treaty has not ended the first/second pillar dichotomy of late.12 The Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) remain located in the 
Treaty on European Union, separate from the Union’s ther external relations policies in the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the EU (trade, development, cooperation with third countries, humanitarian aid, 
relations with international organisations). Arguably, it is therefore the institutional innovation whic  
should spur the drive for more coherence, effectiveness and visibility.13 In that context, one can point 
to the institutionalisation of the European Council,14 which has been tasked with the identification of 
the strategic interests and objectives of the Union,15 as well as the external representation of the Union 
at Presidential level in the area of the CFSP.16 Also, the European Parliament’s role in EU decision-
making in foreign affairs has been greatly enhanced, most notably with respect to the development of 
the Common Commercial Policy.17 
                                                   
10  See, inter alia, C Tietje, ‘The Concept of Coherence in the Treaty on European Union and the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy’ (1997) 2 European Foreign Affairs Review 211; P Koutrakos, Trade, Foreign Policy and Defence in EU 
Constitutional Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2001) 39-44; C Hillion, ‘Tous pour un, un pour tous! Coherence in the 
External Relations of the European Union’ in M Cremona (ed), Developments in EU External Relations Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2008) 10-36; M Cremona, ‘Coherence in European Union Foreign Relations Law’ in P 
Koutrakos (ed), European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2011) 55-92. 
11  The most notable exception, however, is Art. 216 TFEU, which provides a primary law foundation for the power to make 
international agreements, which had hitherto been developed by the ECJ’s case law. 
12  See, e.g., P Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics and Treaty Reform (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010) 380-81. 
In the same vein, also P Van Elsuwege, ‘EU External Action after the Collapse of the Pillar Structure: In Search of a new 
Balance between Delimitation and Consistency’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 987 
13  This tendency has been most vocally criticized by Kishore Mahbubani, in ‘Europe’s Errors’, TIME Magazine, 8 March 
2010: ‘[…] Europe’s obsession with restructuring its internal arrangements is akin to rearranging the deck chairs of a 
sinking Titanic. The focus on internal challenges when the real threats are external is the first of three strategic errors 
Europe is making.’ 
14  Art. 13(1) TEU. 
15  Art. 22(1) TEU. 
16  Art. 15(6) TEU. 
17  Art. 207(2) TFEU. 
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The most relevant institutional changes in the Lisbon Treaty, however, relate to the position of the 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR),18 who ‘conducts’ the 
Union’s foreign, security and defence policies,19 contributes proposals to the development of those 
policies, and – together with the Council – ensures compliance by the Member States with their CFSP 
obligations.20 Primary authority for policy choice in these areas continues to reside with the European 
Council and the Council.21 The Commission remains responsible for policy initiation, implementation 
and external representation in the other domains of EU external action. 
To enhance coordination, the HR has been tasked to take part in the work of the European Council,22 
preside over the Foreign Affairs Council,23 and hold the post of Vice-President of the European 
Commission (VP).24 This new ‘triple-hatted’ person,25 is to take on the role of the big coordinator of 
the EU external policy: the HR/VP is to assist the Council and the Commission in ensuring 
consistency between the different areas of the Union’s external action and between these and the EU’s 
other policies.26 When properly carried out, the upgraded position of HR/VP ought to allow for a 
stronger and more independent development and implementation of the Union’s foreign, security and 
defence policy, which — potentially — would provide the EU with a more coherent and more 
effective role on the international scene.27 To assist the HR/VP in what seems like a mission 
impossible, the EU Treaty foresees the creation of a brand new diplomatic service of the EU, the idea 
for which originated during the European Convention in the Working Group on External Action.28  
The Lisbon Treaty provides for the creation of the diplomatic service in a short and rather open-ended 
manner. Art. 27(3) TEU is the only Treaty basis for the establishment of the EEAS and stipulates 
‘In fulfilling his mandate, the High Representative shall be assisted by a European External Action 
Service. This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States 
and shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council 
and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member 
States. The organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service shall be 
established by a decision of the Council. The Council shall act on a proposal from the High 
Representative after consulting the European Parliament and after obtaining the consent of the 
Commission.’ 
A single general procedural rule was provided for the establishment of the EEAS, i.e. the adoption of a 
Council Decision, proposed by the HR, with the consent of the Commission after having heard the 
opinion of the European Parliament. In fact, most of the questions regarding the establishment of the 
                                                   
18  The name change (compare the title of the pre-Lisbon position) reflects the fact that it has become clear that the HR 
indeed represents the Union and not the (collective) M mber States. Even the President of the European Council (note: 
not the European Union) exercises that position’s external competences ‘without prejudice to the powers of the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy’ (Art. 15 (6)(d) TEU). 
19  Art. 18(2) TEU. 
20  Art. 24(3) TEU. 
21  Arts. 22-26 TEU, resp. Art. 26(2) and 28 TEU. 
22  Art. 15(2) TEU. 
23  Art. 18(2) TEU. 
24  Art. 17(4) TEU. 
25  See J-C Piris, The Lisbon Treaty: A Legal and Political Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010) 243. 
26  See Arts. 18(4), 21(3) and 26(2) TEU. 
27  It has been argued that the triple hats worn by the HR could lead to institutional schizophrenia, with the incumbent being 
subject to conflicting loyalties. See Y Devuyst, ‘The European Union’s Institutional Balance after the Tr aty of Lisbon: 
“Community Method” and “Democratic Deficit” Reassessed’ (2008) 39 Georgetown Journal of International Law 247, 
294-5. Indeed, the Member States of the EU may well have created an even more impossible job than that of the United 
Nations Secretary-General – a post often called the most difficult in the world. 
28  CONV 459/02, Final Report of Working Group VII on External Action, Brussels, 16 December 2002, 6-7. 
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EEAS were left open by the Treaty. It was up to the negotiators of the different parties involved to 
reach agreement on principles and technical issues.29 
The High Representative’s initial proposal for a Council Decision on the set-up and functioning of the 
EEAS was drawn up in March 2010 and became subject to intense debates with Member States and, 
notably, the European Parliament. Much to her credit, the HR managed to navigate the high seas of 
inter-institutional politics and swiftly moved the l gislative process towards adopting the constituent 
Council Decision on 26 July 2010 (‘EEAS Council Decision’).30 This was followed by the adoption of 
three parallel legislative acts, which changed the EU’s financial and staff regulations and established a 
start-up budget for the EEAS.31 The completion of this complex process in barely six months triggered 
one insider to call it a ‘Guinness record for speed’.32 The EEAS was launched on 1 December 2010 
and became operational a month later, on 1 January 2011 when 1643 permanent officials were 
transferred from the Council and the Commission.33 
The key question now – the internal litmus test – is whether the EEAS will be able to pr vide the kind 
of assistance to its political master(s) that is needed to better coordinate external policies and thereby 
attain a higher level of coherence in EU external action.34 To answer this question, the mandate of the 
EEAS will first be analysed and then its organisational structure. The mandate of the EEAS writ large 
entails two dimensions: coordination of EU external action at the levels of strategic planning 
(decision-shaping) and implementation. Each will be discussed in turn, but the focus will first be on 
the tasks which can be distilled from a combined reading of the EEAS Council Decision and the TEU. 
3. Mandate of the EEAS: To ‘assist’, ‘support’ and ‘cooperate’ 
The EEAS Council Decision establishes the Action Servic  as a functionally autonomous body, 
separate from the General Secretariat of the Council a d from the Commission, with the legal capacity 
necessary to perform its tasks and attain its objectives.35 The Service has not been endowed, however, 
with the power to adopt individual and binding decisions vis-à-vis third parties.36 It is placed under the 
                                                   
29  For background and analysis of the negotiation prcess from which the EEAS emerged, see L Erkelens and S Blockmans, 
‘Setting Up the European External Action Service: An Institutional Act of Balance’ CLEER Working Papers (2011), 
forthcoming. 
30  Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External 
Action Service [2010] OJ L 201/30. 
31  Regulation No 1081/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 amending Council 
Regulation No 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities, as 
regards the European External Action Service, OJ [2010] L 311/9; Regulation No 1080/2010 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 24 November 2010 amending the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities and 
the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of thse Communities, OJ ]2010] L 311/1; and European Parliament 
resolution of 20 October 2010 on Council's position on Draft amending budget No 6/2010 of the European Union for the 
financial year 2010, Section II - European Council and Council; Section III - Commission; Section X - European External 
Action Service (13475/2010 – C7-0262/2010 – 2010/2094(BUD)). 
32  PS Christoffersen, ‘A Guinness Record for Speed’ in E Drieskens and L Van Schaik (eds), The European External Action 
Service: Preparing for Success, Clingendael Paper No. 1, December 2010. 
33  See Press Release IP/10/1769, Brussels, 21 December 2010. 
34  For the EU as a whole, the external litmus test is the extent to which international prtners find the EU to be more 
effective and visible. This point, however, is beyond the scope of the current essay. 
35  Art 1(2) EEAS Council Decision. On the character of the EEAS, see B Van Vooren, ‘A Legal-Institutional Perspective 
on the European External Action Service’, CLEER Working Papers 2010/7. 
36  An exception could be provided by the inter-service ‘arrangements’ which the EEAS can conclude. See Arts. 3(4) and 
4(5) EEAS Council Decision. These kinds of acts could potentially entail legal effects vis-a-vis third parties, within the 
meaning of Art. 263 TFEU, and therefore could draw the EEAS into Court proceedings. See further B Van Vooren, ‘A 
Legal-Institutional Perspective on the European External Action Service’ (2011) 48 Common Market law Review 475, 
493-496. 
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authority of the HR,37 and assists him/her in fulfilling his/her mandates, a  outlined, notably, in Arts. 
18 and 27 TEU 
- in fulfilling his/her mandate to conduct the Common Foreign and Security Policy (‘CFSP’) of the 
European Union, including the Common Security and Defence Policy (‘CSDP’), to contribute by 
his/her proposals to the development of that policy, which he/she shall carry out as mandated by 
the Council and to ensure the consistency of the Union’s external action, 
- in his/her capacity as President of the Foreign Affairs Council, without prejudice to the normal 
tasks of the General Secretariat of the Council, 
- in his/her capacity as Vice-President of the Commission for fulfilling within the Commission the 
responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations, and in coordinating other aspects of the 
Union’s external action, without prejudice to the normal tasks of the services of the Commission.38 
As it turns out, the HR does not have the EEAS all to him/herself. Art. 2(2) of the EEAS Council 
Decision states that the ‘EEAS shall assist the President of the European Council, the President of the 
Commission, and the Commission in the exercise of their respective functions in the area of external 
relations’. Thus, the EEAS is expected to serve multiple political masters.39 Considering that the 
EEAS was created as an inter-institutional body, it is ndeed well placed to play a coordinating role 
and assist in efforts to ensure coherence between the different areas of the Union’s external action and
between those areas and its other policies. How this coordination is expected to play out in practice 
becomes (more) clear from a close reading of Arts. 3 (Cooperation) and 4 (Central administration of 
the EEAS) of the EEAS Council Decision.  
Art. 3(1) of the EEAS Council Decision specifically prescribes that the EEAS ‘shall support, and work 
in cooperation with, the diplomatic services of the M mber States, as well as with the General 
Secretariat of the Council and the services of the Commission’. To start with the former: the success of 
the EEAS partly depends on national ownership, on Member States ‘buying in’ to the system. In this 
respect, a crucial but still uncertain factor is the willingness of the Member States to play an enabli g 
role in the early functioning of the new Service, in terms of input (contributions by seconded national 
experts (SNEs)) and output (implementation), both in the capitals (foreign affairs and their line 
ministries) and the delegations abroad.40 Through their membership of international decision-making 
organs, such as the UN Security Council, the G8 and G20, and their differentiated participation in 
several contact groups (e.g. France, Germany and the UK in the E3 group on Iran), individual Member 
States will continue to play a key role in EU foreign policy making. A good interaction between the 
EEAS and the Member States’ capitals – either through Brussels structures (COREPER, PSC and 
working groups) or key figures in the EEAS or in political cabinets – will therefore remain essential.41 
However, such coordination will not be sufficient to tame national ambitions, nor was it ever intended 
to.42 
                                                   
37  Art. 1(3) EEAS Council Decision. 
38  Art. 2(1) EEAS Council Decision. 
39  In fact, as one observer mentioned, ‘the EEAS’ assisting hands are tied to fields that have been transferred to its political 
‘masters’. While the fields of activity of the EEAS are wider than national diplomatic services (diplomacy + defence + 
parts of development cooperation), ‘finding a common approach between the voices of different actors is a task far more 
perplexing than one would encounter at a national foreign ministry’. See Drieskens and van Schaik (eds), The European 
External Action Service, 16. 
40  See S Vanhoonacker and S Duke, ‘Chairs’ Conclusions’ in Drieskens and van Schaik (eds), The European External 
Action Service 6. 
41  See M Lefebvre and C Hillion, ‘The European External Action Service: towards a common diplomacy?’, SIEPS 
European Analysis 2010/6, 7. 
42 A Rettman, ‘UK champions own diplomacy over EU 'action service'’, EUObserver, 5 May 2011, 
euobserver.com/?aid=32271. Compare also Declarations N s. 13 and 14 attached to the Lisbon Treaty. These disclaimers 
show that, indeed, there is still room for national diplomacy after Lisbon. 
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As far as concerns cooperation between the EEAS and the General Secretariat of the Council (GSC), 
on the one hand, and between the Action Service and the Commission, on the other, one key phrase 
mentioned twice in Art. 2(1) of the EEAS Council Decision: the EEAS shall assist the HR/VP in 
fulfilling his/her mandates ‘without prejudice to the normal tasks’ of the GSC and those of the servics 
of the Commission. In the absence of an exhaustive Kompetenzkatalog of the EU and with the very 
idea of normality in EU external action having shifted dramatically with the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty, it is not unlikely that the neutral phrase ‘normal tasks’ will be interpreted differently by 
persons with different institutional affiliations.43 As indicated by Lefebvre and Hillion 
‘Indeed, the functioning of the Service will probably remain determined by an invisible yet 
genuine distinction between two cultures: a Communitarian-like culture inherited from DG Relex 
(which will be numerically dominant in the EEAS, and which will most likely have the greatest 
influence on the geographic and thematic DGs, and o delegations); and a political culture 
inherited from the Council policy unit and crisis management structures, deemed to retain a certain 
autonomy within the Service. In this respect, the Council Decision suggests that the EEAS might 
well internalise past bureaucratic conflicts, rather t an do away with them.’44 
The risk of classic turf wars rearing their ugly heads is also the consequence of the pre-Lisbon 
manoeuvring by then Commission President designate Jos Manuel Barroso, who in November 2009 
unveiled his new team of Commissioners. By way of a simple asterisk behind the names of three 
designated Commissioners, Barroso indicated that the Commissioners responsible for ‘International 
Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis response’, ‘Development’ and ‘Enlargement and European 
Neighbourhood Policy’ would exercise their functions ‘in close cooperation with the High 
Representative/Vice-President in accordance with the Treaties.’45 The requirement of close 
cooperation with the HR/VP and the condition to work closely with the EEAS (as provided in the 
Mission Letters) was later structured, under his ultimate leadership, by the President of the 
Commission so as to ensure the coherence of external policies.46 It may be clear that this line of action 
curtails the HR/VP’s responsibilities as entrusted to him/her by the Treaty. This is further enhanced by 
removing responsibility for the ENP from the portfolio External Relations to that of Enlargement. This 
(re-)reshuffling was not motivated by Barroso (II). Finally, the Trade Commissioner does not 
cooperate directly with the HR/VP or with the EEAS, notwithstanding the genuine international 
character of his portfolio. One could say that the High Representative’s VP hat represents fewer 
portfolios and less coordinating powers then under Bar oso (I). The ‘normal tasks’ of the Commission 
are therefore more expansive than a post-Lisbon coherence-driven process in EU external action 
would have tolerated. 
One former ‘normal task’ of the GSC now entrusted to the EEAS is assisting the HR with exercising 
his/her responsibilities under the acts founding the European Defence Agency, the European Union 
Satellite Centre, the European Union Institute for Security Studies and the European Security and 
                                                   
43  According to one member of the Council Legal Service, the phrase should be interpreted in line with existing practice 
under Art. 23(1) of the Council’s Rules of Procedure: ‘The Council shall be assisted by a General Secretariat […]’ Gilles 
Marhic at the DSEU Conference ‘The Diplomatic System after Lisbon – Institutions Matter’, 18–19 November 2010, 
Maastricht University. 
44  Lefebvre and Hillion, ‘The European External Action Service’ 7. 
45  Press release IP/09/1837 of 27 November 2009. The requirement of close cooperation was repeated in the Mission 
Letters of the same date from Barroso (II) to Andris Piebalgs and Stefan Füle, and of 27 January 2010 to Kristalina 
Georgieva, ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/mission_letters/index_en.htm. 
46  See Art. 17(6)(b) TEU, which states that the President of the Commission shall ‘decide on the internal organisation of the 
Commission, ensuring that it acts consistently, efficiently and as a collegiate body’. On 22 April 2010, Barroso issued an 
Information Note from the President, ‘Commissioners groups’, SEC(2010) 475 final, in which the VP is tasked to chair 
the group of Commissioners responsible for ‘External elations’, a group further composed of Olli Rehn (economic and 
monetary affairs), Karel De Gucht (trade) and the tree aforementioned Commissioners. The Note also says that ‘the 
President can decide to attend any meeting, which he will then chair’. 
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Defence College.47 Other examples of such ‘normal tasks’ include the administrative tasks of 
preparing and holding Council meetings.48 
With respect to the coordination and cooperation betwe n the EEAS and the services of the 
Commission, the EEAS Council Decision specifically obliges the parties to consult each other on all 
matters relating to the external action of the Union in the exercise of their respective functions, except 
on matters of CSDP.49 This far-reaching obligation stems, inter alia, from the quasi-blanket 
competence attributed to the Commission in Art. 17(1), sixth sentence TEU to represent the Union 
externally ‘with the exception of the common foreign and security policy, and other cases provided for 
in the Treaties’. As the Heads of the EU Delegations receive direct instructions from the HR, the 
EEAS and the Commission are effectively and legally bound to cooperate in the external 
representation of the Union.50 On matters covered by the CSDP, simple coordinatio between the 
EEAS and the Commission will not do. In view of the competence distribution in the Lisbon Treaty, 
the EEAS is explicitly positioned to take part in the preparatory work and procedures relating to acts 
to be prepared by the Commission in the area of the CSDP.51 In other words, the Commission relies on 
the HR and the EEAS in fielding proposals under Art. 42(4) TEU.  
At the same time, the EEAS is mandated to provide support for the HR/VP in his/her capacity as the 
Vice-President of the European Commission. In that capacity, the VP is responsible for the external 
relations of the EU and for coordinating other aspects of the Union’s external action so as to ensure 
consistency in implementation.52 The EEAS could be expected to operate in many ways like a service 
of the Commission, but this will require good will and cooperation on both sides. So far, however, the 
picture that has emerged from practice is rather mixed.53 
Although not central to the equation, the European P rliament, European Council, Court of Justice and 
Court of Auditors are not left out. The EEAS shall extend ‘appropriate support and cooperation to the 
other institutions and bodies of the Union, in particular to the European Parliament’. 54 What 
constitutes such ‘appropriate’ support remains unclear, but going by previous practice, it is not 
expected to amount to much more than sharing information, most notably with the Foreign Affairs 
(AFET) Committee of the Parliament. 
In return for all this assistance, the EEAS, too, may benefit from the support and cooperation of the 
above-mentioned actors, albeit not with the same generosity with which the Service itself is expected 
to deliver. The High Representative and the EEAS shall be assisted ‘where necessary’ by the GSC and 
the relevant departments of the Commission,55 and ‘as appropriate’ by the European Parliament, other 
                                                   
47  See the seventh recital of the Preamble of the EEAS Council Decision. 
48  See Council Rules of Procedure, Arts. 3(2 & 5), 5(3-4), 7(3), 27(3-5). 
49  Art. 3(2) EEAS Council Decision. This paragraph shall be implemented in accordance with Chapter 1 of Title V of the 
TEU, and with Art. 205 TFEU. 
50  Art. 5(3) EEAS Council Decision. 
51  Art. 3(2) EEAS Council Decision. 
52  Art. 18(4) TEU. 
53  European Commission President Barroso has been reported t  ake an uncooperative stance towards the difficulties which 
VP Ashton often faces to attend the Wednesday meetings of the College. Barroso has barred Ashton from participating 
via video conference or being deputised when abroad. See B Waterfield, ‘Is absent Ashton a part-timer?’, EUObserver, 
10 January 2011, blogs.euobserver.com/waterfield/2011/01/10/absent-ashton-a-part-time-eu-foreign-minister/. On the 
other hand, cooperation between Ashton and individual Commissioners (Piebals, Füle, Georgieva) has beenconstructive, 
e.g. in monitoring the situation in the Arab World. To this end, and in an effort to keep his VP in check, Barroso 
published an Information Note from the President, Commissioners Groups, SEC (2010) 475 final, Brussels, 22 April 
2010. For further analysis on this the latter, see Erkelens and Blockmans, ‘Setting Up the European External Action 
Service’. See, more generally, E Brok, ‘Préjugés, défis et potentiels: une analyse sans idées préconçues d  Service 
européen pour l’action extérieure’, Fondation Robert Schuman Policy Paper, Question d’Europe n°199, March 2011, 21  
54  Art. 3(4) EEAS Council Decision. 
55  Art. 4(5) EEAS Council Decision. 
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institutions and bodies, including agencies.56 Arguably, the words ‘where necessary’ and ‘as 
appropriate’ leave a margin of discretion to the GSC and the Commission that even the service-level 
arrangements, which may be drawn up to that end by the said parties,57 or between the EEAS and 
other offices or inter-institutional bodies of the Union,58 could – in all likelihood – not close. The 
relationship between the EEAS, on the one hand, and the Commission services and GSC, on the other, 
is inherently asymmetrical with the EEAS performing the role of an assistant to multiple political 
masters and their services. 
In short, the EEAS has been endowed with the task to support the Council and the Commission 
(directly) and the HR (in his/her task to assist the two institutions) in fulfilling their Treaty obligation 
to ensure coherence between the different areas of the Union’s external action and between those areas 
and the EU’s other policies. Moreover, the EEAS hasbeen tasked to serve the President of the 
European Council and the President of the European Commission in the exercise of their respective 
functions in the area of external relations. The European Parliament and other institutions and bodies 
are supported whenever appropriate. The fact that – conversely – the EEAS and its political 
headmaster, the HR may receive the support from the GSC and the relevant departments of the 
Commission should provide further ground for enhancing coherence in all fields of EU external 
action. Yet, as Avery has pointed out, there is a grave risk of friction and rivalry between EEAS and 
the services of the Commission.59 The threat is significant because much of the EU’s action in 
international affairs is related to common policies, such as environment, energy, trade and agriculture. 
The analysis will now turn to a review of the Action Service’s responsibilities with respect to strategic 
policy planning and programming. 
4. Strategic Planning 
It is a self-proclaimed objective of the European Uion to increase its strategic approach to tackling 
global challenges.60 In fact, there is no shortage of strategic aims that guide the Union’s external 
action. The problem is that they are scattered over so many policy documents and ‘strategic 
partnerships’ that the EU begins to look rather rudderless.61 The European Security Strategy,62 the 
European Consensus for Development, 63 he EU Strategy for Sustainable Development,64 and ‘Trade, 
Growth and World Affairs’65 are just a few examples. Their contents are often closely connected, as 
                                                   
56  Art. 3(4) EEAS Council Decision. 
57  Art. 4(5) EEAS Council Decision. 
58  Art. 3(3) EEAS Council Decision. The terms ‘offices’ and ‘inter-institutional bodies’ leave room for coordination and 
cooperation between the EEAS and the office (cabinet) of the President of the European Council, the Publications Office, 
the European Personnel Selection Office, the European Administrative School and others. 
59  G Avery, ‘The EU’s External Action Service: new actor on the scene’, EPC Commentary, 28 January 2011. 
60  See the High Representative’s Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy—Providing Security in a 
Changing World, doc 17104/08 (S407/08), endorsed by the European Council, Presidency Conclusions, doc 17271/08 
(CONCL 5), 2 (hereinafter: ESS 2008). 
61  S Duke, ‘Parameters for Success’, in Drieskens and v  Schaik (eds.), The European External Action Service, 35. 
62  European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World (Brussels, 2003). 
63  See Joint Statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the 
Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development Policy: ‘The European 
Consensus’ [2006] OJ C 46/1. 
64 See the European Commission’s 2009 review of the 2001 EU Strategy for Sustainable Development, eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0400:FIN:EN:PDF. 
65 See DG Trade’s ‘Trade Policy as a Core Component of the EU’s 2020 Strategy’, 
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/november/tradoc_146955.pdf. The strategy aims to enhance the position of EU 
economy by getting new opportunities for trade and investment, deepening the existing trade and investm nt links, 
helping EU businesses access global markets, gainin foreign investment, implementing enforcement measures, and 
enhancing the ‘spirit of multilateralism and partneship’ in trade. These aims, no doubt, entail political consequences. 
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the challenges posed by the security-development nexus have taught us.66 Tackling the coordination 
issue therefore calls not only for better institutional coordination (see the previous section), but also
for more strategic decision-making.67 
Since the entry of the Lisbon Treaty, the onus has been on the European Council, which, according to 
Art. 22(1) TEU, ‘shall identify the strategic interests and objectives of the Union’ that relate to the 
CFSP and to other areas of EU external action. ‘Such decisions may concern the relations with a 
specific country or region or may be thematic in approach.’ The President of the European Council, 
Herman van Rompuy has started off the long-overdue and necessary debate on the EU’s strategic 
priorities. Unfortunately, the first European Council Summit to that effect was not a great success.68 
The analyses prepared by HR Ashton’s team at the tim (September 2010) have been described as 
‘rather disappointing’.69 It is here that a fully-fledged European External Action Service could prove 
instrumental in supporting the HR and the President of the European Council with a well-thought-out 
medium and long-term analytical approach for the Union’s foreign and security policy. 
Under the terms of Art. 22(2) TEU, the HR – for thear a of CFSP – and the Commission – for other 
areas of external action – may submit joint proposals to the Council. A recent example has been 
provided by the Commission with its report ‘Towards a new Energy Strategy for Europe 2011-2020’, 
adopted by the Council in 2010.70 Elements thereof made it on to the European Council strategic 
agenda and were then bounced back to both Commission and the HR 
‘There is a need for better coordination of EU and Member States' activities with a view to 
ensuring consistency and coherence in the EU’s external relations with key producer, transit, and 
consumer countries. The Commission is invited to submit by June 2011 a communication on 
security of supply and international cooperation aimed at further improving the consistency and 
coherence of the EU's external action in the field of energy. The Member States are invited to 
inform from 1 January 2012 the Commission on all their new and existing bilateral energy 
agreements with third countries; the Commission will make this information available to all other 
Member States in an appropriate form, having regard to the need for protection of commercially 
sensitive information. The High Representative is invited to take fully account of the energy 
security dimension in her work. Energy security should also be fully reflected in the EU's 
neighbourhood policy.’71 
The organisational chart of the EEAS includes ‘strategic planning’ and ‘training’, but – at the time of 
writing – adequate resources had not yet been allocated to these important functions. The High 
Representative is expected to take decisions by mid-2011 on the training of the EEAS personnel.72 As 
for strategic planning, one of the successes of Javier Solana’s team was the development of the 
European Security Strategy as an over-arching concept. One of the weaknesses of the Commission in 
external relations was its lack of overall planning capacity.73 This is where the hybrid HR/VP position, 
supported by the EEAS composed of Commission and Council staff, plus seconded national experts 
from the Member States, is expected to make a difference. However, we have still to see the first 
                                                   
66  See C Ashton, ‘Foreword’ in S Blockmans, J Wouters and T Ruys (eds), The European Union and Peacebuilding: Policy 
and Legal Aspects (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press 2010) V. See also ESS 2008, 8-9; and Case C-91/05 Commission v. 
Council (SALW) [2008] ECR I-03651. 
67  As recognised in the ESS 2008, 8-9. 
68  European Council Conclusions of 16 September 2010, Press Release EUCO 21/10, CO EUR 16, conclusion no. 3. 
69  See infra, note 73. 
70  Conclusions of the 3017th Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Council meeting, Brussels, 31 May 2010. 
71  European Council, Conclusions on Energy, Press Release PCE 026-11, 4 February 2011, pt. 11. 
72  For an analysis of how training can contribute towards fulfilling the EEAS objectives and in nurturing a new EU 
diplomacy, see J Lloveras Soler, ‘The New EU Diplomacy: Learning to Add Value’, EUI Working Papers RSCAS 
2011/05. 
73  See Avery, ‘The EU’s External Action Service: new actor on the scene’. 
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proposal coming from the HR in the field of CFSP.74 In the wake of the historical changes in parts of 
the Arab World, and against the wider background of the rise of the BRICs, both the ENP and the 
2003 ESS are obvious candidates for a thorough revision. 
A crucial task when establishing the function of the EEAS in achieving overall consistency in EU 
external action is to identify the policy areas where coordination is necessary. Virtually every EU 
policy has to it an external dimension that fits into the grander scheme of EU presence in the world 
and could therefore also fall within the ambit of the EEAS’ activities. These policy areas include those 
with a clear, chiefly external character – CFSP, CSDP, Common Commercial Policy (CCP), 
development cooperation, humanitarian aid, enlargement, and the European Neighbourhood Policy – 
as well as those usually classified as internal Union policies – the Area of Freedom Security and 
Justice, agriculture and fisheries, public health, environment, energy, tourism. The added value of the 
EEAS’ involvement in strategic planning certainly lies at the crossroads of EU external policies, as the 
nexus between development cooperation and security policy has shown. The overarching development 
goal in the Lisbon Treaty is the eradication of poverty. The coordination on the level of ensuring 
consistency of aims between the overall foreign andsecurity policy goals in general and those of 
development policy in particular – a task specifically entrusted to the EEAS75 – entails a degree of 
strategic planning, in addition to the task of eventually coordinating the activities between the 
institutions implementing the cooperation programmes in the end.  
5. Programming 
In terms of programming, planning and implementation, the tasks of the EEAS are more or less clear. 
According to Art. 9(2) of the EEAS Council Decision, the HR ‘shall ensure overall political 
coordination of the Union’s external action, ensuring the unity, consistency and effectiveness of the 
Union’s external action, in particular through [a number of thematic and geographic] external 
assistance instruments’.  
These instruments include the Development and Cooperation Initiative (DCI), European Development 
Fund (EDF), European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), the European Instrument 
for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialised 
Countries, the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INS) and part of the Instrument for 
Stability (IfS). The relevant Article in the EEAS Council Decision states that  
‘[...] throughout the whole cycle of programming, planning and implementation of the instruments 
referred to in paragraph 2, the High Representative and the EEAS shall work with the relevant 
members and services of the Commission without prejudice to Article 1(3). All proposals for 
decision will be prepared by following the Commission’s procedures and will be submitted to the 
Commission for adoption’.76 
                                                   
74  Ashton has been criticized – so far most vocally by the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs – for not pro osing a well-
thought-out medium and long-term analytical approach for the Union’s foreign and security policy. See L Maroun, 
‘Steven Vanackere dit ses quatre vérités à Cathy Ashton’, Le Soir, 4 May 2011, 14: ‘Bien sûr, pour beaucoup de pays, l  
politique extérieure est au cœur de la souveraineté ationale. Nous, nous avons toujours voulu que le Service d’action 
extérieure soit l’axe central autour duquel les Etats membres peuvent s’organiser. Mais en l’absence d’un axe central qui 
répond, fait des analyses et tire des conclusions rapidement, les Allemands aujourd’hui, les Français demain, ou les 
Anglais, prennent une partie de ce rôle d’axe central, et c’est alors autour d’eux que les autres doivent s’organiser ! Le 
résultat est centrifuge, pas centripète. (...) Il est normal qu’Ashton ne soit pas partout en même temps. Il faut faire des 
choix, se concentrer sur les vrais enjeux, éviter de se perdre dans les détails, et une bonne gestion d’agenda. (…)Mais 
aujourd’hui, je n’ai pas l’impression qu’avec le Service d’action extérieure, on en soit déjà là. On peut accepter que 
certains réagissent plus vite qu’Ashton, mais à condition qu’elle puisse prouver qu’elle travaille sur le moyen et le long 
termes – et sur des thèmes hyper-importants, comme l’énergie par exemple. Mais ça, je n’ai pas encore vu non plus.’ 
75  See the fourth recital of the preamble of the EEAS Council Decision; Art. 21(2)(d) TEU and Art. 208 TFEU. 
76  Art. 9(3) EEAS Council Decision. 
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Thus, the EEAS Council Decision entrusts the Action Service with co-responsibility for preparing the 
Commission decisions on the strategic, multi-annual steps within the programming cycle.77 More 
specifically, this covers the first three multi-annual steps within the programming cycle: country and
regional allocations; country and regional strategic papers; and national and regional indicative 
programmes.78 The objection that the EDF and DCI, which in budget terms represent the largest 
portion of the overall external action budget, imply a different and essentially long-term approach to 
programming while much of the programming in other aspects of EU external action is annual or 
shorter-term appears to have been accommodated by the EEAS Council Decision. In both cases, any 
proposals ‘shall be prepared jointly by the relevant services in the EEAS and in the Commission under 
the direct supervision and guidance of the Commissioner responsible for Development Policy and 
shall be submitted jointly with the High Representative for adoption by the Commission’.79 Similar 
stipulations apply in the ENPI context with referenc  to the Commissioner for Enlargement and 
Neighbourhood Policy.80 
In short, the EEAS Council Decision does not prima facie remove either the Commission’s 
‘management functions’, its rights of initiative orthose of implementation (Art. 17(1) TEU). Art. 
210(2) of the TFEU, which permits the Commission ‘to take any useful initiative’ to promote 
coordination between the Union and the Member States on development cooperation is seen as further 
proof that the Commission should continue as the imple enter of development policy. However, there 
is nothing in the travaux préparatoires of the EEAS Council Decision to suggest that any such 
transferral of implementation of development cooperation instruments to the EEAS has been seriously 
entertained.81 
Based upon the EEAS Council Decision, substantial mnagement and implementation tasks are 
retained by the Commission with the EEAS playing a role in the programming aspects. Programming 
can be conceived of as relating to the political leve  where strategic goals are connected with more 
specific policy-making towards a country or region (cf. the competence of the European Council ex 
Art. 22 TEU), while the actual management of projects (especially their financial aspects) and their 
execution will be tasks retained by the Commission. 
It is only when the President of the European Council, who is backed by the HR/VP’s 
recommendations (prepared by the EEAS), presents the broad priorities of the EU on the international 
stage – who the key strategic partners are, and how t e often difficult dialogue between values and 
interests should be conducted – that the Action Service’s general tasks will become much more clear. 
In the absence of any such strategy at macro level it is difficult to see how the EEAS will make critical 
decisions on programming priorities related to financi l instruments.  
It is important to, once more, make a distinction between the EEAS political role and its legal positin. 
On the first point, the EEAS is potentially vested with significant influence on EU external relations 
policy-making but so far the Commission has ‘goes solo’ on several issues with a significant external 
dimension, e.g. trade, energy security and climate change. As for its legal position, the EEAS has not 
been formally conferred with competences to adopt legal y binding instruments. 
                                                   
77  To be sure, actions undertaken under: the CFSP budget; the Instrument for Stability (other than the part referred to in Art. 
9(2) EEAS Council Decision); the Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialised Countries; communication and public 
Diplomacy actions, and election observation mission, are under the responsibility of the HR/EEAS. The Commission is 
responsible for their financial implementation under the authority of the HR in his/her capacity as Vice-President of the 
Commission. The Commission department responsible for this implementation shall be co-located with the EEAS. See 
Art. 9(6) EEAS Council Decision. 
78  Art. 9(3) EEAS Council Decision. 
79  Art. 9(4) EEAS Council Decision (emphasis added). 
80  Art. 9(5) EEAS Council Decision. 
81  See further S Duke and S Blockmans, ‘The Lisbon Treaty stipulations on Development Cooperation and the Council 
Decision of 25 March 2010 (Draft) establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action 
Service’, CLEER Legal Brief, 4 May 2010,  
www.asser.nl/upload/documents/542010_121127CLEER%20Legal%20Brief%202010-05.pdf. 
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6. Concluding Remarks 
Beyond the support for the exercise of the powers conferred by the Lisbon Treaty to its political 
masters, the main task of the EEAS is to create synrgies between these ‘external action heroes’ and 
the instruments they employ. This essay has shown that in terms of coordination, strategic policy 
planning and programming, the role of the EEAS has been limited in at least three ways. First, the 
service’s scope for action is curtailed by the elasticity of the term ‘normal tasks’ of the General 
Secretariat of the Council and those of the relevant departments of the Commission. This term was 
introduced in the Council Decision setting up the EEAS. Practice has shown that the solidarity among 
the Union’s external action heroes is not boundless. The pre-emptive moves by European Commission 
President to carve out substantial chunks of EU foreign policy-making from the HR/VP’s mandate and 
to tie the latter down in forms of cooperation over which Barroso can preside, are illustrative in this 
respect. Second, the organisational structure does n t foresee the bureaucratic linkages to allow for 
great inter-institutional coordination in the development of medium- and long-term strategies. The 
tension between external competence delimitation in two Treaties and the need to speak with one 
voice to the world seems to have been structurally engrained into the structures of the EEAS.82 And 
thirdly, the Action Service’s success is also dependent on the Member States’ willingness to cooperate 
by sharing relevant information and by seconding their ‘brightest minds’ to the Union’s diplomatic 
service. So far, the signals sent from several Member States’ ministries of foreign affairs have been 
rather sobering in this respect. 
However important the structures and processes are, they are never an end in themselves, but merely 
instruments. The key question underlying this paper has been whether the new body is fit for its 
intended purpose. Does it provide essential support to the senior EU posts in external relations? And 
does it allow the EU to be a credible and coherent diplomatic actor exerting influence on the 
international scene? 
The coordination tasks most likely include information sharing, the EEAS acting as a common source 
of expertise for any institution dealing with EU ext rnal activities, overview of the activities of the 
different institutions, as well as various representation duties to make the Union speak with a single 
voice in the direct sense. It remains to be seen thoug  to what extent the EEAS can contribute to the 
formulation of shared principles guiding the foreign policy not only of the EU, but also of its Member 
States. In fact, its potential lies in becoming a ‘decision-shaping’ body. Perhaps a better term for the 
EEAS would therefore have been the ‘European External Policy Coordination Service’.  
                                                   
82  While it is probably too early to draw firm conclusions on this particular issue in view of the fact that the organisational 
structure from 1 April 2011 is still being tweaked and thus liable to change, one has been able to observe that the former 
Second Pillar bodies have remained apart from the former First Pillar units in the whole series of organisational charts 
which have been floated since March 2010. For further observations on the draft organisational structue, with a 
particular focus on the development-security nexus, see the contribution by Bart Van Vooren in this edited Working 
Paper. 
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The European External Action Service: 
Avoiding Past Disputes in the Security-Development Nexus? 
 
Bart Van Vooren* 
Abstract  
This contribution explores the potential of the Lisbon Treaty’s formal ‘de-pillarization’ and the 
establishment of the EEAS to ease the tension inhere t in the ‘security-development nexus’ of EU 
external action which existed between the former Community’s development policy and the 
intergovernmental Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). As a body that brings together staff 
from the Council, Commission and Member States both in Brussels and in the Union delegations 
around the globe, the EEAS could rise to become the central interlocutor between the various actors 
that formulate EU external action, fostering both coherence and a more unitary representation of the 
Union. This contribution addresses these developments with a view to examining them in the pursuit 
of the oft-evoked, yet often absent ‘single EU voice’. In the past, the pillar structure caused a number 
of turf battles, signifying the shortcomings of the legal and institutional configuration pre-Lisbon, 
which led to judicial disputes, of which the ECOWAS case is the most prominent example. Against 
this backdrop, the present contribution performs the following thought-exercise: Could a conflict such 
as that which led to the ECOWAS judgment on the separation between security and development 
policies still take place under the post-Lisbon lega -institutional setting? 
Keywords 
Security-development nexus – de-pillarization – CFSP post-Lisbon – coherence – Small Arms/Ecowas 
judgement 
 
1. Introduction 
In a recent contribution, I examined the legal-institutional position of the EEAS as against the current 
institutional balance in EU external relations.1  In that article, I defined the EEAS as follows 
‘a body functionally akin to Commission Directorates General, without the legal advantage of 
being part of an institution with decision-making powers proper, accountable to Parliament, while 
being placed under the HR’s authority with a broad mandate of support within the chalk lines set 
by the Council and European Council.’  
The EEAS is a body which brings together staff from the Council, Commission and Member States 
both in Brussels and abroad, serving as an interlocutor between the various actors that formulate EU 
external action. By inserting this new cog into the EU’s external relations machinery the drafters of the 
Lisbon Treaty took another step in the quest towards the ever-elusive single voice for the Union in the 
world. In the past, that single voice had been stymied – among others – by the existence of the two 
different pillars on which EU external relations was based: one comprising a set of procedures and 
instruments to conduct the EU’s Common Foreign and Security policy (CFSP), and another 
comprising procedures and instruments to pursue policies in the field of trade, environment, 
development, and other pre-Lisbon ‘Community’ competences. The Lisbon Treaty has now formally 
                                                   
*  Assistant Professor of EU Law & Integration, University of Copenhagen. 
1  B Van Vooren, ‘A Legal-Institutional Perspective on the European External Action Service’ (2011) 48 Common Market 
Law Review 475. 
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collapsed the pillar structure into one organization with legal personality, though in substance the 
divide remains. This implies that legally the old hierarchical relationship between the CFSP and the 
Community has disappeared, and while the gloss of the single institutional framework has only been 
strengthened by the advent of the EEAS, the divide between notably development and security 
policies remains as strong as ever. This contribution will hone in on these developments, the collapse 
of the pillar structure and the creation of the EEAS, so as to examine them against the quest of 
attaining the single EU voice. In the past, the pillar structure led to a number of turf battles which 
signified the problems inherent to that legal and istitutional configuration, and their negative impact 
on external policy. Most widely known is the conflict concerning the financing of initiatives to combat 
illegal sales of small arms in Western Africa, which led to the ECOWAS Grand Chamber judgment of 
May 2008. The thought-exercise in this contribution is then the following: could a conflict such as that 
which led to that prominent judgment on the separation between security and development policies, 
still take place under the post-Lisbon legal-institutional setting? 
2. The Security-Development Nexus: A Testing Ground for Coherence of EU External 
Relations 
The European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003, the 2006 European Consensus on Development, and 
the EU’s 2008 review of the ESS all state that ‘there cannot be sustainable development without peace 
and security, and without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace.’2 
While that is indeed a rather intuitive connection, this interconnection cannot veil that achieving that 
goal requires decisive and clear strategies, which in ludes choices prioritizing certain objectives and 
initiatives over others: development and security concerns ought thus to be part of a single integrated 
political strategy. Legally, the Union is not well-constructed towards that end: Since the Maastricht 
Treaty the Community has become competent in the area of development policy, a competence which 
is shared and non-pre-emptive, and is to be exercised n coordination with the Member States’ 
development policies. The scope and depth of this competence has grown over the years (for example: 
it now includes anti-landmine initiatives where that formerly was a CFSP field of action), alongside a 
Common Foreign and Security policy which has equally matured since the Maastricht Treaty. With 
the Lisbon Treaty the EU has committed itself – yet again – to attaining a coherent external policy that
intertwines security and development concerns, on the basis of national development and foreign 
policies as well as the EU’s development and foreign policies. 
The continued salience of this problématique was again underlined during the negotiations on setting 
up the EEAS in 2009-2010. Both from an institutional and a substantive perspective, many were 
worried about the impact of the new structures born from the Lisbon Treaty. On the substantive side, 
many in the development community have been worried that the position of Baroness Ashton in the 
CFSP and the Commission was a ruse of the Member States o ensure that aid resources previously 
managed by the Commission would be used for strategically directed objectives rather than long-term 
structural development objectives.3 For example, Oxfam International’s EU office argued that giving 
decision-making power to the EEAS over the EU’s development budget risked making poverty 
objectives hostage to foreign policy goals.4 From an institutional perspective, authors like M. Smith 
have argued that the new structures would do nothing but ‘set back’ by a number of years the 
                                                   
2  European Parliament, Council, Commission, Joint Sta ement by the Council and the representatives of the governments 
of the Member States meeting within the Council, theEuropean Parliament and the Commission on European 
Development Policy: The European Consensus[2006] OJ C 46/1, para 34; Report on the Implementation of the European 
Security Strategy, Providing Security in a Changing World, Brussels, S407/08, 11 December 2008, 8; European Security 
Strategy, A Secure Europe in a Better World, 12 December 2003, 2. 
3  R Youngs, ‘Fusing Security and Development: Just Another Euro-Platitude?’ (2008) 30 Journal of European Integration 
(2008) 419, 432. 
4  Quoted in Euractiv, The EU’s new diplomatic service - Positions, 9 July 2010, www.euractiv.com/en/future-eu/eus-new-
diplomatic-service-linksdossier-309484. 
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organically grown interconnections between former EC and ESDP policies.5 As an example he quotes 
operation Atalanta: to ensure that countries were willing to accept pirates captured by the Member 
States’ navies operating under the EU flag, the Commission proposed to offer development aid as an 
incentive to African countries in the region. Smith then argues that the Lisbon Treaty has stirred up so 
much dust that old institutional struggles have been revived, so that each institution has fallen back to 
old defensive positions to ensure not losing control over respective competences. 
In the next section, I succinctly map how the post-Li bon reshuffle has shaped the EEAS and 
Commission institutional structures in the field of security and development.  This will then serve as 
the basis for an analysis of how an initiative in the field of small arms and light weapons might be 
channelled through this set-up. 
2.1. Reshuffling the Institutions, and the Impact on External Policy Coherence? 
Looking at the organization chart as of 24 February 2011, we can observe that through the transfer of 
parts of the Council General Secretariat, Commission DG RELEX and parts of DG Development, the 
EEAS has been organized in region-specific DG’s flanked by a single multilateral DG. Additionally, 
by the time the EEAS reaches its full capacity, staff coming from the Member States, Council 
Secretariat and Commission will each compose one third of the EEAS’ staff both at headquarters and 
in the delegations.6 This new configuration is expected to ‘create synergies and efficiency gains’7 yet it 
also raises a number of issues from the perspective of policy coherence. First of all, at the top of the 
hierarchy, a number of Commissioners are at least prtially involved in aspects of security and/or 
development, alongside Baroness Ashton: Commissioner for development Andris Piebalgs shares 
common ground with Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis 
Response, Kristalina Georgieva. Alongside them is Stefan Fule, responsible for enlargement and 
neighbourhood policy. These Commission colleagues will have to work very closely with Ashton, the 
primus inter pares in EU external relations. Secondly, at the civil servant level, it is then notable that in 
the new EU external policy structure Stefan Fule remains the Commissioner for enlargement a d the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (which has a clear security rationale),8 but that his DG remains 
organized solely around its enlargement responsibilities. This while current Directorates D, E and F of 
the former DG RELEX have become  part of the EEAS, and those were DG Relex’ Directorates that 
used to fall under Benita Ferrero-Waldner’s responsibility, respectively working on: European 
neighbourhood policy coordination, Eastern Europe, the Southern Caucasus and the Southern 
Mediterranean. Additionally, the more recently set up Task force on the Eastern partnership will also 
be transferred to the EEAS.9 Hence, the implementing staff for the key EU regional security policy 
will be part of the EEAS, while the top political post for this policy remains within the Commission. 
At the level of financing, this is interesting in light of Article 9(5) of the Council Decision setting up 
the EEAS.10 This article sets out the decision-making in the context of the ‘European Neighbourhood 
and Partnership Instrument’ and states that proposals for programming shall be prepared jointly by the
relevant EEAS and Commission services under the responsibility of the Commissioner responsible for 
Neighbourhood Policy, and will be submitted jointly with the HR for adoption by the Commission. 
                                                   
5  M Smith, presentations at the conference on the EEAS in Maastricht, November 2010, and EUSA conference i  Boston, 
March 2011. 
6  European Commission, Draft amending Budget No. 6, COM(2010) 315 final, Brussels, 17.6.2010, 5. 
7  European Commission, Draft amending Budget No. 6, COM(2010) 315 final, Brussels, 17.6.2010, 5. At the prss 
conference of the Gymnich-format meeting on foreign affairs of 10 September 2010, HRVP Ashton confirmed that she 
expects financial efficiency gains of at least 10 per cent. 
8  M Cremona and C Hillion, ‘L’Union fait la force? Potential and Limitations of the European Neighbourhood Policy as an 
Integrated EU Foreign and Security Policy’, EUI Law Working Paper 2006/39. 
9  Annex to the Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the 
European External Action Service [2010] OJ L 201/30. 
10  Idem. 
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However, the relevant services of the Commission are now largely located within the EEAS, except 
for Stefan Fule himself. Thirdly and finally, a similar observation can be made as regards development 
policy: significant parts of Piebalgs’ DG Development have been transferred to the EEAS, with DG 
DEV since 1 January 2011 having been merged with EuropeAid into ‘DG DEVCO’.  Two 
Directorates were transferred to the EEAS in their entirety: Directorate D for West and Central Africa, 
the Carribean and OCTs (excluding OCTs however)11 and Directorate E for the Horn of Africa, East 
and Southern Africa, and the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. Directorate C on general affairs is partially 
transferred to the EEAS: from DG C1 on Aid programming and management, the programming staff 
is transferred; and from DG C2 on Pan-African issue and institutions, governance and migration, the 
staff on Panafrican issues will go to the EEAS. DG C3 on economic governance and budget support 
thus remains in the Commission. The nature of the new DG Development is therefore one of a purely 
thematic nature, with a strong focus on aid management. Along with EuropAid, former Directorates A 
and B constitute the new slimmed down DG: Directorate A on horizontal issues of development 
covered forward looking studies, policy coherence, aid effectiveness, and relations with international 
organizations; Directorate B on thematic issues covered issues such as: infrastructure development, 
sustainable management of natural resources and human development.   
To summarize, from an institutional perspective, policy coherence in security and development will 
require synergies between the following substructures of the EU’s external relations machinery: first 
the CSDP structures which are something of an outlier w thin the EEAS; second, DG Africa and DG 
North Africa of the EEAS; third, within the EEAS’ DG on global and multilateral issues, the desks on 
Human Rights & Democracy and Conflict Prevention & Security Policy will need to be involved; 
fourth, the EEAS has a separate service (DG?) for Foreign policy instruments, including a separate 
desk for CFSP operations  and a desk for Stability Instrument operations; fifth, on the Commission 
side, coordination will be required with the thematic desks of DG DEVCO – to the extent that they 
remain in place, as well as its important function n administering aid; sixth and finally, the Union 
delegations will take instructions from EEAS headquarters and the Commission in the exercise of each 
of their competences:12 Such is the EU’s institutional recipe for coherence in the security – 
development nexus. 
2.2. The Small Arms Dispute: Origins in Policy and Impact of the European Court of Justice 
Judgment Under the Nice Treaty 
The rationale of the Lisbon Treaty for the position of Baroness Ashton and the EEAS as a whole was 
to reduce inter-institutional strife to a minimum so as to attain a single EU external voice.13 To 
examine whether the EEAS will over time provide theEU the capacity to deliver on the promise of 
policy coherence, the much-publicized dispute over th  provision of financial support to the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS)14 serves as a useful basis for a hypothetical scenario 
of guiding an initiative through the EU’s new institu onal set-up. Before doing so, a brief introduction 
to the policy setting of that conflict is necessary. 
In the European Union’s Strategy to combat small arms and light weapons (‘SALW’) adopted in 
2005,15 it is explained that current day wars are conducted by opportunistic factions whose main tools 
are small arms and light weapons rather than traditional armies using heavy weaponry. The abundant 
                                                   
11  OCT’s are overseas countries and territories connected to the Member States. 
12  Art. 5(3) EEAS Council Decision. 
13  For the discussion on the different options and reasons for the new position of High Representative / Vice Presendent see: 
The European Convention, Final Report of Working Group VII on External Action, CONV 459/02, Brussels, 16 
December 2002, (Detailed Report of the discussions), 16. 
14  Case C-91/05 Commission v Council (SALW) [2008] ECR I-03651. 
15  Council of the European Union, EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons and their Ammunition, 5319/06 (13 January 2006). 
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presence of these light weapons has grave consequences in a wide array of fields: weakening of State 
structures, displacement of persons, collapse of health and education services, declining economic 
activity, damage in social fabric, and in the long term the reduction or withholding of development 
aid; all trends which significantly affect sub-Saharan Africa.16  Thus, in 1998, ECOWAS had adopted 
a Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light weapons, renewed in 2001.  
That initiative had, however, significant weaknesses, the principal reason for its limited success being 
its non-binding, voluntary nature.17 At a summit in Dakar on 20 January 2003, there wasthu  a 
decision by the ECOWAS heads of State and government to transform this Moratorium into a legally-
binding Convention. Subsequently, on the part of certain Member States with strong interests in the 
region, there was the desire to follow up on this decision and ensure that they be seen to actively 
support this initiative. Subsequently, the Council Decision of 2 December 2004 was adopted, an 
instrument which has since provided a contribution of 515.000 Euro towards setting up a technical 
secretariat within ECOWAS to convert this moratorium into a binding convention between ECOWAS 
member states.18 
However, in parallel, the Commission was also active in this area.19 Pursuant to Arts. 6 to 10 of Annex 
IV to the Cotonou Agreement, ‘Implementation and Management Procedures’, a regional cooperation 
strategy and a regional indicative programme were laid out in a document signed on 19 February 2003 
by the Commission on the one hand, and by the ECOWAS and the West African Economic and 
Monetary Union (WAEMU) on the other. This document made note of the existing moratorium, and 
further stated that support could be given by the Community to support in implementing this 
moratorium. Following a request from ECOWAS, in 2004, the Commission started preparing a 
financing proposal for conflict prevention and peac-building operations.20 According to the 
Commission, the largest single block of this financing was to be allocated to the ECOWAS Small 
Arms Control Programme. 
Against that background, an EU-internal dispute arose between the Commission and the Council 
running along the security–development competence fault line. Consequently, at the time of the 
adoption of the CFSP Decision, the Commission made the following declaration which targeted not 
just the validity of the Decision taken with regard to ECOWAS, but also the 2002 Joint Action21 which 
provided a broad basis for other CFSP actions with regard to small arms: 
‘In the view of the Commission this Joint Action should not have been adopted and the project 
ought to have been financed from the 9th [European Development Fund (EDF)] under the Cotonou 
Agreement. This is clearly borne out by Article 11(3) of the Cotonou Agreement which 
specifically mentions the fight against the accumulation of small arms and light weapons as a 
relevant activity. It is also reflected in the annotation to the relevant CFSP budget line (19 03 02) 
in the 2004 budget, which excludes CFSP financing of such projects if they “are already covered 
by the provisions of the Cotonou Agreement […]. The Joint Action for financing under CFSP 
would have been eligible under the 9th EDF and fully coherent with the regional indicative 
programme with ECOWAS. This is demonstrated by the fact that the Commission is already 
                                                   
16  Council of the European Union, EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons and their Ammunition, 4. 
17  I Berkol, Analysis of the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons and recommendations for the 
development of an Action Plan, Note d'Analyse - Groupe de Recherche et d'Information sur la Paix et la Sécurité (April 
2007) 1. 
18  Council Decision 2004/833/CFSP of 2 December 2004 implementing Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP with a view to a 
European Union contribution to ECOWAS in the framework f the Moratorium on Small Arms and Light Weapons 
[2004] OJ L359/65, Art. 1. 
19  Opinion of Mr Advocate General Mengozzi, Case C-91/05, paras. 7-9. 
20  Opinion of Mr Advocate General Mengozzi, Case C-91/05, para. 8. 
21  Council Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP of 12 July 2002 on the European Union's contribution to combating the
destabilizing accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons and repealing Joint Action 1999/34/CFSP [2002] 
OJ L 191/1, 1. 
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preparing a financing proposal for an indicative amount of EUR 1.5 million to support the 
implementation of the ECOWAS moratorium on small arms and light weapons (SALW).Finally, 
the Joint Action falls within the shared competences on which Community development policy 
and the Cotonou Agreement are based. Such areas of shared competences are just as much 
protected by Art. 47 [EU] (now Art. 40(1) TEU) as the areas of exclusive Community 
competence; otherwise Art. 47 would be deprived of a large part of its useful effect. The 
Commission reserves its rights in this matter.’22 
From a legal perspective, the Commission thus opined that should such action be undertaken, this 
ought not to be done as a CFSP measure but rather by the Community within the framework of the 
Cotonou Agreement. It argued that the Council had violated Art. 47 TEU (Nice version), which stated 
that nothing in the Treaty on European Union shall affect the Community Treaty. The Council went 
ahead with the Council Decision because mainly the French Government and to some extent the 
British Government were keen on acting immediately.23 To that end a Council Decision was adopted 
on the basis of a previously adopted Joint Action of 2002. Subsequently, the Commission brought 
proceedings challenging the validity not only of that particular Council Decision,24 but also of the 
foundational 2002 Joint Action relating to operations designed to discourage dissemination of 
SALW.25 Through this infringement action, it sought ‘annulment for lack of competence’ on the basis 
of Art. 47 TEU-Nice, since ‘the impugned CFSP decision […] affects the Community powers in the 
field of development aid’.26  The resolution of the conflict thus revolved around the interpretation 
given to Art. 47 TEU-Nice which stated that ‘nothing in this Treaty shall affect the Treaties 
establishing the European Communities’ (emphasis added).  In line with previous inter-pillar case law 
the Court of Justice ruled that a measure with legal ffects adopted under Title V infringes Art. 47 
TEU-Nice ‘whenever it could have been adopted on the basis of the EC Treaty’.27 
In a contribution discussing the post-Lisbon impact of that judgment, I pointed to the new Art. 40 TEU 
(Lisbon version), and argued that the new setting has largely invalidated that judgment.28 Given that 
the Lisbon Treaty setting accords equal legal value to CFSP and former EC competences, such 
disputes could no longer arise. Or rather, they would take on a different form, and hence the 
hypothetical in this contribution: how might this dispute have played out – or would it have occurred 
at all - under the new legal and institutional structures? 
2.3. The Small Arms Dispute Under the Lisbon Treaty: A New Dawn for EU External Relations?  
The above overview of the institutional reshuffle has already indicated that the dividing line between 
development and security persists regardless of the EEAS having been set up to ensure greater 
                                                   
22  Quoted in Opinion of Mr Advocate General Mengozzi, Case C-91/05, para. 23 
23  House of Lords European Union Committee, Europe in the World, 48th Report of Session 2005-2006, Oral Evidence of 
Professor A. Dashwood, October 12th 2006, Question 179 at 45. 
24  Council Decision 2004/833/CFSP of 2 December 2004 implementing Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP with a view to a 
European Union contribution to ECOWAS in the framework f the Moratorium on Small Arms and Light Weapons 
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coherence in EU external action. The same can be said of the programming cycle in development:  
The preamble of the Council Decision setting up the EEAS states in its paragraph four that the EEAS 
should ensure that in its contribution to EU external cooperation programmes it ‘respects’ the 
objectives laid down in Arts. 21(2)(d) TEU and 208 TFEU. The first Article is the general obligation 
of all EU external policies foster sustainable social, economic and environmental development and 
poverty eradication. The second Article is the objectiv  of poverty eradication connected specifically 
to the EU’s competence in development policy laid down in the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
Union. The preamble adds that the EEAS should also promote the European consensus on 
development and that on humanitarian aid.  
Already in the Member States’ consensus document under the Swedish Presidency in October 2009, it 
was clear that Member States wished that the EEAS would play a strategic role in the programming 
and implementation of financial instruments contributing to what has been called ‘structural 
diplomacy’.29 Namely, the EEAS would not only contribute to tasks taken over by Baroness Ashton 
which had traditionally fallen to Javier Solana, but also to those which had largely been overseen by 
Benita Ferrero-Waldner and Louis Michel, the long term engagements of the Union with third 
countries and other regions in which it seeks to shape the political and socio-economic structures in 
line with its own values. According to the EEAS Council Decision, the EU diplomatic service is thus 
to be involved in a number of geographical and thematic instruments on the basis of which the Union 
programs, plans and implements funding for its external policies. The key article in the Council 
Decision setting up the EEAS is Art. 9, on ‘External Action Instruments and programming’. Paragraph 
one of that Article starts out with a provision of questionable utility for attaining coherence across the 
security-development nexus: the management of the EU’s external cooperation programmes remains 
under the responsibility of the Commission, but this is ‘without prejudice to the respective roles of the
Commission and of the EEAS in programming as set out in the following paragraphs.’30 Art. 9 of the 
EEAS Decision continues by stating that: ‘The High Representative shall ensure overall political 
coordination of the Union's external action, ensuring the unity, consistency and effectiveness of the 
Union's external action, in particular through the following external assistance instruments.’ Thereafter 
it enumerates these instruments:  
‘– the Development Cooperation Instrument, 
– the European Development Fund, 
– the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, 
– the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, 
– the Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialised Countries2, 
– the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation3, 
– the Instrument for Stability, regarding the assistance provided for in Article 4 of 
Regulation (EC) No 1717/20064.’31 
The third paragraph of Art. 9 is then essential for the present purposes, where it sets out how the 
EEAS shall collaborate with the Commission. Specifically, the diplomatic service will ‘contribute’ to 
the programming and management cycle for the instruments referred to above, ‘on the basis of the 
policy objectives set out in those instruments’.32 Its responsibility is to prepare decisions of the 
Commission regarding the strategic, multi-annual step  within the programming cycle at three specific 
stages: 
                                                   
29  S Keukeleire, M Smith and S Vanhoonacker, ‘The Emerging EU system of diplomacy: How fit for purpose?’, DSEU 
Policy Paper 1, 1. 
30  EEAS Council Decision Art. 9(1). 
31  EEAS Council Decision Art. 9(2). 
32  EEAS Council Decision Art. 9(3). 
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‘(i) country allocations to determine the global financial envelope for each region, subject to the 
indicative breakdown of the multiannual financial framework. Within each region, a proportion of 
funding will be reserved for regional programmes; 
(ii) country and regional strategic papers; 
(iii) national and regional indicative programmes.’33 
The Article then adds: ‘In accordance with Article 3, throughout the whole cycle of programming, 
planning and implementation of the instruments refer d to in paragraph 2, the High Representative 
and the EEAS shall work with the relevant members and services of the Commission without 
prejudice to Article 1(3).’ In keeping with the institutions’ and Member States’ insatiable need to 
delineate competences, the reference to Art. 1(3) is a reminder that the EEAS is placed under the 
authority of the High Representative, separate from the Council and the Commission.  The reference 
to Art. 3 is a reference to the duty of cooperation existing between the EEAS and the Council.   
Let us assume now that the EU should wish to support ECOWAS financially in rendering a 
moratorium on the sale of illegal arms legally binding. The date is 1 January 2012. The EEAS has 
been working for one year, the relevant personnel transferred, nothing in the implementation of the 
CFSP is to affect development policy and vice-versa (Art. 40 TEU), policy circumstances in Western 
Africa are as previously described, and the EU wishes to deal with the small arms-ECOWAS issue in a 
coherent fashion.  
To provide funding for such an instrument, a choice would have to be made already early on during 
the drafting process: should this be taken as a CFSP measure on the basis of the 2002 Joint Action; 
should it be considered as falling under the general development cooperation with the ACP countries, 
and therefore be funded through the European Development fund as proposed by the Commission 
back in 2004; or rather, should this be undertaken on the basis of the Instrument for Stability adopted 
in 2006, as part of conflict prevention and peacebuilding objectives? The rationale behind the EEAS is 
then that the integrated institutional framework would provide the forum and necessary institutional 
interconnections to avoid that this choice become a dispute going to the heart of the EU’s legally 
fragmented nature. The problem is then that because the security-development fault line continues to 
exist from a competence perspective,34 there remains much room for what M. Smith called ‘falling 
back to former defensive positions’ on part of the rather fragmented institutional framework as 
outlined above. 
The aforementioned Art. 9 then pinpoints the moment in the policy process where a dispute such as 
that in ECOWAS could, or should, be avoided: the obligation for the EEAS and the Commission to 
jointly and actively cooperate in completing the first three stages of the development programming 
cycle. At present, actions to prevent illicit trade in small arms are included in the 2009-2011 multi-
annual indicative programme implementing Art. 4 (the long-term component) of the Instrument for 
Stability.35 More specifically, such actions are included in Priority 2 on trans-regional threats, under 
project area 11.36 As to the institutional management of the Instrument for Stability, the short term and 
long term component were managed differently:  The s ort term has in the past been managed by DG 
RELEX staff, which now moved to the EEAS; whereas of the long term component of priorities 1 and 
2 have been managed by EuropeAid, and priority 3 ofthe long-term component by DG Relex. In the 
current institutional set-up, DG DEVCO remains responsible for management of development aid, 
therefore including small arms initiatives under the Instrument for Stability. However, the 
Commission decision whether to include small arms in the post-2011 indicative programme under the 
instrument for stability will from now on be ‘prepared’ by the EEAS, in line with Art. 9 of the EEAS 
Council Decision. It is this clustering of the strategic or thematic decision-making that is meant to 
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avoid disputes such as ECOWAS in the future. However, as seen, the new DG DEVCO has a strong 
thematic component to it, and thus the divide betwen CFSP and development competences from the 
TEU and TFEU remains mirrored in the institutional structures of the EU. On the one hand, where 
EuropeAid formerly fell under the responsibility of the Commissioner for external relations, this has 
now been moved to the portfolio of Commissioner Piebalgs for development. Hence, within the 
Commission there remains in place a DG DEVCO with strong development expertise.  On the other 
hand, EuropeAid’s former colleagues from the geographic desks at DG DEV are now part of the 
EEAS, with responsibility for the strategic multi-annual planning aspects. The present multi-annual 
indicative programme on the Instrument for Stability runs until 2011. That instance could thus provide 
the ideal moment at which the EEAS and the Commission could reach agreement on avoiding 
conflicts related to small arms. Notably if drawn up in the context of broader inter-service discussion  
on the new interrelationship, this should aid in alleviating or even resolving the deep disagreement on 
the develop-security nexus, which as the instance of the revision of the Instrument for Stability shows, 
still remains problematic. However, legally and institutionally, the pillars remain firmly in place inthe 
security-development nexus. As a consequence, coherenc  as avoiding conflicts in matters such as 
small arms will not depend on legal rules, but squarely on the willingness to compromise of all 
involved – and avoiding falling back to old defensive positions. 
No hypothetical exercise can speculate on the concrete effect of novel legal rules and a new 
institutional set-up. However, sufficiently illustra ive of the willingness to reach across the pillar rift 
have been discussions on the Stability Instrument following the ECOWAS judgment.  Namely, in 
April 2009 the Commission proposed to revise the instrument for stability in line with the ECOWAS 
Judgment. In the words of that institution: ‘The Court found that measures against the proliferation of 
small arms and light weapons may be implemented by the Community under its development policy.’37 
On the basis of a joint statement made in 2006 when t  Instrument for Stability was adopted, the 
Commission wishes to see Arts. 3(2)(i) and 4(1)(a) revised to refer explicitly to small arms and light 
weapons. Art. 3 concerns assistance in response to crisis situations or emerging crises, and Art. 4 
concerns assistance in the context of stable conditi s for cooperation.  
Hence, according to the Commission, the Community is now competent to undertake initiatives such 
as in the case of small arms and ECOWAS on the basis of the Stability Instrument. Translated to the 
post-Lisbon situation this now means that such action is to be undertaken under the TFEU 
development competences rather than the TEU CFSP competence. However, it is clear that even after 
that ruling, the Council and the Commission are in thorough disagreement on the interpretation of the 
ECJ judgment. Even now, it is unclear who is responible for initiatives in relation to small arms. The 
key point of interpretative contention between Council and Commission has been ever since the 
statement towards the end of the judgment which read th t ‘the contested joint action which the 
contested decision aims to implement does not itself exclude the possibility that the objective of the 
campaign against the proliferation of small arms and light weapons can be achieved by Community 
measures’.38 The inter-institutional debate then revolved around whether ‘can’ is to be read as 
optional, in that it leaves a choice; or whether it means that from then onwards SALW initiatives 
always fall within the remit of development competenc . In past contributions this author has argued 
that the answer is the first, and at the time of writing there has been no movement on this revision to 
the Stability Instrument and the dossier remains on the desk of Baroness Ashton.39 
Would this initiative be undertaken on the basis of the Instrument for Stability, this would be done on 
the basis of Art. 4, which allows for assistance in the context of stable conditions for cooperation such 
as is the case with ECOWAS. Given that the EEAS is involved in the strategy of regional and country 
allocations over one year or longer, such concrete conflicts are not necessarily avoided through the 
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39  See B Van Vooren, ‘The Small Arms Judgment in an Age of Constitutional Turmoil’ 231. 
Bart Van Vooren 
28 
new structures. When all is said and done, a decision till needs to be made on whether such an 
initiative falls within the sphere of development policy, or whether it falls within the sphere of the 
CFSP. This is so because Art. 40 TEU states that nothing in the EU Treaty is to affect competences in 
the TFEU, and vice-versa. Hence, if no agreement at service level is attained, the Council could still 
adopt it on the initiative of the High Representative, without the Commission’s support (Art. 30 TEU). 
It is then exactly the double-hatted role of Baroness Ashton which should avoid such a potentiality, 
since it would be rather schizophrenic to submit it as High Representative, in conflict with her role as 
vice-president of the Commission.  It would also put her in a tense relationship with her colleagues 
(notably Commissioner Piebalgs), generally considere  a heavyweight Commissioner who in the past 
has been quite active in external relations as energy Commissioner. The political undesirability of a 
strained relationship between Mr. Piebalgs and Baroness Ashton is then the means through which the 
new institutional structures are supposed to provide a greater guarantee to avoid conflicts such as that 
seen in the small arms dispute. The individual servic s may not have been fully integrated, but due to 
the links at the political echelons of the Commission, between the HRVP and the other 
Commissioners, deep rifts may indeed be avoided where previously they would not have been. That, 
of course, is speculation on the working relationship  of actors fulfilling newly created positions, and 
does not detract from the fact that, given the formulation of the Stability Instrument as it stands, and 
with the present case law on EU Treaty law, there is still no clarity on the exact dividing line in case of 
blurred security-development objectives. As such, institutional divisions and fragmented competences 
across the TEU and TFEU remain as potential breeding ground for such conflicts in the post-Lisbon 
era.  
3. Conclusions 
No inter-institutional reconfiguration is perfect, as it is a necessary compromise between the many 
different institutional and Member State interests involved. Significant divisions remain between 
policy areas that are undoubtedly interconnected: tra e was always seen as separate from the EEAS;40 
parts of development go to the EEAS, parts remain with the Commission; energy remains with the 
Commission, though of a clear security concern for the Union as a whole. EU external relations have 
always developed in a piecemeal fashion, as a Harlequin’s costume of failed or successful initiatives, 
institutional and political innovations, ad hoc resolutions in response to geopolitical and socio-
economic stimuli within and outside the Union. This is exactly the case with the EEAS as well. In 
many areas the new diplomatic service has merged elments that used to function separately, the 
Council Decision apportions responsibility in a relatively clear yet flexible fashion, and the EEAS 
does provide a good basis for further cooperation. The example of small arms has shown that 
coherence in EU external relations now lies beyond the realm of legal and institutional tinkering: 
without willingness to collaborate and compromise, th  ever-present calls for increased coherence and 
effectiveness in EU external relations will never rach beyond the point of rhetoric. The role of the 
EEAS as an interlocutor between various desks, services and institutions, and the merger of staff from 
the three key spheres of authority in EU external relations does provide good ground for avoiding 
conflicts, but several years of practice will be necessary before that is true. 
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Restraints on Member States’ Powers Within the EEAS: 
A Duty to Form a Common Position? 
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Abstract 
Although the coming into being of the European External Action Service (EEAS) does not have any 
impact on the distribution of competences between the EU and the Member States in matters of 
foreign policy, cooperation within the framework of the EEAS could nevertheless lead to significant 
procedural restraints on the Member States in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) area 
flowing from the duty of sincere cooperation. Drawing on case law of the Court of Justice from the 
former first pillar, the paper seeks to argue that special procedural duties exist in situations governed 
by inter-institutional agreements aimed at ensuring cooperation between the European Union (EU) and 
the Member States on the international scene. Similar restraints, it will be argued, can apply within the
framework of the EEAS by analogy. In practice, this could lead to a more significant role for the 
Commission in the EU decision-making process concerning foreign policy. 
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1. Introduction  
Two non-legally binding Declarations on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) inserted in 
the Final Act concluding the Lisbon Treaty strike a rather cautious note on the part of the Member 
States vis-à-vis the European External Action Servic  (EEAS).1 The first stresses that the provisions 
on CFSP including the creation of the post of the High Representative and of the EEAS will not 
‘affect the responsibilities of the Member States, a  they currently exist, for the formulation and 
conduct of their foreign policy nor of their national representation in third countries and 
international organisations’.2  
The second affirms that they will 
‘not affect the existing legal basis, responsibilities, and power of each Member State in relation to 
the formulation and conduct of its foreign policy, its national diplomatic service, relations with 
third countries and participation in international organisations, including a Member State’s 
membership of the Security Council of the United Nations’.3  
This emphasis on the retention by the Member States of their foreign policy powers reflects the 
Member States' unwillingness to relinquish their prerogatives of sovereignty in the area of CFSP. 
                                                   
*  PhD candidate, European University Institute. 
1  Final Act, conference of the Representatives of the Member States, CIG 15/07, 3 December 2007, Declarations 
concerning provisions of the treaties, Declaration n . 13 and 14 concerning the CFSP. 
2  Final Act, conference of the Representatives of the Member States, CIG 15/07, 3 December 2007, Declarations 
concerning provisions of the treaties, Declaration n . 13. 
3  Final Act, conference of the Representatives of the Member States, CIG 15/07, 3 December 2007, Declarations 
concerning provisions of the treaties, Declaration n . 14. 
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However, as far as the Member States' participation in the EEAS is concerned, fears of diminishing 
foreign policy powers appear unfounded. Fundamentally, neither the Lisbon Treaty nor the setting-up 
of the EEAS have changed the decision-making procedures relating to EU external policy. Matters 
which until now were the reserve of the Union are still mainly driven by the Commission, while CFSP 
policy matters generally continue to be decided by unanimity in the Council.4 Since the EEAS does 
not streamline the distribution of competences or the differences in decision-making procedures, all 
initiatives prepared by the EEAS, therefore, still require the approval of the appropriate decision-
making authorities of the Union.  
In view of the fact that the changes brought about by he establishment of the EEAS are mainly of a 
procedural nature, the question arises whether the institutionalised cooperation between the staff of the 
Member States, the Commission and the Council that have hitherto acted more in competition than in 
cooperation, will in itself be able to generate a more efficient and better coordinated EU external 
action. This contribution seeks to argue that it is precisely the fact that the cooperation between the 
Member States and the EU institutions has become institutionalised which opens up new ways of 
imposing an enhanced duty of cooperation on the diff rent actors within the EEAS.   
The aim of the present paper is therefore to assess th  impact of the EEAS on the Member States' 
freedom to exercise their foreign policy powers. Drawing on case law of the Court of Justice from the 
former first pillar, it will be argued that special procedural duties exist where cooperation between th  
Member States and the EU institutions on the external scene has been institutionalised. In such a 
setting, the Union's international commitments are of an ongoing nature, requiring strict procedural 
conduct from the Member States from the moment in which a common strategy has been formed at the 
level of one of the EU institutions. Similar restraints, it is submitted, can apply within the framework 
of the EEAS by analogy, with the result that a strategy or policy developed by the EEAS which has 
not yet been adopted in a Council Decision imposes an obligation on the Member States to act in 
conformity with the Union position adopted. In practice, this could lead to a more significant role for 
the Commission in the EU decision-making process concerning foreign policy. 
To that end, section two will seek to establish a framework for the analogous application of the duty of 
sincere cooperation to the EEAS by addressing the question whether we can characterise the EEAS as 
an inter-institutional arrangement for our purposes. Section three will then look at how the Court of 
Justice has shaped the duty of sincere cooperation in areas of institutionalised cooperation into a duty 
to form a common position. The question then arises to what extent the Court's interpretation of the 
duty of sincere cooperation from the former first pillar can be transposed to the area of CFSP which 
remains intergovernmental in nature.5 This question will be addressed in section four. The final section 
will attempt an assessment of the impact of the establi hment of the EEAS on the Member States' duty 
of loyalty in the area of CFSP.  
2. The Framework of Restraints – The EEAS as an Inter-institutional Arrangement 
As already noted, the EEAS does not significantly affect the distribution of competences between the 
Member States and the Union and the decision-making procedures relating to CFSP. However, the 
mere fact that no transfer of competences has taken place does not allow for the conclusion that the 
Member States' freedom to act is not subject to any legal restraints. As Dashwood has put it, ‘duties or 
                                                   
4  According to Art. 31(2) TEU, recourse to qualified majority voting is only foreseen for the adoption f a Decision 
defining a Union action or position, on a proposal which the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy has presented following a specific request from the European Council, made on its own initiative or that 
of the High Representative.  
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  According to Art. 24(1) TEU, the CFSP remains ‘subject to specific rules and procedures’. Similarly, the ‘mutual non-
affectation clause’ of Art. 40 TEU emphasizes the distinction between the CFSP and other EU policies. Se further e.g. P 
Van Elsuwege, ‘EU External Action after the Collapse of the Pillar Structure: In Search of a new Balance between 
Delimitation and Consistency’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 987, 1013. 
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disabilities for the Member States do not imply correlative powers for the [Union]’.6 The starting point 
for any analysis of such duties is the duty of loyaty to the Union in CFSP- related matters laid down 
in Art. 24(3) TEU,7 a lex specialis provision of the duty of sincere cooperation found i  Art. 4(3) TEU 
(ex Art. 10 EC)8 governing the exercise of Member State powers under the former first pillar. The duty 
of loyalty under Art. 4(3) TEU  is generally considered a constitutional principle of Union law and has 
been subject to a wide-ranging application and development by the Court of Justice in a multitude of 
different settings and levels.9 The same cannot be said of the CFSP specific obligation contained in 
Art. 24 TEU. The Court's fundamental role in vesting the vague notion of Union loyalty with content 
has virtually been absent as far as Art. 24 TEU is concerned, due to the limited jurisdiction granted to 
the Court in matters relating to the CFSP.10 In order to assess the operation of the CFSP loyalty 
obligation in a given setting, the most substantial guidance is provided by the Court's jurisprudence on 
the related obligation from the former first pillar. 
However, even within the former first pillar the scope of the loyalty obligation and the precise legal 
obligations it gives rise to may differ significantly depending on the specific legal context11. As we 
will see below, an inter-institutional arrangement be ween the Commission and the Council may be 
considered a “start of concerted action” at Union leve , imposing strict procedural constraints on the 
Member States, even in fields in which the Member States have retained competence. Where such 
concerted action is initiated within an institutionalised setting, i.e. within a framework establishing 
ongoing obligations for all the parties involved, such constraints appear to be even more stringent.  
For our purposes, the EEAS can be considered an inter-institutional arrangement established with a 
view to ensuring uniform representation of the Union and the Member States on the international 
                                                   
6  A Dashwood, ‘The Limits of European Community Powers’ (1996) 21 European Law Review 113, at 114: ‘[T]he 
objectives of the Treaty are not exclusively pursued through actions of the Community institutions: theM mber States, 
too, have a part to play through the observance of rules that require them sometimes to take action, but more often to 
refrain from exercising, or from exercising fully, powers that would normally be available to them as incidents of 
sovereignty’. 
7  Art. 24(3) TEU provides: ‘The Member States shall support the Union's external a d security policy actively and 
unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the Union's action in this area. The 
Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain from any 
action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesiv  force in 
international relations. The Council and the High Representative shall ensure compliance with these princi les’. 
8  Art. 4(3) TEU: ‘Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual 
respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties. The Member States shall t ke any 
appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensur  fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting 
from the acts of the institutions of the Union. The M mber States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union's tasks and 
refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's objectives’. 
9  See e.g. J Temple Lang, ‘Article 5 of the EEC Treaty: the emergence of constitutional principles in the case-law of the 
Court of Justice’ (1987) 10 Fordham International Law Journal 503; K Mortelmans, ‘The principle of loyalty to the 
Community (Article 5 EC) and the obligations of the Community institutions’ (1998) 5 Maastricht Journal of European 
and Comparative Law 67; A Hatje, Loyalität als Rechtsprinzip in der Europäischen Union (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2001); 
J Temple Lang, ‘Developments, issues, and new remedies – The Duties of National Authorities and Courts nder Article 
10 of the EC Treaty’ (2004) 27 Fordham International Law Journal 1904. 
10  The Court’s jurisdiction in the area of CFSP is limited to the monitoring of Art. 40 TEU (the non-affect clause) and a 
review of legality of Decisions taken on the basis of Art. 275(2) TFEU (sanctions). See further, M G Garbagnati Ketvel, 
‘The Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in Respect of the Common Foreign and Security Policy’ (2006) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 77.  
11  For more on the duty of loyalty in the field of ext rnal relations, see, for example, M Cremona, ‘Defending the 
Community Interest: the Duties of Cooperation and Compliance’ in M Cremona and B De Witte (eds), EU Foreign 
Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2008) 163; ENeframi, ‘The Duty of Loyalty: 
Rethinking its Scope through its Application in theFi ld of EU External Relations’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 
323; C Hillion, ‘Mixity and Coherence in EU External Relations: the Significance of the “'Duty of Cooperation”’ in C 
Hillion and P Koutrakos (eds) Mixed Agreements Revisited – The EU and its Member States in the World (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing 2010) 87. 
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scene, comparable to arrangements governing the coordination of Member States' and Union interests 
under mixed agreements concluded under the former first pillar.12 While the TEU itself, in Art. 27(3), 
merely states that the Service 
‘shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States and shall comprise 
officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the [European] Council and of the 
Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States’, 
the EEAS Council Decision13 is more forthcoming. It provides in Art. 1 that the Service establishes a 
functionally autonomous body of the Union under the authority of the High Representative. The 
Decision, therefore, leaves no doubt that the EEAS is an autonomous body, operating separately both 
from the Council and the Commission. The Service has been described as an arrangement ‘bringing 
together the various actors in the field of external relations [in order to] ensure that [the Union's] 
relations with the outside world are clear, coherent a d driven by a single set of policy goals’14. 
Indeed, the EEAS is composed of representatives from the Commission and the Council and Member 
State diplomats representing the interests of theirome country. Therefore, the EEAS is not an intra-
institutional body responsible for attaining consensus among the Member States, but an inter-
institutional body, all under the authority of the High Representative. In other words, the Service is not 
an auxiliary body to the EU institutions. Neither does it have any powers delegated to it by the Union 
institutions. The new Diplomatic Service can be considered to be partly a preparatory organ to the 
institutions, and partly a forum for the international representation of the Union.  
We can thus identify two principal characteristics hat are significant for the present discussion. On the 
one hand, the EEAS is based on a tripartite structue, bringing together representatives from the 
Member States, the Council and the Commission in an i stitutionalised setting. On the other hand, the 
Service is not attached to any of the institutions. I tead, it is an explicitly autonomous body of an 
inter-institutional nature, aimed at establishing structures for the inter-institutional coordination i  
foreign policy-making. Against this background, it can be argued that the EEAS establishes a similar 
framework for the operation of the duty of loyalty to that governing the duty of sincere cooperation 
concerning the joint participation of the Union and the Member States under mixed agreements. It is 
firmly established in the case law of the Court of Justice that the Union and the Member States have 
an obligation of close cooperation in fulfilling the commitments undertaken by them under joint 
competence when they conclude a mixed agreement.15 One aspect of such duty is to strive for common 
positions.  
3. The Duty to Adopt a Union Position  
The Court of Justice has repeatedly emphasised that in si uations in which the subject-matter of a 
given agreement falls partly within the competence of the Union and partly within that of the Member 
States, it is  
                                                   
12  For a detailed discussion of the classification of the EEAS, see B Van Vooren, ‘A Legal-Institutional Perspective on the 
European External Action Service’ , CLEER Working Paper 2010/7 (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Instituut). 
13  Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External 
Action Service [2010] OJ L 201/30. 
14  Benita Ferrero-Waldner, former EU commissioner for external relations, www.euractiv.com/en/future-eu/eu-s-new-
diplomatic-service-linksdossier-309484 
15  See e.g. Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland (MOX Plant) [2006] ECR I-4635, para. 175. 
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‘essential to ensure close cooperation between the Member States and the Community institutions, 
both in the process of negotiation and conclusion and in the fulfilment of the commitments entered 
into’.16 
To that end, the Union institutions and the Member States are under an obligation to take ‘all 
necessary steps to ensure the best possible cooperati n in that regard’.17  
3.1. Concrete Union Law Obligations Before the Adopti n of a Common Position – The Start of 
Concerted Action  
Until recently, the case law of the Court of Justice on the duty of sincere cooperation between the 
Union institutions and the Member States remained rather general. The only guidance on the legal 
restraints as a result of a start of concerted action at Union level was provided by two cases, 
Commission v. Luxembourg and Commission v. Germany, concerning the negotiation, ratification and 
bringing into force of, as well as the refusal to terminate, by two Member States, bilateral agreements 
with third countries on inland waterway transport.18 The Court had held in these cases that the 
adoption by the Council of a decision authorising the Commission to negotiate a multilateral 
agreement on behalf of the Union marked the ‘start of a concerted [Union] action at international 
level’.19 This required  
‘if not a duty of abstention on the part of the Member States, at the very least a duty of close 
cooperation between the latter and the [Union] institutions in order to facilitate the achievement of 
the [Union] tasks and to ensure the coherence and co sistency of the action and its international 
representation’.20 
It follows from Commission v. Luxembourg and Commission v. Germany that in the context of 
negotiation of international agreements in areas of hared competence, the Member States are subject 
to special obligations only after the Council has adopted a decision.21 In other words, the submission 
of a Commission proposal is not sufficient to mark the start of concerted Union action.  
Recent case law, however, suggests that these obligations become even more stringent where such 
cooperation between the Commission, the Council and Member State representatives takes places 
within an institutionalised setting. In fact, within the framework of institutionalised cooperation, 
concrete Union law obligations have been found to exist even before the adoption of a common 
position, on the ground that a common strategy had been initiated.  
In the Swedish PFOS case22 which concerned the Union's participation in the Stockholm Convention 
on Persistent Organic Pollutants, a mixed agreement regulating substances that are harmful to the 
environment, the Court was asked to rule on the extnt of the Member States' obligations under Art. 4 
(3) TEU in an area of shared competence. While work was still ongoing at EU level concerning the 
same subject-matter, Sweden had unilaterally submitted a proposal to include a particular chemical 
substance (PFOs) in the annex of the Stockholm Convention. After an unsuccessful attempt at 
                                                   
16  Ruling 1/78 re Draft Convention of the International Atomic Energy Agency on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Materials, Facilities and Transports [1978] ECR 2151, paras. 34-36; Opinion 2/91, Convention No. 170 of the ILO 
[1993] ECR I-1061, para. 36; Opinion 1/94 re WTO Agreement [1994] ECR I-5267, para. 108. 
17  Opinion 2/91 Convention No. 170 of the ILO [1993] ECR I-1061, para. 38. 
18  Cases C-266/03 Commission v Luxembourg [2005] ECR I-4805 and C-433/03 Commission v Germany [2005] ECR I-
6985. 
19  Case C-266/03 Commission v Luxembourg, para. 60.  
20  Case C-266/03 Commission v Luxembourg, para. 60. 
21  This is true only in areas of shared competence. Where Union competence is exclusive, by contrast, Member States are 
subject to ‘special duties of action and abstention’ once the Commission has submitted to the Council ‘proposals which, 
although they have not been adopted by the Council, represent the point of departure for concerted Community action’, 
see Case 804/79 Commission v United Kingdom [1981] ECR I-1045, para. 28.  
22  Case C-246/07 Commission v Sweden, Judgement of 20 April 2010, not yet reported. 
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encouraging Sweden to comply with the formal notice all ging a breach of Art. 4(3) TEU, the 
Commission decided to start infringement proceedings before the Court of Justice.  
In the present case there was no formal decision regarding a proposal to include PFOs in the annex of 
the Stockholm Convention. Nevertheless, this did not mean that no concerted Union action had been 
initiated. In the view of the Court, the mere existence of a Union ‘strategy’ not to propose the listing of 
the substance in the context of the Convention was sufficient to impose special procedural obligations 
on the Member States.23 Examining whether such a strategy had already been adopted at the time 
when Sweden submitted its unilateral proposal, the Court found that there was ‘no “decision-making 
vacuum” or even a waiting period equivalent to the absence of a decision’, because it had been 
intended not to reach a decision not to add PFOs to the list of pr posed substances.24 There was, 
therefore, a ‘concerted common strategy’ within the Council not to propose the addition of PFOs to 
the Stockholm Convention, which Sweden ‘dissociated’ itself from by unilaterally submitting such a 
proposal.25  
In this case, we see a committee structure imposing gnificant restraints on the Member States. 
Within a specialised Council working group, the Member States and the Council agreed that no action 
was to be taken concerning this substance, because work was ongoing on the identification of control 
measures at EU level. In the specific context of institutionalised cooperation, a strategy adopted within 
the framework of a committee structure had the effect of precluding all unilateral national action.   
What emerges from the Court's case law is a broadly-framed procedural duty on the Member States 
once a concerted action has been initiated aimed at the adoption of a common Union position. Where 
cooperation between the Member States, the Commission and the Council in an institutionalised 
setting is concerned, however, the duty of sincere ooperation is more stringent in comparison with the 
way it operates in the context of the conclusion of international agreements.  
3.2. The Legal Effect of Inter-institutional Initiatives 
In a different case, moreover, such inter-institutional strategies have been found to have binding effect, 
imposing on the Member States a duty not to adopt cnfli ting positions. This question was addressed 
in the FAO case26 which concerned the exercise of voting rights by the EU and the Member States 
within the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). In order to facilitate voting within the FAO, 
the Council and the Commission had adopted an arrangement setting up a coordination procedure 
between the Commission and the Member States. In accordance with the arrangement, the 
Commission submitted a proposal to the Council providing for the exercise by the Union of the right 
to vote in respect of a particular topic. In spite of the Commission proposal, the Council proceeded to 
give the Member States the right to vote.  
Asked by the Commission to annul the Council's decision to conclude the draft agreement, the Court 
found that in the specific case, the duty flowed directly from the arrangement concluded between the 
Council and the Commission:  
‘In the present case, section 2.3 of the Arrangement b tween the Council and the Commission 
represents fulfilment of that duty of cooperation between the Community and its Member States 
within the FAO’.27  
In other words, as Heliskoski notes, ‘it was through the concept of the duty of co-operation that the 
Arrangement […] was vested with normative content’.28 As a result, the Council decision to conclude 
                                                   
23  Case C-246/07 Commission v Sweden, para. 76. 
24  Case C-246/07 Commission v Sweden, para. 87. 
25  Case C-246/07 Commission v Sweden, para. 91. 
26  Case C-25/94 Commission v Council (FAO) [1996] ECR I-1469. 
27  Case C-25/94 Commission v Council, para. 49. 
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the draft agreement was annulled. The Court's judgement in the FAO case, thus, left no doubt that the 
start of an informal Union initiative within an institutionalised framework can have binding effect on 
the Council and restrain the latter in its freedom t  adopt a position of its own. Any such arrangement 
is considered a fulfilment of the duty of sincere cooperation.  
4. The Duty of Loyalty in the Context of CFSP 
As the previous section showed, the Members States are ubject to strict procedural obligations once a 
Union initiative has been started in the context of mixed agreements under what used to be the first 
pillar. In order to assess the impact these findings could have for restraints within the framework of the 
EEAS, the question needs to be addressed to what extent the restraints flowing from the duty of 
loyalty under Art. 4(3) TEU can be transposed to the CFSP.  
The Treaty does not provide much guidance on the binding nature of Decisions taken within the CFSP 
context, and neither is the Court of Justice in a position to take it upon itself to develop guiding 
principles, due to its limited jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it has been argued that the language found in 
the relevant Treaty provisions suggests that the adoption of CFSP decisions does indeed limit the 
Member States' freedom to pursue their foreign policy-making as they wish.29 In particular, CFSP 
decisions ‘shall commit the Member States in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their 
activity’ (Article 28(2) TEU). CFSP decisions can, therefore, be considered ‘concrete norms of 
conduct, demanding a certain unconditional behaviour from the Member States’.30 As a result, the 
Member States are not allowed to adopt national position  or to act in violation of CFSP Decisions in 
any other way.  
Notwithstanding substantive obligations, the question is whether the Member States’ freedom of 
action on the international scene can be subject to procedural restraints even before a CFSP Decision 
is adopted. The key provision concerning procedural restraints in the CFSP is constituted by Art. 32 
TEU which lays down that ‘Member States shall consult one another within the European Council and 
the Council on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to determine a 
common approach’.31 This obligation forms part of the concept of systematic cooperation referred to 
in Art. 25 TEU. In the CFSP area, it still serves as the key notion, in the absence of which it would be 
impossible for the Union to define and implement a foreign and security policy.32 The systematic 
cooperation referred to in Art. 25 TEU is to be established in accordance with Art. 32 TEU, which 
contains the actual procedural obligations. In principle, the scope of issues to which the systematic 
cooperation applies is not subject to any limitation, but Art. 32 TEU immediately qualifies the 
obligation by adding the words ‘of general interest’. The European Council has not provided any 
further specification of ‘general interest’ in Art. 32 TEU. This seriously limits the information and 
(Contd.)                                                             
28  J Heliskoski, Mixed Agreements as a Technique for Organizing the International Relations of the European Community 
and its Member States (The Hague: Kluwer 2001) 65. 
29  See further, A Dashwood, ‘The Law and Practice of CFSP Joint Actions’ in M Cremona and B De Witte (eds), EU 
Foreign Relations Law – Constitutional Fundamentals (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2008) 53; C Hillion and R Wessel, 
‘Restraining External Competences of EU Member States under CFSP’ in M Cremona and B de Witte (eds), EU Foreign 
Relations Law - Constitutional Fundamentals (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2008) 83.  
30  Hillion and Wessel, ‘Restraining External Competences of EU Member States’ 83.  
31  The provision reads as follows: ‘Before undertaking any action on the international scene or entering into any 
commitment which could affect the Union's interests, each Member State shall consult the others within t e European 
Council or the Council. Member States shall ensure, through the convergence of their actions, that the Union is able to 
assert its interests and values on the international scene. Member States shall show mutual solidarity. When the European 
Council or the Council has defined a common approach f t e Union within the meaning of the first paragrph, the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Member 
States shall coordinate their activities within theCouncil’. 
32  R Wessel, ‘The Multilevel Constitution of European Foreign Relations’ in N Tsagourias (ed), Transnational 
Constitutionalism: International and European Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007) 160, 179.
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consultation obligation in the first part of this Article. On the one hand, the Member States are 
obligated to inform and consult one another, while on the other hand they are given the individual 
discretion to decide whether or not a matter is of ‘general interest’. Indeed, although there is an 
obligation to try and reach a Union policy, in case of failure, the Member States remain free to pursue 
their own national policies. 
Nevertheless, it can be asserted that the Member States are indeed under a general obligation to inform 
and consult one another. Through the information and consultation obligation in Art. 32 TEU, the 
Member States ordered themselves to use it as one of th  means to attain the CFSP objectives in Art. 
24 TEU. This assumption is supported by Art. 24(3) TEU which lays down a more general loyalty 
obligation. This obligation is not further defined. A possible interpretation could be found in the duty 
of sincere cooperation under Art. 4(3) TEU. Like Art. 4(3) TEU, the CFSP provision contains a 
positive obligation for the Member States to actively develop the Union's policy, including the 
obligation to ‘work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity’. Moreover, the 
negative obligation not to undertake ‘any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or 
likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations’ is also comparable to the 
negative obligation contained in Art. 4(3) TEU.  
Given the similarities between Art. 4(3) TEU and Art. 24(3) TEU which virtually echoes the wording 
of the former provision, there are no obvious reasons not to interpret the former in the light of the 
jurisprudence on the latter. However, the limited jurisdiction of the Court of Justice concerning CFSP-
related matters turns the question of whether the restraints attributed to Art. 4(3) TEU by the Court 
could also apply to Art. 24(3) TEU into a discussion on a primarily theoretical level.  
The limited jurisdiction notwithstanding,33 the Court of Justice has repeatedly made it clear that the 
duty of loyalty is of general application and reaches beyond limitations imposed by Treaty provisions 
and questions of competence. Thus, Member States are bound by a duty of loyalty even when 
operating in spheres of national competence34. As the Court held in Commission v. Luxembourg, the 
‘duty of genuine cooperation is of general application and does not depend either on whether the 
[Union] competence concerned is exclusive or on anyright of the Member States to enter into 
obligations towards non-member countries’.35   
The broad construction of the duty of loyalty by the Court does not, however, necessarily imply the 
extension of the Court's findings concerning Art. 4(3) TEU to other areas of Union law, such as the 
CFSP. Yet, it has become apparent that the Court relies on its interpretation of provisions from the 
first pillar in order to interpret corresponding provisions from other areas of EU law. Thus, the Court 
suggested in the Pupino36 judgement that the duty of loyalty expressed in (current) Art. 4(3) TEU was 
not limited to the first pillar:  
‘It would be difficult for the Union to carry out its task effectively if the principle of loyal 
cooperation, requiring in particular that Member States take all appropriate measures, whether 
general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of their obligations under European Union law, were not 
                                                   
33  With the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, he High Representative has assumed an important role in ensuring 
compliance by the Member States of their CFSP duty of co peration. According to the last indent of Article 24(3) TEU, 
the HR, together with the Council, is entrusted with the enforcement of the loyalty principle, a highly important role 
given the absence of the Court's jurisdiction over CFSP matters. Considering that, according to Art. 11(2) TEU (Nice), 
the supervision of compliance was formerly assigned only to the Council, the fact that this duty has been partly delegated 
to the ‘double hatted’ High Representative, who unites both Union and intergovernmental interests in one position, can 
only contribute to increasing the effectiveness of uch supervision.  
34  See e.g. Case C-124/95 The Queen, ex parte Centro-Com Srl v HM Treasury and Bank of England [1997] ECR I-81, 
paras. 24-25; Case C-235/87 Annunziata Matteucci v Communauté Française de Belgique [1988] ECR 5589, para. 19.  
35  Case C-266/03 Commission v Luxembourg [2005] ECR I-4805, para. 58. 
36  Case C-105/03 Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285. 
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also binding in the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, which is moreover 
entirely based on cooperation between the Member States and the institutions [...]’.37 
In the view of the Court, recourse to legal instruments with effects similar to those provided for by the
by the former EC Treaty was necessary in order to ‘contribute effectively to the pursuit of the Union’s 
objectives’.38 The Court thus suggested that the principle of sincere cooperation has a binding effect 
on the Member States in relation to the Union as a whole. This broadly-framed reasoning has led 
commentators to deduce that the principle of sincere ooperation should also, a fortiori, apply in the
context of CFSP.39 
Another argument brought forward in support of the applicability of the Court's interpretation of Art. 
4(3) TEU across all areas of EU law relates to the principle of consistency and coherence of the 
Union's external action laid down in Art. 13 TEU. The duty of loyalty under Art. 4(3) TEU, in fact, 
plays a key role in ensuring such coherence.40 A failure to comply with the requirement of consistency 
and coherence could thus be considered a breach of the duty of sincere cooperation.  
5. The Duty of Sincere Cooperation Within the EEAS 
On a general basis, there is no reason to doubt that a general duty of loyalty between the EU 
institutions and the Member States also applies within the EEAS, especially considering the inclusion 
of a specific duty of cooperation in Art. 3(1) of the Council Decision, emphasising that the EEAS shall 
cooperate with, inter alia, the diplomatic services of the Member States. However, the precise scope 
and content of such a loyalty obligation within the framework of the EEAS depends on the extent to 
which the Court's findings from the former first pillar can apply within the EEAS context. 
5.1. Common Strategies in the EEAS - A Duty to Adopt a Common Position? 
As we saw in the previous section, the Member States r  subject to a loyalty obligation similar to the
duty of sincere cooperation under Art. 4(3) TEU even when acting in areas of CFSP competence. 
Nevertheless, it does not follow that the Member States' obligation to adopt a common position once 
concerted Union action has been initiated can be transposed to the EEAS. The cases discussed earlier, 
in fact, are specific to the context of legally binding international agreements, while the EEAS does 
not generally operate in the framework of international agreements, being primarily internal in its 
functioning. An external dimension requiring certain commitments by the Member States owards the 
Union is, therefore, absent in the EEAS. Indeed, in the Swedish PFOS case, the Court of Justice 
expressly refers to the unity in the international representation of the Union and its Member States and 
the fact that a unilateral proposal would weaken their negotiating power with regard to the other 
parties to the Convention concerned.41 As a consequence, it could be argued that the different 
institutional structures concerned make it impossible to transfer the principles established in the 
context of international agreements to the EEAS.  
                                                   
37  Case C-105/03 Pupino, para. 42. 
38  Case C-105/03 Pupino, para. 36. 
39  See A Dashwood, ‘The Law and Practice of CFSP Joint Actions’ in M Cremona and B De Witte (eds), EU Foreign 
Relations Law – Constitutional Fundamentals (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2008) 53, 56; C Hillion and R Wessel, ‘External 
Competences of EU Member States under CFSP’ in M Cremona and B de Witte (eds), EU Foreign Relations Law - 
Constitutional Fundamentals (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008) 79, 93. 
40  See also CW Hermann, ‘Much Ado about Pluto? The “Unity of the Legal Order of the European Union” revisited’, EUI 
Working Papers, RSCAS 2007/05; C Hillion, ‘Tous pour un, un pour tous! Coherence in the External Relations of the 
European Union’ in M Cremona (ed), Developments in EU External Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008) 
10. 
41  Case C-246/07 Commission v Sweden, Judgement of 20 April 2010, nyr, para. 104. 
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These structural differences notwithstanding, it is submitted that the decisive point in the Court's 
reasoning in the Swedish PFOS case is not so much the impact of unilateral action on the unity of 
international representation as it is the fact thatwithin the framework of inter-institutional cooperation, 
it had been agreed not to take action, which, in turn, was based on a number of relevant factors, 
including economic ones, which had led the Council committee to postpone further action.42 The 
Court thus makes it clear that the duty of sincere ooperation operates on two levels in this case. As we 
saw in the Commission v. Germany and Commission v. Luxembourg cases,43 considerations of external 
representation and the fulfilment of international obligations alone are not sufficient to justify 
compliance restraints once a strategy had been initiated by a single institution. Such a strategy was 
only found to create compliance obligations for theM mber States, once accepted as ‘concerted 
action’ at Union level. It thus becomes apparent that in the Swedish PFOS case, the institutional 
framework created for the cooperation between the Commission, the Council and the Member States 
gave rise to additional procedural obligations.  
A similar reasoning, in fact, can be found in the FAO case.44 On the one hand, the Court of Justice 
criticised the false impression that the Member States were representing the Union created by their 
exercise of the voting rights, but on the other hand, it emphasised the fact that the Union was 
prevented from having any effective say in the in the deliberations preceding the final decision on the 
text of the Agreement.45 Moreover, the Court argued that the exercise by the Member States of the 
right to vote also had effects as regards competenc to implement the Agreement and to conclude 
subsequent agreements on the same question.46  
In both cases, therefore, the Court's considerations go beyond questions of external representation in 
specific instances. What is at stake is the Union's freedom to assume and carry out commitments and 
adopt strategies within the same framework in the future. Since in an institutionalised setting, rules 
and regulations are adopted with a view to creating a  ongoing obligation for the EU institutions and 
the Member States, the latter are under strict procedural duties which go beyond the general duty to 
facilitate the achievement of the Union's tasks laid down in Art. 4(3) TEU that we find, for example, in 
the case of the negotiation of an agreement, as in the Commission v. Germany and Commission v. 
Luxembourg cases. While in these two cases, there was no ongoing obligation and no rules of conduct 
in place, Member State action in the Swedish PFOS and the FAO cases affected a Union strategy 
concerning the fulfilment of an ongoing commitment. Compared with the notion of ‘start of c ncerted 
Union action’ which we find in the context of negotiation and ratification of an international 
agreement, the obligations imposed on the Member States once a ‘Union strategy’ has been adopted 
have an additional dimension, both in a temporal as well as in a normative sense. Rather than being a 
force for negotiation, in this context the duty of c operation becomes a force for convergence. 
5.2. Restraints Within the EEAS in Practice  
In light of the fact that the Member States are under a duty not to jeopardise a Union strategy by 
adopting conflicting national positions, the establishment of the EEAS may entail significant 
restrictions for the Member States' freedom to act on he international scene. As we saw above, when 
                                                   
42  Case C-246/07 Commission v Sweden, paras. 87-90: As the Court pointed out, the committee's decision was motivated by 
the fact that work was ongoing on the identification f control measures at Union level. Once the Commission had 
submitted a proposal on those control measures, PFOS were intended to be proposed for inclusion in the annex of the 
agreement. In addition, the Court noted that the Presidency drew the attention of that group to the economic 
consequences of a proposal to include might result in a call for additional financial aid on the part of developing countries 
which are parties to that convention.  
43  Cases C-266/03 Commission v Luxembourg [2005] ECR I-4805 and C-433/03 Commission v Germany [2005] ECR I-
6985, see above. 
44  Case C-25/94 Commission v Council (FAO) [1996] ECR I-1469, see above. 
45  Case C-25/94 Commission v Council, paras. 33 and 34.  
46  Case C-25/94 Commission v Council, para. 36. 
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acting within the framework of the CFSP but outside th  EEAS, the Member States are merely bound 
by a limited procedural obligation under Art. 32 TEU, under which they are given the individual 
discretion to decide whether or not a matter falls within the scope of application of that provision or 
not. Moreover, such procedural obligations only arise once a ‘common approach of the Union’ has 
been defined (Art. 32, second indent, TEU). More restrictive procedural duties relating to the start of 
concerted Union action, as they exist in the context of the former first pillar, have consequently been 
absent. 
 This absence can be explained by the significantly less prominent role which the Commission plays in 
CFSP. The Commission's influence remains far from that the one it enjoys in the former first pillar. In 
fact, the Council generally does not depend upon the Commission to make proposals in order to 
initiate the law-making process.  
Its limited competences in the CFSP field notwithstanding, the Commission has various non-binding 
instruments at its disposal to influence the Council's policy choices at the agenda-setting phase: the 
Commission can submit ‘communications’, give ‘recommendations’ and communicate non-papers to 
the Council. Containing conceptual proposals and Commission initiatives, such documents are aimed 
at the policy initiating stage.47 Nevertheless, the Commission's prospects of making the Council accept 
its initiatives are very much limited by intergovernmentalism. If the Member States, acting within the 
Council, refuse to take the Commission's proposals into account, their lack of political will prevent the 
adoption of any kind of Commission initiative at EU level in the CFSP sphere.  
With the creation of an institutionalised framework for foreign policy-making in the form of the 
EEAS, however, the Member States are no longer merely representatives of the national interest. 
Although their national diplomatic identity continues to be important, the Member States now form 
part of a tripartite structure aimed at establishing a consistent and coordinated foreign EU policy. In 
view of the particular procedural duties imposed on the Member States where a Union strategy has 
been adopted within the framework of such institutionalised cooperation, a case can be made for a 
stronger position of Commission initiatives in foreign policy. Whilst still not legally binding on the 
Member States, Commission initiatives, such as policy or strategy papers, may now be considered a 
‘strategy’ or ‘start of a concerted action at EU level’, which would impose on the Member States strict 
procedural restraints to endeavour to adopt a common position in that regard and not to take 
conflicting national action. In those cases where a common position between the Community and the 
Member States is not possible, however, Member States will ultimately be able to express their own 
national views and exercise their national powers.  
6. Concluding Remarks 
With the establishment of the EEAS outside the Council Secretariat and with an important representation 
of Commission officials, the Member States have created a body capable of becoming a powerful and 
influential actor in European external policy. In this respect, the tripartite structure created by the 
EEAS is of particular importance, not only in political terms, but also legally speaking. From a 
political point of view, the Member States have, by including Art. 27(3) in the Treaty, consented to the 
establishment of a framework for the coordination of their external policies. From a legal perspective, 
the EEAS has the potential of imposing significant procedural restraints on the Member States' 
freedom to conduct their foreign relations. The application of the duty of sincere cooperation under 
Art. 4(3) TEU and the interpretation it has been given by the Court of Justice in relation to the 
requirement to form a common position once an inter-i stitutional strategy has been initiated at EU 
level may create obligations in areas which were previously merely subject to general and vaguely 
defined information and consultation obligations. A a result, initiatives submitted by the Commission 
                                                   
47  See A Krause, ‘The European Union's Africa Policy: The Commission as Policy Entrepreneur in the CFSP’ (2003) 8 
European Foreign Affairs Review 221; further, e.g., L Cram, Policy-Making in the EU: Conceptual Lenses and the 
Integration Process (London: Routledge 1997). 
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may be given a significantly higher legal status, even if the final role played by the Commission within 
the framework of the EEAS ultimately depends on how the EEAS will develop and operate in 
practice. 
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Abstract 
Over the years, decisions taken by the European Union (EU) political institutions and judicial 
positions expressed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) – directly or indirectly – concerning the 
settlement of commercial disputes within the WTO have come to form part of a coherent EU strategy. 
This paper discusses whether innovations brought about y the Lisbon Treaty in relation to trade 
policy and to EU external action will trigger a rethinking of the EU strategy towards WTO disputes. 
The analysis focuses on whether conditions for a str tegy revision are met as a result of the recent 
changes undergone by the EU trade policy and, more gen rally, by the Union’s external relations. To 
this end, three issues will be taken into account: first, the broader framework of objectives that the
Common Commercial Policy (CCP) is to serve following the Lisbon reshuffling; secondly, the role of 
fundamental rights; thirdly, the creation of coordinat on mechanisms with other EU external policies 
and policy-makers. It is submitted that, although they have so far enjoyed a wide scope for manoeuvre, 
EU political institutions will be faced with a demanding juggling exercise as their strategy towards 
commercial disputes must be fine-tuned so as to ensur  full consideration of both trade and non-trade 
objectives of EU external action. 
Keywords 
WTO dispute settlement strategy – Lisbon Treaty – Common Commercial Policy (CCP) – 
fundamental rights – policy coordination 
 
1. Problem Definition  
Decisions taken over the years by the Commission and the Council concerning the settlement of 
commercial disputes within the WTO with a view to avoiding actual compliance (choice to bear 
retaliations, pay compensations, enter into agreements outside the WTO legal framework, etc.) and 
positions expressed by the ECJ in this regard (denial of direct effect to WTO law, including to the 
reports of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) panels and those of the Appellate Body (AB), denial of 
EC extra-contractual liability for breach of WTO law) form part of a coherent EU strategy towards 
commercial disputes, which applies particularly – although not exclusively – when the EC/EU acts as 
defendant.1 These policy decisions and judicial positions respond to a ratio that goes beyond the 
immediate objective of avoiding that the CCP be over-constrained by WTO obligations. This rationale 
concerns internal and international standard setting as well as with the protection of vested Union 
interests.2 
                                                   
*  Phd candidate, University of Bologna. 
1  It is to be mentioned that the number of defensive cases involving the EU marginally exceeds the number of offensive 
actions. However, the strategic features of the Union’s approach to commercial disputes are more evident in defensive 
cases, where the EU strategy can be observed not only before the WTO panel or AB but also outside the WTO 
jurisdictional context, namely in relation to Commission negotiations practices and ECJ’s judicial activity. 
2  In view of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the formal succession of the EU to the EC in the WTO arena, for 
the purpose of the present analysis, unless further sp cification is offered, the term Union will hereinafter replace the 
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A strategy is a set of decisions, actions and means put in place in order to pursue one or more 
predetermined objectives. An actor may decide to modify its strategy for the following reasons: first, 
the previous strategy becomes obsolete as result of a change in circumstances; secondly, a reshuffle of 
the objectives that the strategy was designed to pursue occurs, so that a swift adjustment of the means 
becomes necessary; thirdly, means employed prove to b unsuitable to achieve the final aims or, more 
generally, the cost/benefit ratio of the strategy proves to be unbearable. 
The assertion whereby the EU has so far enacted a proper strategy towards commercial disputes is 
founded on the observed connection between means and objectives. As to the former, on the one hand, 
the EU has made offensive use of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, by systematically 
challenging measures adopted by commercial partners that were deemed to impair EU benefits 
resulting from the WTO agreements. On the other, when allegations of unfair trade practices against 
the EC3 were proven founded, the Union reacted by denying d rect effect of adverse DSB rulings;4 by 
choosing to bear commercial retaliations or to pay compensations to the initiators of the dispute; by 
concluding bilateral or plurilateral agreements outside the WTO legal framework in order to 
accommodate the commercial requests of the adverse party so as to protect the Community interest 
while defusing the threat of a formal dispute. 
Such means were often devised in order to shield specific manufacturing sectors of the European 
economy from foreign competition, as was the case for the interests of producers and importers of 
agricultural products in the bananas disputes. In some cases, however, the objective of the Community 
was not, or at least not only, the defence of certain economic interests, but also the need to protect 
internally agreed standards and, ultimately, its regulatory autonomy. This is particularly the case of 
commercial disputes which arose from Community violat ns of the SPS and TBT Agreements, such 
as the hormones beef and GMOs cases. 
Will the Lisbon reform lead to a revision of the EU strategy towards commercial disputes by inducing 
a rethinking of the relation between objectives andmeans? This paper aims to verify whether at least 
one of the three which may prompt a strategy revision has been met following the recent changes 
undergone by the EU’s trade policy and more generally by the Union external relations. For the 
purpose of answering this question, one is forced to tackle the issue from a broader perspective. No 
specific mention of dispute settlement in the WTO can be found in the reformed Treaty, just as it was 
the case in the previous Treaty regime. The lack of direct connections requires that the analysis focus 
on the ways in which the Lisbon reform indirectly impacts on the Union’s strategy in the settlement of 
(Contd.)                                                             
term Community so that the former will be employed also when referring to legal circumstances and case-l w pertaining 
to the scope of the former EC law, such as the participation in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, the denial of 
direct effect of WTO law or of non-contractual liablity for breach of the latter. 
3  Following the changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty, and still at the time of writing, no dispute was settled in 
which the EU as such took part as defendant. Thus no formal incompatibility of Union legislation with WTO law has yet 
been found. This is despite the fact that some dispute  against the Union have actually been launched in the post-Lisbon 
era. See WTO DS405, European Union — Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Footwear from China; WTO DS408, 
European Union and a Member State [The Netherlands] — Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, (India complainant); 
WTO DS409, European Union and a Member State [The Netherlands] — Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, (Brazil 
complainant). 
4  Such direct reaction by the Court of Justice had been anticipated by the political institutions when they inserted in the 
Decision concluding the WTO Agreement a clause ruling out the direct effect of the WTO law within the EU legal order. 
The Court itself used this argument to back up it’s reasoning in Portugal v. Council, where it refferred to the final recital 
in the preamble to Decision 94/800, according to which ‘by it’s nature, the Agreement establishing theWorld Trade 
Organisation, including the Annexes thereto, is not susceptible to being directly invoked in Community or Member State 
courts’. See Case C-149/96 Portuguese Republic v Council of the European Union [1999] ECR I-8395, para. 48; and 
Council Decision 94/800/EC of 22 December 1994 concerning the conclusion on behalf of the European Community, as 
regards matters within its competence, of the agreements reached in the Uruguay Round multilateral negotiati ns (1986-
1994), OJ L 336, 23.12.1994, 1, preamble final recital. See also A Ciampi, ‘Il Preambolo di una Decisione del Consiglio 
preclude al “GATT 1994” gli effetti diretti nell’ordinamento comunitario?’ (1995) 78 Rivista di Diritto Internazionale 
407. 
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commercial disputes. To this end, three issues willbe taken into account: firstly, the broader 
framework of objectives that the Lisbon Treaty sets for the CCP;5 secondly, the role of fundamental 
rights following the conferral of binding force to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) and the 
Union’s prospective accession to the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms; thirdly, a subsidiary element of discussion, relating to the creation of mechanisms for 
coordination between the CCP and other EU external policies, will be dealt with in the final section of 
the paper. 
It is submitted that both the first and the second element might have a significant impact on the EU 
strategy in commercial disputes since, even if to different extents, they will both affect the context and 
the objectives of CCP policy-making, eventually influencing the cost/benefit ratio of adhering to the 
strategy devised so far. The third element concerning the coordination between trade and other 
external policies, which, as the first two sections f the paper will demonstrate, appears to be more 
pressing than before Lisbon, will equally play a crucial role in developing the EU’s strategy towards 
commercial disputes. 
2. Issue I – The CCP in the Broader Framework of the Union’s External Action 
The CCP is now placed under the overall heading ‘External Action’ and its objectives appear to be 
broader than in the past. Will this new set of CCP objectives (Art. 206 TFEU; Art. 205 TFEU juncto 
Art. 3(5) TEU and 21(2) TEU, particularly points (d) to (f) and (h)) place any real constraint on the 
considerably wide scope for manoeuvre so far enjoyed by the institutions in the conduct of the CCP, 
particularly insofar as compliance with WTO obligations is concerned? 
2.1. CCP Principles and Objectives Under the Community Treaty 
2.1.1. Uniformity Principle 
Aiming to protecting the uniformity of the Common Market by avoiding distortions in competition 
and risks of trade deflection that could arise if Member States pursued their individual external trade 
policies,6 the principle of uniformity required the adoption f common rules throughout the EC in the 
field of the CCP.7 Besides the need to accommodate Internal Market concerns also beyond 
Community frontiers, the ECJ considered that uniformity was necessary to preserve the unity of the 
EC’s position with respect to third countries in order to enhance the Community’s ability to defend 
common interests.8 
The a priori exclusive nature of the Community competence in the field of trade arose as a result of 
the application of the principle of uniformity. However, uniformity comes to the fore only in areas of 
the Internal Market where full harmonisation has alre dy been achieved, so that common external 
rules are necessary for the functioning of the Market itself. The fact that the need for uniformity results 
from internal harmonisation is clearly apparent in areas such as trade in services and trade related 
aspects of intellectual property rights, where inter al harmonisation existed to a limited extend. 
                                                   
5  On the necessity to make a distinction between th objectives of the CCP and those of the Union’s strategy towards WTO 
commercial disputes, see infra, fn 13. 
6  Opinion 1/78 [1979] ECR 2871, para. 45 ff. See alsoJoined Cases 37 and 38/73 Social Fonds voor de Diamantarbeiders 
v. NV Indiamex et Association de fait De Belder [1973] ECR 1609. 
7  M Cremona, ‘The External Dimension of the Internal Market’ in C Barbard and J Scott (eds), The Law of the Single 
European Market (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2002) 354. 
8  A Dimopoulos, ‘The Effects of the Lisbon Treaty on the Principles and Objectives of the Common Commercial Policy’ 
(2010) 15 European Foreign Affairs Review 153, 154. 
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Uniformity not being an imperative, such trade areas fell within shared EC-Member States 
competence for the purpose of concluding the Marrakech agreement establishing the WTO. 
The relation between internal harmonisation and the ne d to ensure uniformity of external trade 
policies did not entail that the CCP was meant to pursue externally the same objectives of the Internal 
Market, namely non-discrimination and elimination of all trade barriers. The Court clearly recognised 
the lack of a community obligation under EC law to grant non-Member States equal treatment in all 
respects. As a consequence, the Community was allowed to discriminate, firstly, between domestic 
and third country products, producers and service providers; secondly, between products coming from 
different third countries. Although the latter kind of discrimination was to be driven by the 
Community interest,9 its application by the EC was nonetheless subject to the requirements enshrined 
in WTO and other international obligations applicable to the Community. 
Therefore, the principle of uniformity had only instrumental value, since the uniformity of trade 
policies was only required for the sake of protecting internal harmonisation. Where this was not the 
case, uniformity was only an additional tool for Community institutions (see shared trade 
competences).10 
Finally, the instrumental nature of such a principle is also highlighted by its neutrality in terms of 
content.11 Uniformity explains how the EC trade policy should be but not what it should include. It did 
not provide any substantial orientation to the CCP, thus leaving the Community institutions with a 
quasi-absolute discretion for shaping trade policy so as to best serve the Community interest.  
2.1.2. The Objective of Liberalising Trade and Non-Trade Aims 
Art. 131 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC) contained the only substantive 
objective to be ascribed to EC trade policy and, therefore, capable of affecting CCP policy making, 
namely the liberalization of world trade through the progressive abolition of restrictions to 
international commerce. Although substantial, such aim was also nothing more than aspirational in 
nature.12 In fact, the Court stated the non-binding character of the liberalization objective, emphasizing 
that the provision at issue should be confined to establishing an objective rather than imposing an 
obligation.13 In other words, the EC might adopt trade measures pur uing liberalisation but it was not 
compelled to do it: trade measures adversely affecting such objective were not to be deemed 
incompatible with Art. 131 TEC. 
That being so, the concept of the Community interes has long been pivotal in shaping the CCP. 
Whereas liberalization represented a guideline to Community institutions in charge of trade policy-
making, they enjoyed considerable discretion in asses ing whether a liberalising policy would be 
suitable to advance the Community interest. Should the Community interest not coincide with the 
prospected outcomes of liberalisation, the former would nonetheless take precedence over the latter. 
This allowed policy objectives other than liberalist on as such to influence the content of the CCP. 
                                                   
9  M Cremona, ‘Neutrality or Discrimination? The WTO, the EU and External Trade’ in G de Búrca J Scott (eds), The EU 
and the WTO – Legal and Constitutional Issues (Oxford-Portland: Hart Publishing 2001) 165 ff. 
10  Cremona, ‘The External Dimension’ 374. 
11  Dimopoulos, ‘The Effects of the Lisbon Treaty’ 156. 
12  Dimopoulos, ‘The Effects of the Lisbon Treaty’ 156. 
13  Case C-150/94 United Kingdom v. Council (Chinese Toys) [1998] ECR I-7235, para. 67; Case C-112/80 Dürbeck v. 
Hauptzollamt Frankfurt [1982] ECR 1251, para. 10 ff; see also Case C-51/75 EMI v. CBS United Kingdom LtD [1976] 
ECR-811. 
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From an international point of view, while pursing non-trade objectives, CCP-related actions 
occasionally resulted in restrictions of international trade, thus openly contradicting the aim of 
liberalisation and possibly giving rise to commercial disputes. 
Internally, the Treaty lacking a clear-cut definition of the content of the CCP, the circumstance 
whereby trade measures pursued objectives other than trade liberalisation gave rise to numerous 
disagreements regarding the scope of such a policy and the types of measures that could fall under the 
Community trade competence. As a matter of fact, when a more specific legal basis was lacking in the 
Treaty, the CCP has been used for the adoption of trade measures which pursued objectives other than 
regulation of trade flows and trade restrictions, which were linked for example to environmental 
protection and development cooperation. 
When specific legal bases allowing the Community to undertake external actions in the above-
mentioned fields were eventually inserted into the Tr aty, legal battles concerning the choice of the 
most appropriate legal basis ensued. The Court reaffirmed in most instances the role of the CCP in the 
adoption of measures pursuing non-trade objectives, particularly in cases where Community measures 
had more than one purpose or a twofold component. As it is well known, the choice of the legal bases 
upon which to found a prospected policy measure profoundly affects the exercise of the relevant 
competence. Within this framework, the Court recognised the possibility to adopt trade measures 
pursuing other objectives without however clarifying the interaction between trade and non-trade 
objectives, their respective legal value and criteria for prioritisation. In this way, the Court avoide  
interfering with the substantive policy choices made by legislative and executive Community 
institutions. 
2.2. CCP Principles and Objectives Under the Reformed EU Treaty 
The Lisbon Treaty has modified the scope and nature of the CCP and has reformed the principles and 
objectives14 governing it. To start with, the Lisbon Treaty groups all EU external policies, including 
the CCP, under a common heading (Arts. 3(5) and 21 TEU) containing principles and objectives of 
general application. Moreover, specific attention being paid to the CCP, the reform touches upon the 
nature and the role of the objective of liberalisation, as shown in Art. 206 TFEU (ex Art. 131 TEC). 
Will such changes also affect the EU’s strategy towards commercial disputes within the WTO? 
Various considerations can be advances in this respect, articularly concerning a possible narrowing of 
the scope for manoeuvre enjoyed by EU institutions. It is submitted that the different nature of the 
objective of liberalisation and the broader framework f CCP goals will make EU positions regarding, 
first, the effect of DSB and AB reports and, second, the EU extra-contractual liability for breach of 
WTO law more difficult to bear. 
                                                   
14  For the purpose of this paper the term ‘objective’ is mployed in relation to different contexts, which should however not 
induce any ambiguity as to the argument presented hereinafter. It is therefore appropriate to clarify that the term 
‘objective’ points at both the goals that the CCP as such is intended to achieve according to the relevant Treaty 
provisions, and the aims that the Union’s strategy towards commercial disputes is designed to pursue. It is important to 
underline that, whereas the Lisbon reform touches upon CCP goals, particularly by changing their nature, th  same 
cannot be said with regard to the aims of the Union’s strategy. The latter, which have been identified earlier as the 
protection of European key economic interests and of the Union’s regulatory autonomy, remain in fact largely 
unmodified. It is interesting to note that the two sets of objectives do not necessarily point in the same direction and are 
not easy to organise in a consistent strategy, in that often the objectives of protecting economic interests and regulatory 
autonomy can only be pursued at the expenses of further liberalisation. 
Valeria Bonavita 
46 
2.2.1. Uniformity Principle 
The principle of uniformity remains of utmost importance for the nature and exercise of the EU 
competence in external trade and has undergone no substantial modifications. Art. 207 TFEU 
reiterates that ‘the CCP shall be based on uniform principles’. 
Moreover, uniformity seems to continue having a mere instrumental interest for trade policy-makers. 
In fact, it has correctly been noted that the extension of the Union’s exclusive competence to all areas 
of the CCP, including trade in services, trade aspect  of IP and FDI, somehow diminished the 
instrumental function of the principle of uniformity and its role as a link between internal 
harmonisation and the nature of the external competenc .15 As a matter of fact, not all aspects of trade 
in services, trade aspects of IP and FDI have already been subject to harmonisation. Whereas in the 
past this would have led to the maintenance of a shared competence, the extension of the EU’s 
exclusive competence to cover such trade sectors soften  the link between harmonisation in the 
internal market and the nature of the trade competenc . It follows that the uniformity principle may be 
vested with more than a mere instrumental function. 
However, such rethinking must however be balanced by further considerations. Even though the EU 
becomes a single trade actor in the abovementioned fields, different national interests remain shelterd 
from undesired policy actions. When deciding on issue  concerning trade in services, commercial 
aspects of intellectual property rights and FDI, the Council will continue acting according to the 
unanimity rule as long as unanimous actions are still required for the adoption of internal rules.16 
Unanimous decision-making is also required for the adoption of trade measures pertaining to trade in 
cultural and audio-visual services, on the one hand,  trade in social, education and health services, 
on the other.17 The lasting pivotal role played by Member States in these trade areas is probably not 
sufficient to bring the instrumental role of uniformity back into the spotlight, as in fact Member States 
can no longer adopt different approaches to trade with third countries in such areas,18 but surely makes 
the assessment of the new degree of exclusivity of the EU’s trade competence more nuanced.  
2.2.2. The Reformed Objective of Liberalisation 
The Lisbon Treaty alters the role of liberalisation as an objective of the CCP. In terms of scope, Art. 
206 TFEU adds a reference to foreign direct investments (FDI) and to other barriers to trade in order 
to mirror the substantive expansion of the EU’s exclusive trade competence. 
The main change, however, stems from the new wording of the provision. Whereas prior to the Lisbon 
reform liberalisation enjoyed just an aspirational v lue on the ground that, according to Art. 131 TEC, 
the Member States only aimed to contribute to such objective, Art. 206 TFEU uses a more assertive 
language and states that the EU as such, not just is Members, shall now contribute to the liberalisation 
of international trade, namely to the harmonious development of world trade, the progressive abolition 
of restrictions to international trade and on FDI, and the lowering of customs and other barriers. 
What used to be an option now seems to have turned into a proper legal obligation. In fact, the drafters 
of the Lisbon Treaty did not reiterate the qualificat on of liberalisation as a non-binding objective of 
the reformed Treaty, whose pursuance lies in the hands of the EU institutions and depends on their 
                                                   
15  Dimopoulos, ‘The Effects of the Lisbon Treaty’ 159. 
16  Art. 207(4) TFEU, second alinea. 
17  Art. 207(4) TFEU, third alinea. Provisions contaied in both the second and third alinea justify the ne d for unanimous 
action in the respective trade fields in the light of he imperative to defuse any risk of prejudicing Member States’ cultural 
and linguistic identities on the one hand, and natio l peculiarities with regard to the organisation of social, education and 
health services, which Members States are solely responsible to deliver, on the other. 
18  Dimopoulos, ‘The Effects of the Lisbon Treaty’ 159. 
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assessment of the Community interest.19 On the contrary, they have opted to upgrade the obj ctive of 
trade and FDI liberalisation to the rank of compulsory aims, as the true and main target of all CCP 
measures, to which other – both commercial and non-commercial – objectives must give way. 
The mandatory nature of the objective of liberalisation becomes even more apparent if Art. 206 TFEU 
is compared to other provisions having a similar woding and which the Court has already interpreted. 
In Portugal v. Council,20 for example, the ECJ confirmed the compulsory nature of the objective of 
promoting democracy and the rule of law in the Community competence in the field of development 
cooperation (as enshrined in then Art. 177(2) TEC). The binding character of the relevant provision 
was acknowledged based precisely on its wording.21 Applying such a reasoning to Art. 206 TFEU, 
would make it difficult to deny the mandatory nature of the objective of liberalisation. Consequently, 
proven incompatibilities of EU trade measures with such an objective may compromise their very 
lawfulness and could result in them being declared voi . 
Nor does the commitment to a gradual liberalisation of international trade lessen the binding nature of 
the obligation contained in Art. 206 TFEU. On the contrary, such a commitment may be interpreted as 
precluding any step back from the achieved level of liberalisation and as prohibiting the adoption of 
restrictive measures,22 which would in practice disregard the mandatory objective of pursuing 
progresses, however gradual, in liberalisation. 
It should be noted that EU institutions retain discretion as regards the determination of the timeframe 
and means for fostering liberalisation. However, the Lisbon Treaty narrows their margin of 
appreciation as it forbids the adoption of commercial measures that might hamper the aim of further 
reducing barriers to trade and, possibly, that negatively affect the existing levels of liberalisation. 
2.2.3. The CCP Under a Common Constitutional Framework of EU External Relations 
Previously placed under different and autonomous headings of the Community Treaty,23 external 
policies are now found under a single framework of principles and objectives governing EU external 
action as a whole. Mainly consisting of Arts. 3(5)24 and 21 TEU25 and later reiterated in Art. 205 
TFEU,26 such a single framework encompasses a set of common rules which are intended to provide 
                                                   
19  M Cremona, ‘A Constitutional Basis for Effective External Action? An Assessment of the Provisions on EU External 
Action in the Constitutional Treaty’ EUI Working Paper Law 2006/30, 29; see also Dimopoulos, ‘The Effects of the 
Lisbon Treaty’ 160. 
20  Case C-268/96 Portugal v. Council [1996] ECR I-6177, para. 23. 
21  The Court interpreted the expression ‘shall contribu e’ contained in Art. 177(2) TEC as conferring binding force upon the 
objectives at issue, the result being that the Treaty would compel EU institutions and Member States to their attainment. 
See Case C-268/96 above. 
22  Dimopoulos, ‘The Effects of the Lisbon Treaty’ 161. 
23  Cremona has noticed that the current list of principles and objectives of EU external action incorporates principles and 
objectives that were found in specific policy fields under the TEC. See Cremona, ‘A Constitutional Basis’ 5. 
24  While providing an overall glimpse at the final aims of the European integration process, Art. 3 TEU acknowledges an 
autonomous role to some general external goals. Paragraph 5 thereof points at ‘peace, security, the sustainable 
development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the 
protection of human rights […] as well as […] the strict observance and the development of internationl law’ as the 
objectives that the Union is called upon to pursue while acting on the international scene. 
25  Art. 21 TEU complements and further specifies Art. 3(5) TEU by indicating both the principles inspiring EU external 
action (para. 1) and the specific objectives it is ntended to pursue (para. 2). 
26  Art. 205 TFEU creates a functional linkage between the General Provisions on the Union’s External Action contained in 
the TEU and the specific external competences laid down in the TFEU in that it prescribes that the Union’s action on the 
international scene shall be guided by the principles, pursue the objectives and be conducted in accordance with the 
general provisions laid down in Art. 21 TEU. Moreovr, it is to be noted that the drafters of the Treaty took care of 
establishing a one-to-one functional linkage between th  relevant provisions of the two Treaties. The requirement that the 
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guidance in the exercise of EU external competences, irrespectively of their nature and of whether 
they have been conferred by the TEU or the TFEU. 
The Union’s trade policy is henceforth to be conducted according to the principles and objectives of 
the EU’s external action. On the one hand, this raies the question as to whether there will be any 
increased tendency for the EU to use trade policy as an instrument for the achievement of other 
external policy objectives, such as the ones inherent to the CFSP, environmental or development 
policy.27 On the other hand, one might wonder if such broader range of objectives, besides offering 
new opportunities to enhance the consistency of external relations, will also pose major legal 
constraints to trade policy-making as such. 
Art. 3(5) TEU mentions free and fair trade as one of the basic objectives of the Union’s international 
action. Therefore, the creation of a single constitutional framework for EU external relations affects 
the CCP given that the latter is not only bound by the principles and objectives expressed in trade-
related provisions of the Treaty but also by the general ones applicable to the Union’s external actions, 
as enshrined in Art. 21 TEU. In other words, the new ormative setting indirectly imposes a general 
need to coordinate the CCP with other external policies, whilst at the same time formally allowing the
pursuit of non-trade objectives through the adoption of CCP measures.28 The new framework 
determines what can and what cannot be painted on the canvas, by imposing additional constraints to 
the exercise of the EU trade competence, while at the same time affording previously unexpressed 
opportunities for the employment of CCP measures. The legal logic enshrined in such provisions is 
hardly questionable, particularly if looked at from the point of view of consistency advocates. 
Whereas Art. 3(5) TEU gives a glimpse of the principles governing the Union’s external action, Art. 
21 TEU contains a detailed list of principles and objectives that are relevant for the exercise of the 
Union’s external competences, including the CCP. 
The Treaty emphasizes the application of those general principles in the field of the CCP more than 
once. The connection between Art. 21 TEU and the CCP is reaffirmed in the TFEU, particularly in 
Arts. 205 and 207, with the former providing a functional link between Art. 21 TEU and the external 
policies under the TFEU and the latter explicitly incorporating the general principles and objectives of 
Art. 21 into the CCP.29 
In conclusion, under the Lisbon Treaty, objectives and means previously applicable to more distinct 
external competences become of general and interchangeable application. Specifically referring to 
trade concerns, they are to be extended to all areas of EU external action, so that trade objectives ar  to 
be duly taken into account when drafting both CCP and non-CCP measures. Similarly, CCP measures 
are to be designed with a view to serve, or at leasnot to hamper, both trade and non-trade objectives. 
(Contd.)                                                             
development and implementation of the different areas of the Union’s external action covered both by the CFSP, by Part 
Five of the TFEU and by the external aspects of its other policies respect the principles and pursue the objectives 
contained in the first two paragraphs of Art. 21 TEU can already be detected in the third paragraph of the same 
provisions. Finally, the reference to external aspects of the Union’s internal policies extends the scope of Art. 21 TEU 
principles and objectives to yet another dimension of EU governance, not touched upon by the Treaty provisions on 
external action but certainly relevant for the definition of the overall EU international conduct. In particular, in the light 
of the practice whereby virtually all EU policies have acquired an external dimension, it could be infrred that Art. 21 has 
a significantly wider scope than expected. Decision and treaty-making practice - and possibly judicial ontrol operated by 
the ECJ - will tell to which extent EU institutions and Member States will be willing to acknowledge such a scope. 
27  S Woolcock, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon and the European Union as an actor in international trade’, ECIPE Working Paper 
01/2010, 13. For an assessment of the recent practice of concluding bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), concluding 
that this focus on trade liberalization leaves other objectives on the sidelines, see the contribution by Boris Rigod in this 
edited Working Paper. 
28  Dimopoulos, ‘The Effects of the Lisbon Treaty’ 161. 
29  The last sentence of Art. 207(1) TFEU provides that ‘The common commercial policy shall be conducted in the context 
of the principles and objectives of the Union’s external action’. 
The EU Strategy Towards WTO Commercial Disputes After the Lisbon Reform 
  
49 
2.2.3.1. Trade Objectives of the EU External Action 
Arts. 3(5) and 21 TEU emphasise that general trade obj ctives such as liberalisation of international 
commerce, which Art. 206 TFEU defines as being the only CCP aim, are not to be served only by the 
Union’s commercial policy but must be taken into account also when other competences are exercised. 
In other words, also non-trade policies are to contribute to the achievement of trade-related objectivs. 
In Art. 3(5) TEU, free trade is identified as a general objective of the EU external action alongside 
with fair trade. Social concerns therefore become part of European trade policy, and apply in parallel 
to the more obvious economic ones. 
This is confirmed by a close reading of Art. 21(2)(e) TEU, which explicitly recognises the progressive 
abolition of restrictions to trade as an objective of EU external action, but also puts the aim of 
commercial liberalisation in perspective, making it instrumental to the promotion of international 
economic development. The constitutional relevance of liberalisation comes to the fore insofar as such 
a goal is designed to be the basic tool for the achievement of the broader objective of integrating third 
countries into the world economy. 
2.2.3.2. CCP Non-Trade Objectives 
As mentioned earlier, EU external action principles and objectives incorporate values and goals that 
were previously ascribed to specific Community policies. Following the Lisbon reform, these 
principles and objectives not only apply to their specific policy field of origin but also to all other 
fields of the Union’s external action, including the CCP. Therefore, both trade and non-trade related 
aims guide the exercise of the Union’s trade-related powers. Although the use of CCP measures in 
order to achieve non-trade objectives was practiced by EU institutions and recognised by the ECJ prior 
to the Lisbon Treaty,30 Art. 21 TEU represents nonetheless an important legal innovation as it provides 
the legal foundations for the non-commercial use of CCP measures. 
More specifically, the operative value of this provision lies in the clarification it provides that the 
orientation of the CCP will now also depend on non-trade principles and objectives, such as the 
promotion of democracy, rule of law, respect of human rights, the Union’s security and the 
preservation of international peace and security. Art. 21 TEU thus legitimises the practice of inserting 
conditionality clauses in trade agreements and granting trade preferences to virtuous third countries 
which show deference to such values.31 Besides the objectives mentioned above, Art. 21 TEU also 
recalls the preservation and improvement of the quality of the environment and the sustainable 
management of natural resources. This reference enhances the role of environmental goals as non-
trade objectives, with which trade measures are nonetheless required to comply. Moreover, the 
Union’s contribution to the achievement of sustainable economic, social and environmental 
development of third countries is also meant to occur, inter alia, via EU trade policy. Finally, the CCP 
must be conceived and implemented so as to favour the advancement of multilateralism and good 
governance. The Union shall therefore be committed o multilateral trade negotiations and shall 
actively play a role in organisations such as the WTO, also by promoting the enhancement of their 
effectiveness. In this respect, the Union will need to abide by international commercial rules and to 
avoid unfair trade practices. 
                                                   
30  See L Bartels, ‘The Trade and Development Policy of the European Union’ in M Cremona (ed), New Developments in 
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2.2.4. Legal Consequences 
The teleological scope of the EU’s trade policy hasundergone a twofold reform. On the one hand, the 
specific goal of liberalisation has gained strength by shedding its aspirational nature and acquiring the 
character of a legal obligation. On the other hand, the Lisbon Treaty has placed the CCP eventually 
under the single heading on EU external action, thus including non-commercial concerns in the range 
of purposes and principles that the Union’s trade policy is to serve. The reformed Treaty affects the 
Union’s management of commercial disputes by narrowing the array of CCP policy-options at the 
disposal of EU political institutions. As a result, a strategy based on the adoption of measures which 
does not comply with the new CCP constraints becomes internally unbearable, because 
unconstitutional, in the first place. 
Whereas it is apparent that the objective of liberalisation will herein act as a proper constraint on the 
formulation of the CCP content, the assessment of the legal implications of the reshuffle and 
‘generalisation’ of external action principles and objectives is not so straightforward. 
There is indeed no doubt that the strong language used in Arts. 3 and 21 TEU suggests that the values 
and goals therein contained oblige the Union to imple ent its external action within the framework 
they create. Moreover Art. 206 TFEU, if read in conjunction with Art. 205, which in turn refers to the 
afore-mentioned general provisions, also confirms that he CCP should not only serve the specific 
objective of liberalisation but should also aim to achieve the general objectives of the EU external 
action, i.e. political, social and economic development, environmental protection and the promotion of 
multilateralism. Undoubtedly these are all justiciable obligations which measures adopted by the EU 
must comply with, on pain of incurring in annulment procedures should they fail to do so. 
However, it has been noted that the mandatory nature of the provisions contained in Arts. 3 and 21 
TEU, and therefore of the obligations deriving therefrom, is somehow softened by their broad 
formulation.32 Both Articles leave a great deal of discretion to p licy-making institutions, which 
therefore still enjoy a considerable leeway in choosing the appropriate course of action, both in terms 
of means and content, to pursue the prescribed objectives. 
Moreover, consistency problems may arise from interactions between the trade and non-trade 
objectives which the reformed CCP is bound by. The reason lies in the absence of a prioritisation rule
which could be applied whenever different objectives point in opposite directions as regards the 
content of a trade measure. As mentioned, the aim of liberalisation as redefined in the Lisbon Treaty 
contains a no-step-back obligation regarding the abolishment of commercial and non-commercial 
barriers to trade. Therefore, conflicts between trade nd non-trade objectives could arise should the 
latter be pursued by means of restrictive measures. Such a scenario is perfectly conceivable. For 
instance, restrictive measures could be used on the ground that they serve the objective of fair trade – 
i.e. equitable trade as opposed to lawful trade – contained in Art. 3(5) TEU. The promotion of 
equitable trade conditions could be used to justify the adoption of protectionist measures. Whereas this 
would not be compatible with the prohibition of adopti n of new restrictions resulting from the 
liberalisation objective, it is arguable that the pursuance of other and more general objectives makes 
trade restrictions a viable policy option. The contrary would entail that the acknowledgement of the 
EU external action general objectives be de facto disregarded to the extent that the pursuance of them 
would be severely limited when it comes to commerce.33 
Of course, the limit of such use of trade restrictions lies in the demonstration, on the basis of elemnts 
amenable to justice, of the functional connection between the restrictive trade measure and the general 
objective that it is intended to pursue. In this rep ct, the requirements of a two-tier test must be 
fulfilled in order for a protectionist measure to be justified and declared lawful: it must not only pursue 
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The EU Strategy Towards WTO Commercial Disputes After the Lisbon Reform 
  
51 
a general – and forcibly legitimate – objective but also be proportional to the achievement of the 
declared aim.34 In the case of equitable trade, the EU can adopt protectionist measures insofar as the 
link with the goal of promoting socio-economic development is sufficiently proven and the 
proportionality test is satisfied. 
3. Issue II – Commercial Disputes and Fundamental Rights: A Real Constraint? 
In the FIAMM judgment,35 the ECJ suggested the possible contrast between non-compliance with 
WTO obligations and the respect of fundamental rights related to private business. With a fully 
binding Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) in force, the respect of rights such as the freedom to 
conduct a business (Art. 16 CFR) and the right to property (Art. 17 CFR) bind EU institutions in the 
conduct of the CCP, including the shaping of the EU’s strategic approach to commercial disputes. 
How and to what extent will this affect the EU’s approach to inter alia direct effect of DSB and AB 
reports and to EU liability for breach of WTO obligations? 
In the FIAMM case the Court was confronted with the need to balance the scope for manoeuvre of the 
EC institutions in the settlement of commercial disputes within the WTO with the protection of 
fundamental rights, such as the right to property and the right to pursue a trade or profession, as 
general principles of law applicable within the EU legal order. Having been victims of the retaliation 
enacted by the United States following EC non-compliance with the WTO DSB adverse ruling in the 
hormones case, FIAMM and others asked the Court to declare the EC liable for the losses they had 
incurred and demanded compensations thereof on the ground of, inter alia, an alleged breach of 
certain general principles of EC law. In the 2008 judgment issued on a request for the cross-appeal, th  
Court affirmed that a Community measure whose application leads to restrictions that impair the 
substance of the right to property and the freedom to pursue a trade or profession in a disproportionae 
and intolerable manner, could give rise to non-contractual liability on the part of the Community.36 
The ruling of the Court in this case is on the factthat no provision has been made for compensation to 
avoid or remedy the aforementioned impairment. In other words, a right to compensation might arise 
if the omission of the Community to balance the loss incurred by individuals as a consequence of the 
EC’s continued WTO infringement was in breach of general principles, including property-related 
rights.37 
The Court recalled its previous case-law whereby prope ty-related rights do not constitute absolute 
entitlements, but must be viewed in relation to their social function.38 It thus held that the exercise of 
the right to property and to pursue a trade or profession freely may be restricted on condition that tose 
restrictions correspond to objectives of general interest pursued by the Community and that, with 
regard to the aim pursued, they do not constitute a disproportionate and intolerable interference which 
infringes the very substance of the rights guaranteed.39 Called upon to assess FIAMM’s request, the 
                                                   
34  Dimopoulos, ‘The Effects of the Lisbon Treaty’ 167. 
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Court would have needed to address the questions as to whether the temporary acceptance of 
retaliation was in the general interest and whether  resulting restriction of trade for retaliation 
victims constituted a proportionate and tolerable int rference. 
Earlier in its judgment, the Court did recognized the potential right to compensation where no 
provision has been made for compensation to avoid or remedy the impairment of the very substance of 
those rights in a disproportionate and intolerable manner. However, it concluded that Community law 
as it stood did not provide for a regime enabling the liability of the Community for its legislative 
conduct to found an action in a situation where, account being taken of the denial of direct effect to 
WTO rules within the EU legal order, any failure ofsuch conduct to comply with the WTO 
agreements cannot be relied upon before the Community courts.40 Besides the analysis of the existence 
and applicability of the liability regime,41 the Court based its founding on settled case-law whereby an 
economic operator cannot claim a right to property in a market share which he may have held at any 
given time, since such a market share constitutes only a momentary economic position which is 
exposed to the risks of changing circumstances.42 Moreover, the guarantees accorded by property-
related rights cannot be extended to protect mere commercial interests or opportunities, the 
uncertainties of which are part of the very essence of conomic activity.43 The Court stated that an 
economic operator whose business mainly consists in exporting goods to the markets of non-Member 
States must be aware that the commercial position which he has at a given time may be affected and 
altered by various circumstances, including the possibility that one of the EU’s trading partners may 
adopt measures suspending concessions within the framework of the WTO as a result of EU non-
compliance with WTO decisions and may for this purpose select in its discretion the goods to be 
subject to those retaliatory measures, as provided for in Arts. 22(3)(a) and (f) of the DSU.44 
Some time after the much debated FIAMM judgment, the European Charter of Fundamental Rights 
entered into force, thus allowing for a possible change in the Court’s attitude vis-à-vis the possibility 
to rely on fundamental rights when challenging the Union’s conduct in the context of international 
trade disputes and when demanding compensation in case of losses resulting therefrom. 
Art. 6(1) of the reformed Treaty confers upon the CFR the same legal value as the founding Treaties. 
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the rights codified in the Charter therefore acquire 
constitutional value within the European legal order. Even though the Court of Justice had consistently 
stated that fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of Community law whose 
observance the Court must ensure already before the entry into force of a binding Charter,45 the 
provision above entails the obligation for European institutions to respect the rights, freedoms and 
prohibitions contained therein. A breach of such obligations will in turn result in the annulment of the 
relevant acts by the Court.46 Therefore, the Charter acts as a parameter of legality also in relation to 
measures adopted under the CCP.47 
Art. 17 CFR recognises the right for everyone to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her lawfully 
acquired possessions. Deprivations of possessions are prohibited, except if operated in the public 
interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensation 
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being paid in good time for their loss. This article is based on Art. 1 of the First Protocol to the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Notwithstanding the slightly updated wording, in 
accordance with Art. 52(3) CFR, the meaning and scope of the right are the same as those guaranteed 
by the ECHR and the limitations may not exceed those provided for therein. Moreover, this is a 
fundamental right common to all Member States’ constitutions which has been recognised on 
numerous occasions and which is part of settled ECJcase-law having its origins in the Hauer 
judgment.48 
Whereas Art. 17 CFR specifically protects the right to peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions, it 
nonetheless affords Member States – and EU institutions - considerable scope to interfere with 
individual property rights, as resulting from the aforementioned conditions for a lawful State-operated 
deprivation of a person’s possession. Moreover, States re responsible only for interferences affecting 
the economic value of property.49 
A ‘fair balance test’ will be applied in order to determine whether a fair balance has been struck 
between the demands stemming from the general interest of the Community and the need to protect 
individuals’ fundamental rights.50 The level of justification required will depend onthe extent of the 
interference on the individual’s enjoyment of the right in each case. The precise weight to be given to 
the different interests will, in most cases, involve a wide range of policy considerations and, indeed, 
matters of political judgment. Accordingly, courts are likely to afford States and institutions a wide 
margin of appreciation51 when determining whether the Community interest outweighs individual 
interests in any particular case involving the right to property. 
As it should be recalled, the State is required to emonstrate that the deprivation of property under Art. 
17 CFR is in the public interest. In particular, the State must identify the interest in question, how the 
deprivation is rationally connected to it, and show that the interference is proportionate. However, it 
seems difficult to conceive circumstances in which the Court would dispute the purpose alleged by the 
government or contest its assertion that a measure p sued a public interest. Moreover, the 
requirement that conditions provided by law must be respected means that the State must have a basis 
in national law for its act of deprivation and that the law concerned must be both accessible and 
sufficiently certain. In particular, the law should contain sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness. 
Finally, Art. 17 CFR clearly states that individuals are entitled to fair compensation in good time for 
their loss, except when the deprivation is in the public interest and in the cases and under the 
conditions provided for by law. The payment of compensation will be a highly relevant factor 
determining whether a ‘fair balance’ has been struck between the community at large52 and the rights 
of the individual in question53. 
Art. 16 CFR acknowledges the freedom to conduct a business in accordance with Community law and 
national laws and practices. This provision is based inter alia on the ECJ case-law recognizing the 
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freedom to exercise an economic or commercial activity.54 in line with such case-law, the enjoyment 
of such right is subject to the limitations provided for in Art. 52(1) of the Charter. In particular, the 
freedom to run a business includes protection for one f the essential principles of free-market 
economics, which is the freedom of competition. This requirement means that the activities of the EU 
should include a system ensuring that competition in the Internal Market is not distorted. On this basis, 
Art. 16 CFR protects the right of each person within t e EU to start-up or continue a business without 
being subject to either discrimination or unnecessary restriction. 
Besides the restrictions to the above rights provided by the Charter itself, the impact of such 
provisions on the FIAMM case-law is to also be considered in the light of their very nature and origin. 
The issue is whether acknowledging a legally binding value for the Charter makes a substantial 
difference. CFR rights are mainly a codification of obligations previously recognised by the ECJ as 
being part of the EU legal order and/or derived from the ECHR. From the start, the Charter has been 
conceived as a catalogue that formally recognises rights de facto already in force through different 
sources of the Union’s legal order, such as internaio l law, the constitutional traditions common to 
all Member States, the European Convention on Human Rights, Community and Union acts and 
judgements of the Court of Justice, rather than an instrument codifying new rights and prohibitions. 55 
Therefore, it is debatable whether the Charter will be a real watershed56 vis-à-vis the ECJ’s approach 
to the relation between the protection of fundamental property rights and the Union’s scope for 
manoeuvre in the management of commercial disputes. 
Although it adds further pieces to the puzzle of fundamental rights protection within the EU, the 
Union’s prospected accession to the ECHR does not clarify the issues in so far as the protection of 
property-related rights under the Convention suffers rom the same constraints highlighted in relation 
to the CFR given that, as mentioned above, the lattr is inspired to the former. 
4. Issue III – The Impact of the External Relations Institutional Reform on the Strategic 
Management of Commercial Disputes and the Need for Coordination 
Are organisational arrangements in the management of the CCP and trade disputes foreseen in order 
to better accommodate the institutional reform that EU external relations has undergone? Is there a 
need to establish a mechanism of coordination with the HRVP and the EEAS? 
The extent to which the Lisbon reform will affect the management of the CCP and of trade disputes 
will also depend on what use the institutions and institutional figures directly – or indirectly – involved 
will make of the new opportunities afforded by the Tr aty itself. 
On the one hand, from the point of view of specific trade-related provisions, Art. 207 TFEU confirms 
the consolidated practice whereby, in relation to trade, the core of EU policy-making has been the 
relation between the Commission and Member States, sitting either in the Council or in its ‘Article 
133 Committee’, now renamed as ‘Trade Policy Committee’.57 The latter institution remains formally 
charged with the legislative responsibility in the field of trade. However, one of the main novelties put 
forth by the recent reform consists in the fact thae Council is now joined by the Parliament, which, 
as co-legislator in the ordinary legislative procedure (OLP), for the first time enjoys equal decision-
making powers in trade-related matters. 
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On the other hand, and more in general, the inclusion of trade policy under the common heading of EU 
external action and the applicability to the CCP of the general objectives and principles contained 
therein, raises questions as to the role that other institutions and bodies may play in relation to trade 
matters. 
First and foremost, there is room for a possible involvement of the High Representative/Vice-President 
(HRVP) in his/her dual role of head of European diplomacy (High Representative for the CFSP), 
assisted by the European External Action Service (EEAS), and coordinator of European external 
policies (Commission Vice-President in charge of the extended ‘relex’ portfolio). 
Moreover, given the acknowledged instrumental value of commercial measures for the attainment of 
non-trade objectives, a role in the management of the CCP, however non-pivotal, can be envisaged 
also for the EEAS. The need for the EU to be represented either in multilateral fora or in bilateral 
negotiations inter alia for the sake of dispute settlement may result in coordination issues arising. 
Finally, looking at the judicial aspect of EU governance, it is submitted that both the Union’s renewed 
commitment to fundamental rights and the broader ori ntation of the CCP towards general objectives 
create new parameters for the ECJ to apply when reviewing the legality of trade measures. 
4.1. The HR/VP, the EEAS and the Need for Coordination 
The HRVP is in a position to influence the conduct of the CCP by virtue of his/her institutional 
ubiquity. The dual function of Vice President of the Commission charged of external affairs and of the 
institutional figure responsible for the conduct of the CFSP enables the HRVP to influence policy 
making in trade-related matters both by participating in the work of the Commission and by taking 
autonomous actions. 
It has been maintained that Art. 18(4) TEU prioritises between the two roles of the HRVP so that, in 
case of conflict of interests, his/her role as head of the Union’s diplomacy and director of the CFSP 
must prevail (nota). The question could therefore be raised as to whether this may cause the CCP to be 
more CFSP-oriented because of the HRVP’s influence. In this respect, an reasonable position is that 
the High Representative should not be expected to affect the focus of the CCP more than is necessary 
for the sake of ensuring coherence with the CFSP.58 Avoiding inconsistencies between different 
external policies and turf battles amongst different services in charge of external relations is precisely 
the aim of endowing the HRVP with a ‘double hat’. The possibility of autonomous action foreseen by 
Arts. 215(1) and 218(9) TFEU does not affect this evaluation. Arguably, he/she will therefore not 
interfere with the tasks of the remaining ‘relex’ Commissioners, such as for instance the Trade 
Commissioner, who keep their posts and their prerogatives over the competence portfolio they are 
entrusted with. 
As regards the role the HRVP will need to play in striking the balance between trade and non-trade 
objectives, much will depend on how the relationship develops between the HRVP, the EEAS, the 
Commission and the Council. One indicator of how things might develop is where Commission staff 
dealing with trade issues will sit. As it is known, this is not going to be in the EEAS, which will thus 
not have autonomous know-how in trade matters. DG Trade will stay where it has been for decades, 
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therefore retaining – arguably with limited intention to share59 – the institutional memory and the 
technical expertise that is central to trade policy.60 
The conclusion that could been drawn is that the High Representative and the Council will continue to 
make key-political decisions, concerning for instance trade negotiations (who? where? when? with 
whom?), but DG Trade is likely to continue to develop the content of trade policy measures for the 
foreseeable future.61 However, such a conclusion is nuanced by the fact that, following the Lisbon 
Treaty, trade is not just about trade. Before the reform the equation applied by Community trade 
policy-makers was the following: depending on the community interest, reduction of trade barriers 
equals achievement of liberalisation objectives, which is to say that liberalisation is affordable to the 
extent that it does not conflict with Community interests. The relation between the content of a trade 
measures and its objectives is now much more complex. For the sake of ensuring the legality of trade 
measures, DG Trade is now obliged to stick to the objective of liberalisation without declining it 
according to the Community interest and to consider other variables, i.e. the other general objectives 
of EU external action. In order to fulfil these uneasy tasks, institutional memory and technical 
expertise may not be sufficient. However time-consuming, coordination efforts with other 
Commission services, the HRVP and the EEAS might becom  a crucial instrument. 
It has been argued that the exclusion of DG Trade from the EEAS is a result of the exclusive nature of 
EU competence in this policy-area.62 It is to be noted that under the current legal framework – or 
better, legal network – of EU external policies, exclusivity is not in itself a gateway to consistency. 
Moreover, consistency is not an end in itself. Consistency as absence of contradictions between trade 
measures and non-trade objectives becomes crucial under the reformed Treaty because the very 
legality of trade measures is at stake. Legality in this respect can be achieved only through a trade 
policy-making exercise that takes a variety of objectiv s into account by means of coordination 
mechanisms. 
Once again the challenge of coordination is of utmost importance, even more so insofar as trade 
disputes are concerned. Employed in the past as powerful instruments of foreign policy lato sensu, 
trade disputes involving the EC have represented battles of standards and interests, particularly when 
the EC was summoned as defendant before the DSB. The question today is who will dispose of the 
power to use such a powerful instrument? Who will deci e what purposes the EU strategy in 
commercial disputes is to serve? Who will be determine such strategy? 
So far, the Commission has been the unchallenged authority in this filed. In particular, the legal 
service of DG Trade has to date been entrusted with WTO dispute settlement and the TBR. They 
possess the technical expertise to assess interests and set positions in the midst of a controversy. They 
retain historic memory of past and ongoing WTO disputes involving the EC and now the EU. It should 
therefore be concluded that they represent the more qualified institutional subject and, arguably, they 
will retain their monopoly over dispute settlement management. 
Whereas it appears to be the most reassuring option, two problems may arise in relation to path-
dependency in the management of commercial disputes. First of all, trade disputes would remain a 
field of self-referential policy-making, where priorities are autonomously set by Commission. DG 
Trade may fail to take into account what are the current non-commercial objectives that trade 
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measures, including those relating to the settlement of disputes, must pursue. The need for 
coordination comes to the fore once again. 
One may argue that the problem of ensuring coordinatio  and consistency is not really new, 
particularly when it comes to EU external relations. Such a need has always been perceived at the 
policy level. The difference between the present and the past, namely between the pre- and post-
Lisbon era, lies precisely in the governance sphere to which such coordination needs can be ascribed. 
During the pre-Lisbon era, coordination and consistency were desirable for the sake of policy 
effectiveness. The reformed Treaty adds a further dimension by indirectly making them crucial for the 
legality of policy measures. Should a trade measure, fo  instance the decision to suffer retaliation or to 
pay compensations as result of an adverse DSB report, be at odds with other ‘relex’ objectives, such as 
environmental protection or development cooperation, it can be now formally sanctioned by the ECJ. 
Secondly, as discussed below, a further potential inconvenience of path-dependency may derive from 
the reinvigorated role of the European Parliament in trade policy. 
4.2. The European Parliament 
The role of the European Parliament (EP) in trade policy is formally enhanced by the Lisbon reform. 
Firstly, Art. 207 TFEU confers upon the EP and the Council the power to adopt the measures defining 
the framework for implementing the CCP, in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure. The 
EP now shares co-decision powers with the Council to adopt measures relating to anti-dumping, 
safeguards, the Trade Barriers Regulation (TBR) and the EU’s GSP scheme. Secondly, the EP is 
granted a greater – however not crucial – say in trade negotiations. Although the EP is not given 
powers to be directly involved in negotiations or t authorize them, the Commission is now obliged 
(Art. 207(3) TFEU) to regularly report to the specialised EP International Trade Committee (INTA) 
and to provide it with information concerning the conduct of negotiations. Finally, the EP will have an 
enhanced role in ratifying trade agreements through its power to consent to their adoption. Art. 
218(6)(a) TFEU lists the cases in which the consent of the EP is a mandatory requirement for the 
conclusion of an agreement by the Council. Since such cases include inter alia the conclusion of 
agreements covering fields to which the OLP applies, the EP is granted the power to consent to 
practically all trade agreements by virtue of the extension of the ordinary legislative procedure to trade 
matters. 
In view of the above, questions arise concerning possible EP attempts to be involved in the 
management of trade disputes, particularly since trade disputes may relate to issues that are sensitive 
to public opinion. Consumer health and environmental protection, for example, are of particularly 
important for democratically elected institutions such as the EP, whose members inevitably tend to 
work for their own re-election throughout their mand te. 
Moreover, the enhanced role of the Parliament via the application of the OLP for the revision of trade 
measures might add new means to the EU strategy in commercial disputes. As in most two-level 
games63, the EP veto can be used as a bargaining tool during the diplomatic phase of WTO dispute 
settlement procedures or during the negotiation of extra-legem agreements with complainant WTO 
members. The subtle threat of an uncooperative Parliament, that retains a power of veto over ongoing 
negotiations, could be used by EU negotiators as a device to obtain a softening of the counterparts’ 
requests. 
                                                   
63  For a compherensive theory of multilevel games, se R Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The logic of Two-
Level Games’ (1988) 42 International Organization 427. 
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4.3. The ECJ 
The broader perspective in which the CCP is placed under the reformed Treaty might also affect the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. Indeed, the latter could now be called upon to apply additional new 
parameters when reviewing the legality of trade and non-trade measures, in what could be defined as 
‘cross-policy’ judicial control. Different scenarios can result in such a judicial control. On the one
hand, the content of a trade measure could be such as to hamper the achievement of further 
liberalisation of the world market, which is a stated objective of the CCP. This is likely to result in the 
annulment of the measure by the Court. Moreover, still concerning trade measures, legality review can 
now be conducted also in the light of general external objectives such as the promotion of political and
social development, the enhancement for multilateralism and so on. On the other hand, non-trade 
measures might in turn negatively affect trade objectiv s, namely liberalisation. 
As it has been shown earlier,64 the incompatibility between trade and non-trade concerns enshrined in 
the last two scenarios is a perfectly conceivable ground for a legality challenge. Particularly relevant 
for the evolution of dispute management by the EU is the case of alleged inconsistencies of a CCP 
measure with objectives of the Union’s external action other than those inherently related to the 
commercial policy – i.e. liberalisation. In this case, the Court would plausibly adopt a three-step 
approach.65 It would establish the alleged incompatibility in the first place. The Court would then 
clarify whether a legitimate justification to such incompatibility exists. In other words, the existence of 
a necessary functional relation between, on the one hand, the challenged measure’s content, which had 
been previously established as detrimental to some th r external action objective and, on the other, 
the pursuance of a declared objective of the challenged measure itself must be proven. The Court 
would eventually apply a proportionality test in order to ascertain whether or not the content of the 
measure does exceed what is necessary for the pursuance of its declared objective. Should this be the 
case, the measure would result disproportionate with respect to its aim, however justified, which 
would lead the Court to declare the measure void. 
The question remains as to whether the Court has got the technical expertise to assess the adverse 
impact of trade actions on other ‘relex’ objectives, account being taken of the technical nature of such 
measures, whose non-commercial side effects are not always easy to detect. 
A further limit might arise in relation to those subjects, both institutional and not, who might at once 
be legally capable of and politically interested in challenging a trade measure on the ground of its 
incompatibility with other external action objectives. As regard the institutions’ position as privileged 
applicants in actions for annulment, the issue is whether they retain a political interest in challenging a 
trade measure, be it an agreement concluded under Art. 207(3) TFEU or a piece of CCP-implementing 
secondary legislation adopted under Art. 207(2) TFEU, whose coming into being they have 
contributed to in the first place. Having regard to this aspect, the major change with respect to the TEC
regime can be found in the different relative positi ns of the institutions involved in trade-related 
decision-making. Both applicable to the conclusion of trade agreements and to the adoption of 
implementing legislation, the ordinary legislative procedure put the EP on an equal footing with the 
Council, which makes the two institutions equally responsible for the content of the act and therefore 
unlikely inclined to challenge it before the ECJ. As for the Commission, its position is more nuanced 
in that, although it holds a right to initiate the procedure, it does not share legislative responsibility 
with regard to the content of the eventually adopted measure.66 The same can be stated with regard to 
                                                   
64  See above. 
65  It mirrors the two-fold reasoning mentioned in para. I.4 regarding the case of a non-trade measure negatively affecting 
liberalisation. 
66  From the legal point of view, this consideration holds true even in the light of the Commission’s right to modify the 
legislative proposal at any stage of the procedure and in the light of its role as negotiator on behalf of the Council. On the 
one hand, the Commission’s right to modify the proposal is said to confer to the institution a significant bargaining power 
during the procedure, particularly vis-à-vis the Council; see R Adam and A Tizzano, Lineamenti di Diritto dell’Unione 
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the Member States. The fact that each of them sits in the Council does not prevent possible 
disagreements to arise with respect to the adopted m asures to the extent that the rule of qualified 
majority voting is applicable, with the result that dissenting opinions within the Council might be 
disregarded. Finally, having regard to non-privileged applicants, judicial actions are obviously the sol  
possibility for legal and physical persons to challenge trade measures whose content is deemed to 
hamper the achievement of other external goals. In this respect, not only political reluctances resulting 
from decision-making are of no concern since individuals are the recipient and not the actors of the 
legislative procedure, but also the reform of the admissibility requirements for annulment proceedings 
brought about by the Lisbon Treaty points in the dir ct on of an enhancement of the chances for non-
privileged applicants to resort to legality actions.67 
The above shows how concrete the hypothesis of judicial review being conducted by the Court is for 
the purpose of assessing the legality of trade measur s in the light of their compatibility with non-
commercial external objectives. Notwithstanding thewide margin of discretion enjoyed by political 
institutions in striking the balance between trade nd non-trade objectives of the CCP, the potential for 
ECJ intervention should not be underestimated on the ground that the Court has so far chosen to 
interfere only marginally in trade-related matters for the sake of not tying the hands of political 
institutions. After all, it was the Court itself that suggested that the incompatibility of EU trade 
measures with objectives other than commercial ones, such as the protection of fundamental rights, 
could serve as ground for alleging the illegality of such measures. 
Although the initiation of an action for annulment based on the above grounds is both conceivable 
from the theoretical point of view and actually likely to occur in practice, attention must nonetheless 
be paid to the difference between the action in itself, and the grounds thereof, as well as the solution 
that the Court could devise in order to decide such a ase. In particular, caution should be used when 
thinking about what could be expected from the Court. Since the Treaty does not contain any 
prioritisation rule to be applied to different and potentially conflicting external objectives, the Court 
would not be in a position to do much more than acknowledging that a trade measures might 
negatively affect other ‘relex’ objectives. Striking the balance between those must be left to the 
political institutions.68 The Court is therefore unlikely to go as far as to criticise the balance that the 
latter have chosen, simply because there is no rule of prioritisation upon which the European 
judicature could base any such condemnation. 
 
(Contd.)                                                             
Europea (Torino: Giappichelli 2010) 177. The existence of such power of modification of the proposal might acu lly 
induce the Commission to make use of it for the purpose of obtaining the desired content of the measure before the end of 
the legislative procedure, instead of resorting to the ECJ afterwards. However plausible, this scenario does not in fact 
hamper the capacity of the Commission to challenge the legality of the measure after its adoption. On the other hand, the 
same can be said with regard to the role of negotiator of trade agreements enjoyed by the Commission. As foreseen in 
Art. 207(3) TFEU, second and third alinea, such role is played on behalf of the Council, within the framework of the 
directives issued by the latter and under the strict control of its specialised committee (formerly known as ‘Article 133 
Committee’). Therefore the Commission’s discretion is not unlimited and the Council is ultimately responsible for the 
conclusion of the agreement. This leaves some room f r disagreement with the Commission as regards the content of the 
agreement itself. 
67  Under Art. 263 TFEU, fourth alinea, natural and legal persons who intend to initiate an action for annulment can do so to 
the extent that the contested measure is an act addressed to them or is of direct and individual concer  to them or that the 
measure consists of a regulatory act which directly oncerns the applicant and which does not entail implementing 
measures. This is different from the previous admissib lity regime, in which individuals were required to prove their 
interest in the annulment of the challenged measure by means of a demonstration that the latter was of both direct and 
individual concern to them. The requirement of the individuality of the measure was particularly cumbersome, all the 
more in relation to trade measures whose scope is often too general to accommodate such condition for admissibility, 
which therefore represented a concrete constraint on individuals’ actions against the legality of trade measures. 
68  For a comparative institutional analysis argument in his respect, see the contribution by Boris Rigod in this edited 
Working Paper. 
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5. Concluding Remarks  
This paper attempted to assess whether innovations brought about by the Lisbon Treaty in relation to 
the Union trade policy and to EU external action will cause a rethinking of the Union’s strategy in the
management of trade disputes. 
The arguments presented herein lead to the conclusion that such a rethinking of the Union’s strategy 
for the management of commercial disputes is likely to take place insofar as the previous strategy will 
no longer prove suitable for the achievement of the current objectives of the EU trade policy. This is 
for three reasons. First, the objectives themselves have changed in number and nature, now 
encompassing both trade and non-trade goals. Secondly, the circumstances of EU trade action have 
changed and additional constraints might arise to the extent that the EU constitutional architecture has 
come to encompass a legally binding Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Union itself is bound to 
eventually join the European Convention for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Finally, if 
considered in the light of both the new objectives and the new context of the Union’s trade policy, the 
current strategy appears too risky and therefore unbearable, as its exposure to adverse judicial review 
has now become more likely. 
What is next then? Whereas they have previously enjoy d a wide scope for manoeuvre, EU political 
institutions are now in for a quite demanding jugglin  exercise as their strategy towards commercial 
disputes must be fine-tuned so as to ensure full consideration of both trade and non-trade objectives of 
EU external action. The number of balls to throw in the air and catch again has suddenly grown. 
Bearing in mind the broader orientation of the CCP towards general and potentially conflicting 
external objectives, the task of balancing between liberalisation and other objectives acquires a new 
crucial dimension. Long established practices and orientations in policy-making are not likely to 
change overnight. Commercial strategies, particularly when it comes to international disputes, are no 
exception in this respect. Time will tell whether political institutions, particularly the Commission, the 
Council and the HRVP will be up to the task by means of coordination efforts, or whether the ECJ will 
be called to play a more active – although not necessarily corrective – role in strategy-making. 
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The ‘New Generation’ of EU Free Trade Agreements and the Duty of Consistency 
 
Boris Rigod* 
Abstract 
Since its foundation, the EU has concluded about 30 free trade agreements (FTAs) with countries all 
over the world. Notwithstanding this huge number of agreements, the EU launched a new series of 
FTA negotiations in 2006. This paper, first, delineates the policy shift from strict multilateralism in 
trade policy to the launch of new FTA negotiations a d identifies four reasons for that development: 
the refocusing of the common commercial policy on economic goals, the inaptitude of existing FTAs 
to serve them, the stalemate of negotiations within e WTO and the EU's main competitors’ trade 
policies. Having set the framework, the paper briefly sketches out the content of the first FTA 
concluded under the new trade strategy. Part three en turns to the duty of consistency in EU external 
relations and the question of how EU FTAs may be accommodated with other EU policies. Whereas 
some commentators try to define 'consistency' in substantive terms, the paper argues that the decisive 
question is not the term’s abstract meaning but rathe  who decides on EU policy 'consistency'. This, in 
turn, has repercussions on how to assess the role of FTAs in the general framework of EU external 
affairs.  
Keywords 
Common Commercial Policy (CCP) – free trade agreements – EU-Korea FTA – 
consistency/coherence – comparative institutional aysis  
1. Introduction 
Currently, there are about 30 free trade agreements between the European Union and third states, 
which are in force or in the process of ratification. This web of treaties covers countries in Europe, 
Asia, and Africa and the Americas. Notwithstanding this broad coverage, the EU launched a new 
series of FTA negotiations in 2006 and concluded its first FTA from this series, after a seven-year de 
facto moratorium on FTAs, with the Republic of Korea in 2010. This treaty is, however, only the first 
of a long list of prospective agreements. Apart from ngoing negotiations with Canada, India and 
Singapore, FTAs are planned with a wide range of countries all over the world.  
The re-engagement in bilateral trade negotiations fllowed a lengthy de facto moratorium on activities 
outside the WTO framework, which aimed at sustaining the current multilateral negotiations.1 The 
question hence arises: what has changed to make the Union re-embark on bilateral negotiations despite 
ongoing efforts within the WTO? In what follows, I shall first explain the inducements leading to the 
launch of new FTA negotiations. Second, I will give an overview on the EU-Korea FTA as the first 
tangible result of the 2006 policy shift and point out how it reflects the EU's renewed priorities. The 
third part puts the 'new generation' of FTAs into the broader context of the duty of consistency of the 
EU external action.      
                                                   
*  PhD candidate, European University Institute. 
1  European Commission, Report on Progress Achieved on the Global Europe Strategy 2006-2010, SEC(2010) 1268/2, 
Brussels 9 November 2010, 3.  
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2. Why New FTAs? 
The motivations to establish preferential trading arrangements outside the WTO framework are 
manifold. Economists and political scientists offer various explanations why states seek to conclude 
trade agreements in general and FTAs in particular. The classical economic inducement is enhanced 
market access.2 Based on Ricardo’s model of comparative advantage and economies of scale, FTAs 
which liberalize trade increase welfare of all participants in comparison to a situation where trade 
barriers exist. By contrast, Bagwell and Staiger stress the function of trade agreements to disciplne 
governments, which may, due to their country’s economic ponderosity, exploit its market power, in 
particular to inhibit the setting of tariffs and other border measures so as to influence a state’s term -
of-trade, that is the quantity of imports it can buy through the sale of its exports.3 However, this 
approach is highly contested, first, because it does not seem to either explain the question why state 
under real-world conditions do not manipulate their t rms-of-trade, or why trade agreements rarely 
contain rules on export duties, which are one of the few pure ‘terms-of trade’ instrument.4 A third 
approach considers trade agreements as a means for long term government commitments, which 
ensure time consistency of trade policies and allow g vernments to resist the protectionist pressure of 
domestic interest groups by referring to their inter ational obligations.5 Others, in turn, have 
emphasized the role of FTAs for non-economic foreign policy goals6 but also governments’ 
motivations to satisfy domestic constituencies, whose interest in foreign markets and political 
influence has shifted the political economy equilibrium in favour of free trade.7 Finally, FTAs are 
regarded as a means to put political pressure on other WTO members, in order to accelerate 
negotiations and deepen commitments.8 
The inducements for the launch of the ‘new generation’ FTAs were, as will be shown, based on 
economic considerations and corresponded largely to the explanations outlined above except for the 
‘foreign policy’ and ‘terms-of-trade’ arguments. The specific incitements of the EU to embark on new 
bilateral trade negotiations are comprehensively summarized in the Commission's 2006 'Global 
Europe' communication9 and endorsed in the most recent 2010 'Trade, Growth and World Affairs' 
communication.10 From these two documents, one may identify four main reasons for the launch of 
new FTA negotiations: first and foremost, domestic economic policy considerations; second, the 
inaptitude of existing trade agreements to be conducive to the EU’s economic objectives; third, the 
stalemate of the Doha Development Round; and finally, the trade policy of the EU's main competitors.  
                                                   
2  On the EU’s market access strategy beyond treaty conclusion, see Joanna Miksa’s contribution in thisedited Working 
Paper. 
3  K Bagwell and R Staiger, The Economics of the World Trading System (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 2002) 18 et seq. 
4  D Regan, ‘What are Trade Agreements for? Two Conflicting Stories Told by Economists, with a Lesson for Lawyers’ 
(2006) 9 Journal of International Economic Law 951, 969-82.  
5  G Maggi and A Rodriguez-Clare, ‘The Value of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressures’ (1998) 106 
Journal of Political Economy 574. 
6  See the references in B Hoekman and M Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Trading System (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2009) 480-81. 
7  R Baldwin, ‘A Domino Theory of Regionalism’ in R Baldwin, P Haaparanta and J Kiander (eds), Expanding European 
Regionalism: The EU’s New Members (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1995); W Ethier, ‘The Theory of Trade 
Policy and Trade Agreements: A Critique’ (2007) 23 European Journal of Political Economy 605.  
8  Hoekman and Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Trading System 480. 
9  Commission of the European Communities, Global Europe: Competing in the World’ – A Contribution to the EU’s 
Growth and Job Strategy, COM(2006)567 final, Brussels, 4 October 2006.  
10  European Commission, Trade, Growth and World Affairs – Trade Policy as a Core Component of the EU’s 2020 
Strategy, COM(2010)612, Brussels 9 November 2010.  
The ‘New Generation’ of EU Free Trade Agreements and the Duty of Consistency 
  
63 
2.1. Domestic Policy Considerations 
The first and foremost objective is to stimulate economic growth. Finalizing all ongoing negotiations 
would result in a 1% increase of the EU GDP. Economies of scale and comparative advantage through 
the establishment of free trade areas would most likely foster also employment opportunities and 
consumer welfare and thereby create tangible results for European citizens.11  In the words of a recent 
Commission communication,  
‘[t]he latest generation of competitiveness-driven Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) is precisely 
inspired by the objective of unleashing the economic potential of the world's important growth 
markets to EU trade and investment.’12 
The thereby acquired welfare gains are, however, accompanied by efficiency pressure on all producers 
within the free trade area. While tariffs and other import barriers may allow inefficient producers to 
remain in the market, the logic of the free trade area is to force these producers either to adapt to the 
stronger competition by becoming more productive or to give way to more efficient producers. The 
establishment of new free trade areas has hence (presumably) the important domestic effect of 
fostering innovation and efficiency through competition.   
Moreover, concluding FTAs locks in domestic policy reforms. The external and the internal 
dimensions of trade are intrinsically linked. FTAs will increase competitive pressure on EU market 
actors and, arguably, promote efficiency. The establi hment of free trade areas is, accordingly, a way
to encourage domestic reforms and even to foster the completion of the Internal Market by creating 
incentives for higher economies of scale and accompanying comparative advantages in international 
competition. This holds true, in particular, for sectors which are not yet wholly liberalized, such as the 
services sector. In the same vein, by binding itself externally the Union may overcome collective 
action problems13 and reject claims of domestic interest groups for pr tectionist measures by tying its 
hands ex ante.  
Political support for a European free trade agenda, however, does not depend on economic criteria 
alone. Apart from 'adjustment' costs caused through competitive pressure and detrimental effects on 
social justice,14 trade policy has to take into account wider policy concerns, primarily in order to 
ensure support by that part of the domestic constituency that has only an indirect interest in free trade. 
Whereas opposition to free trade has traditionally been expected from import-competing industries, 
nowadays resistance is broader. It ranges from worried consumers and workers to plain citizens who 
are worried about non-economic virtues such as labour standards, environmental protection or cultural 
diversity, which they feel are threatened by the forces of free trade.15 Since these worries are not fully 
addressed within the multilateral framework, FTAs may be a tool to secure that these aspects are taken 
into account and strengthen the social legitimacy of trade policy.  
In sum, the first reason for the launch of new FTA negotiations reposes on there are three domestic 
policy considerations: commercial interests, the lock-in of the open market model domestically and 
linkage issues concerning the social acceptance of trade policy. These objectives, however, also have a 
more far-reaching goal, which is to contribute to the Union’s 'output' legitimacy.16 This pursuit of 
                                                   
11  European Commission, Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, COM(2010)2020, Brussels, 
3 March 2010, 22 et seq.; and European Commission, Trade, Growth and World Affairs, 5. 
12  European Commission, Towards a Comprehensive European International Investm n  Policy, COM(2010)343 final, 
Brussels, 7 July 2010, 7. 
13  Cf. M Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and theTheory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press 1971). 
14  European Commission, Global Europe, 4. 
15  J Pauwelyn, 'New Trade Politics for the 21st Century' (2008) 11 Journal of International Economic Law 559, 563.  
16  'Output legitimacy' can be described in terms of Lincol 's famous description of the main elements of democracy as 
'government for the people', which requires ‘no more than the perception of a range of common interests that is 
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legitimacy is brought home in the 'Global Europe' communication, which states: '[E]conomic 
prosperity, social justice and sustainable development […] are a core criterion by which citizens will 
judge whether Europe is delivering results in their daily lives.'17             
2.2. Inaptitude of Existing FTAs 
The next reason to embark on new bilateral trade accords is that existing FTAs do not fully serve the 
current EU trade policy’s objectives.18 While they promote the EU's security and development policy 
interests quite well, they have a low impact on trade, mainly because the respective FTA partners are 
of relatively little importance for EU trade. The inducements for many FTAs were mainly political. 
The Union’s exclusive competence in the field of external trade (Art. 207(1) juncto Art. 3(1)(e) 
TFEU) has made FTAs susceptible to the use of purposes ther than commercial interests, i.e. in this 
case, to meet general foreign policy concerns.19 The constant struggles for the common commercial 
policy’s accurate scope between Commission and Council provide illustrative examples for this 
susceptibility.20 Therefore, existing EU FTAs can be subdivided intotw  broader groups: those which 
are motivated primarily by foreign policy considerations, such as development, security and the 
promotion of regional integration and those which aim t commercial objectives.21  
The first group comprises three kinds of agreements with either developing countries or countries in 
transition. First, European Partnership Agreements with regional groups of the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) countries which aim at development and poverty reduction through trade and provide 
for political dialogue.22 Secondly, agreements within the framework of the neighbourhood policy, i.e. 
the Euro-Med Agreements with the Mediterranean state  that promote economic integration and 
democratic reforms within these countries and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with the 
eastern neighbours such as Ukraine. Finally, the Stabilisation and Association Agreements with the 
Western Balkan Countries, which intend to ensure peace and stability within the region by providing 
support by, inter alia, establishing a free trade area among the respective countries and the Union, and 
primarily aim at preparing these countries for prosective membership in the Union. 
Apparently, these agreements are less commercially motivated and make no claim to have a huge 
impact on economic welfare in the Union, at least not at the moment. That these agreements serve 
other purposes, too, is strongly reflected in the broadness of issues addressed, which reach far beyond 
trade, as, for instance, rules on illegal immigration,23 on nuclear safety24 or on illicit drugs.25 All these 
(Contd.)                                                             
sufficiently broad and stable to justify institutional arrangements for collective action’. F Scharpf, Governing in Europe: 
Effective and Democratic? (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999) 12.   
17  European Commission, Global Europe, 2. 
18  European Commission, Global Europe, 9. 
19  O Cattaneo, ‘The Political Economy of PTAs’ in S Lester and B Mercurio (eds), Bilateral and Regional Trade 
Agreements: Commentary and Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009) 28, 44-5. 
20  Cf. P Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union: Legal and Constitutional Foundations (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005) chapters 2-4; P Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2006) 
chapters 1-3 both with references to the relevant cse-law. 
21  For a similar distinction see M Cremona, ‘The European Union and Regional Trade Agreements’ (2010) 1 European 
Yearbook of International Economic Law 245 and 249. For an analysis of most of these agreements see M Maresceau, 
‘Bilateral Agreements concluded by the European Communities’ (2004) 309 Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of 
International Law 311-450. 
22  L Bartels, ‘The Trade and Development Policy of the European Union’ (2007) 18 European Journal of International Law 
715, 733 et seq. 
23  Art. 57 of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their 
Member States, of the one part, and the State of Israel, of the other part [2000] OJ L147/3. 
24  Art. 103 of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of 
the one part, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, of the other part [2004] OJ L84/13. 
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fields clearly exceed the conventional coverage of trade agreements. Even though one may be tempted 
to explain the inclusion of non-trade issues by the inf rence that the Union would use its trading power 
as leverage to pursue non-trade objectives,26 the actual normative value of the provisions contradicts 
this view. About 92% of all the provisions beyond the scope of traditional FTA coverage are 
unenforceable.27 Moreover, trade under all of these arrangements accounts for only 5,2% of all EU 
imports and 8,4% of its exports.28 A further argument for the 'mixed' motivations to c nclude these 
agreements is their non-reciprocal phase-in period, i.e. the amount of time until tariffs are fully 
abolished. Whereas goods from these countries may be imported duty free from the entry into force of 
the respective agreement, tariffs on goods originating in the EU are abolished only in successive 
annual steps.29 FTAs as a means to foster economic prosperity in the Union are hard to justify against 
this backdrop. The first group of agreements must, therefore, be assessed as a foreign policy tool, 
which utilizes trade as leverage.30 Nevertheless, these treaties represent nearly two thirds of all EU 
FTAs. 
The second group of more commercially motivated FTAs comprises agreements with European 
countries either under the Agreement on the European Economic Area31 or under separate agreements 
establishing customs unions such as with San Marino32 and Andorra33 and the agreements with Chile,34 
Mexico35 and, arguably, South Africa.36 All these agreements are, however, either with countries 
whose markets are rather static and do not hold for fast growth or with countries which only account 
for a small share of EU trade (see also Figure 1).  
In view of this analysis, the main objective of contributing to the 'Europe 2020' strategy by creating 
growth through trade is not well served by existing FTAs. In particular trade relations with the 
emerging market economies in Asia and South-America are neglected under established agreements. 
In order to contribute via trade policy to the ‘Europe 2020’ goals of sustainable, intelligent and 
inclusive growth, new FTAs are necessary.  
 
(Contd.)                                                             
25  Art. 79 of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of 
the one part, and the Republic of Croatia, of the othr part [2005] OJ L26/3.  
26  S Meunier and K Nicolaidis, ‘The European Union as a Conflicted Trade Power’ (2006) 13 Journal of European Public 
Policy 906. 
27  H Horn, P Mavroidis and A Sapir, ‘Beyond the WTO: An Anatomy of EU and US Preferential Trade Agreements’ 
(2010) The World Economy 1565, 1583. 
28  European Commission, Trade, Growth & World Affairs, 20. 
29  E.g. Art. 11 of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement stablishing an association between the European Communities and 
their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Tunisia, of the other part [1998] OJ L97/2. 
30  Cf. also A Winters, ‘EU's Preferential Trade Agreements: Objectives and Outcomes’ in P Van Dijck and G Faber (eds) 
The External Economic Dimension of the European Union (The Hague: Kluwer 2000), 196. 
31  Agreement on the European Economic Area [1994] OJ L1/3. 
32  Agreements on Cooperation and Customs Union between the European Economic Community and the Republic of San 
Marino [2002] OJ L84/43. 
33  Agreement between the European Community and the Principality of Andorra [2005] OJ L135/14.  
34  Agreement establishing an Association between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the 
Republic of Chile, of the other part [2002] OJ L352/3. 
35  Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement between the European Community ad its 
Member States, of the one part, and the United Mexican States, of the other part [2000] OJ L276/45. 
36  Agreement on Trade, Development and Cooperation between the European Community and its Member States, of the 
one part, and the Republic of South Africa, of the other part [1999] OJ L311/3. The agreement with South Africa is not 
clear cut. While the initiation of the agreement followed a commercial logic and was induced by DG Trade, the actual 
negotiations were carried out by DG Development with a significant impact on the final result. See M Frennhoff Larsén, 
‘Trade Negotiations between the EU and South Africa: A Three-Level Game’ (2007) 45 Journal of Common Market 
Studies 857. 
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Figure 1: EU Preferential Trade Agreements Concluded 
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Consequently, the criteria for the launch of FTA negotiations have changed. Whereas broader policy 
considerations will still be taken into account, it is now primarily market potential and the level of 
protection against EU export interests that will be decisive to embark on new negotiations.37 In line 
with these requirements, the EU has identified its potential treaty partners. 
2.3. Stalemate of the Doha Round 
A third reason to embark on new FTA negotiations ha been the stalemate of the Doha Development 
Round (DDR). The DDR is the current trade negotiations round of the WTO, which commenced in 
2001. Its main goal has been to implement the WTO development objectives, as set out in the 
preamble of the Marrakech Agreement establishing the WTO,38 i.e., in particular, to secure developing 
countries a share in the growth of world trade commensurate to their needs of economic development. 
Although the EU has reiterated its commitment to the multilateral system on several occasions, the 
slow progress completing the round has been one of the crucial motivations for the shift towards 
selective bilateralism.  
The Union embarked on the round with a highly ambitious agenda. It aimed at deepening existing 
commitments, in particular in the services sector but also brought up a range of new matters extending 
the ambit of the WTO, in particular the four so-called ‘Singapore Issues’39 (i.e. investment, 
competition, transparency in government procurement and trade facilitation). Moreover, the quest for 
clarification of the role of environmental and labour standards in the WTO legal order was on the 
Union’s agenda.40 However, after two rounds of negotiations the EU realized that it could not find 
enough support among WTO Members and negotiations cllapsed during the Cancun Ministerial 
Meeting. Developing countries, in particular, rejected attempts to extend the coverage of WTO 
obligations rather than addressing their interests and needs under existing rules. Eventually, three of 
the four issues were taken off the agenda with trade facilitation being the only one still under 
negotiations in the WTO. After the breakdown of the talks and the formal suspension of the 
negotiations in 2006 the Commission launched the ‘Global Europe’ strategy, which illustrates the tight 
linkage between failed efforts in the WTO and the sift towards bilateralism. 
It is noteworthy that the Singapore issues were not pursued out of mere commercial interest.41 The 
establishment of a regulatory framework 'beyond tariffs and quotas' formed part of the Union's broader 
agenda to 'harness' globalization.42 The failure to integrate these new and, arguably, important issues 
into the multilateral framework, led the Union to look for ‘second-best’ solutions. Accordingly, the 
‘Global Europe’ communication states that key issue, including the ‘Singapore Issues’, should be 
addressed through FTAs43 and the Union has thenceforth included rules on competition, transparency 
in government procurement and investment in its trade greements and in particular in EPAs with 
developing countries.44 
                                                   
37  European Commission, ‘Global Europe’ 9. 
38  WTO, ‘Ministerial Declaration adopted on 14 November 2001’, WT/MIN(01)/DEC1, para. 2 et seq. 
39  The term ‘Singapore Issues’ refers to four working groups set up during the 1996 WTO Ministerial Meeting in 
Singapore. 
40  Council of the European Communities, ‘Preparation fr the Third WTO Ministerial Conference – Draft Council 
Conclusions’, Document 12092/99 WTO 131, Brussels 22 October 1999. 
41  D De Biévre, ‘The EU Regulatory Trade Agenda and the Quest for WTO Enforcement’ (2006) 13 Journal of European 
Public Policy 851, 853 et seq. 
42  P Lamy, ‘Europe and the Future of Economic Governance’ (2004) 42 Journal of Common Market Studies 5. 
43  European Commission, ‘Global Europe’ 8. 
44  Cf. e.g. Art. 65 et seq. (Investment); Art. 125 et seq. (Competition); Art. 165 et seq. (Public Procurement) Economic 
Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States, of the one part, and the European Community and its Member 
States, of the other part [2008] OJ L289/I/3.  
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2.4. Trade Policy of the EU's Main Competitors 
Lastly, the EU was inspired to shift its trade policy n view of the strategies followed by its main 
competitors, notably the USA and Japan, which also engaged in FTA negotiations with the EU’s 
priority FTA partners.45 The US, for instance, has already concluded and ratified an FTA with Korea, 
one of the EU’s priority partners, and has further FTAs on its trade agenda. Japan has embarked on 
negotiations with ASEAN countries, another high-listed EU FTA partner. Under these circumstances 
the problem of trade diversion becomes urgent. ‘Trade diversion’ denotes the possibility that with the
establishment of preferential trade agreements there is the risk that trade flows are not established 
between the most efficient traders but, due to the protection of the respective markets through tariffs, 
are diverted to less efficient traders within the pr ferential trade area. This may happen when tariff 
reductions outweigh efficiencies.46 This was the EU’s experience after the conclusion of NAFTA, 
which resulted in a substantial loss in market share fo  the EU in Mexico.47 The example of NAFTA 
also helps explaining today’s move towards FTAs. NAFT  triggered what Baldwin coined the 
‘domino effect’ of regionalism.48 It induced EU exporters who suffered from it to lobby for the 
conclusion of an FTA with Mexico in order to restore competition. In this vein, today’s political 
economy equilibrium shifted in respect of other FTA partners, too. To launch FTAs is, transposed on 
the ‘new generation’ FTAs, hence also a defensive means to maintain a ‘level playing field’ on 
emerging markets and to prevent trade diversions to the detriment of EU exporters.49  
2.5. Interim Conclusion 
The launch of a ‘new generation’ of EU FTAs depicts a further-reaching policy shift. While FTAs 
have been concluded in the past almost solely within e framework of other policies, the ‘new 
generation’ FTAs aim primarily at commercial goals in order to contribute to the ‘Europe 2020’ 
strategy.50 Economic welfare is a strong thread of legitimization for the Union51 and successful trade 
policy forms one part of this general approach. Thus, FTAs are nowadays emancipated to a certain 
extend from other policies and shall operate as a discrete means to achieve economic objectives 
outside the WTO framework. This is a significant policy change insofar as it redefines the role FTA 
shall play in EU external relations. Furthermore, it br ngs home that the political choice for ensuring 
economic welfare inside Europe has been made in favour of more, rather than less competition by 
extending the potential sales markets but also the number of competitors.  
Nevertheless, one should not overlook the fact that FTAs are only a 'second-best' solution to attain 
economic objectives and are by no means a panacea. Ev n if all planned FTAs were concluded, they 
would, together with preferential systems for developing countries,52 cover only 50 % of EU external 
trade. MFN-tariffs would still apply to trade with all EU major trading partners (Australia, China, 
                                                   
45  European Commission, Staff Working Document, Global Europe, 14. 
46  J Viner, The Customs Union Issue (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1950) 43-44. 
47  European Commission, Staff Working Document, Global Europe, 17. 
48  R Baldwin, ‘A Domino Theory of Regionalism’. 
49  On previous cases of trade diversion: A Dür, ‘EU Trade Policy as Protection for Exporters: The Agreem nts with Mexico 
and Chile’ (2007) 45 Journal of Common Market Studies 833.  
50  See also C Brown, ‘The European Union and Regional Trade Agreements: A Case Study of the EU-Korea FTA’ (2011) 
European Yearbook of International Economic Law 297, 308. 
51  G Majone, Europe as the would-be world power: the EU at fifty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009) 143 et 
seq. 
52  Council Regulation (EC) 732/2008 of 22 July 2008 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences for the period 
from 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2011 and amending Regulations (EC) No 552/97, (EC) No 1933/2006 and 
Commission Regulations (EC) No 1100/2006 and (EC) No 964/2007, OJ [2008] L211/1. 
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Japan, New Zealand, Russia53 nd the United States).54 Important regulatory issues, by contrast, may 
be addressed more effectively through FTAs since the Union can more easily trade market access for 
regulatory issues in bilateral negotiations. Due to the nature of these issues, they may, nevertheless, 
have a multilateral effect. When an FTA partner deci s to adopt competition laws or rules on public 
procurement, these will most likely not only govern t ade with the Union but also be of general 
application. The same holds true for environmental and labour standards.  
3. What is New? The EU-Korea FTA 
This part addresses the question of how the policy shift and the new role of FTAs are reflected in 
actual agreements. The first tangible result of the 'new approach' is the FTA with the Republic of 
Korea.55 The agreement, which was concluded on 6 October 2010, is remarkable at first glance for a 
rather prosaic reason. It is the first EU agreement with a non-European state to be plainly labelled as 
'Free Trade Agreement' without any attempt to embed it into a wider political context. However, in the 
case of Korea this may be explained by the fact that t e FTA has been concluded under a broader 
framework agreement56 between Korea and the Union and forms an integral part thereof.57 
Nevertheless, apart from the EEA and the WTO-Agreement, it is the Union's first treaty to make clear 
from the outset that it only addresses trade aspect. A cordingly, the agreement abandons the inclusion 
of non-trade related issues and its substantive provisions are widely modelled on the WTO-
agreements. 
The substantive content of the agreement may be subdivided into two broader categories. First, WTO-
plus rules, i.e. provisions which correspond to thecurrent mandate of the WTO and where the 
agreement provides for bilateral commitments beyond those accepted multilaterally. Examples are 
tariff reductions, additional commitments in services and the extensions of IP-rights. Second, extra-
WTO rules, i.e. provisions lying outside the current body of WTO rules, such as, for instance, 
competition and labour standards.58 In what follows I will briefly depict some of the FTA’s content. 
3.1. WTO-plus Rules 
3.1.1. Trade in Goods 
In the fields of goods, the agreement brings about a substantial reduction of tariffs on industrial and 
agricultural goods. Industrial tariffs will be phased out within a maximum period of seven years and 
agricultural tariffs within a maximum of 20 years. However, most tariffs will be abolished long before 
these dates. While the average MFN-tariff on industrial products was not particularly high prior to the 
                                                   
53  Even though Russia is not a member of the WTO the MFN tariff applies to trade with it. See Art. 10(1) Agreement on 
partnership and cooperation establishing a partnership between the European Communities and their Member States, of 
one part, and the Russian Federation, of the other part [1997] OJ L327/3.  
54  Trade with these countries accounts for about 50 % of all imports and 39% of all exports. Cf. European Commission, 
Trade, Growth & World Affairs, 20 Table 1.  
55  Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of 
the other part, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfmid=443&serie=273&langId=en.  
56  Framework Agreement for Trade and Cooperation between the European Community and its Member States, on the one 
hand, and the Republic of Korea, on the other hand [2001] OJ L90/46. 
57  Art. 15.14 (2) of the EU-Korea FTA. 
58  For this categorization see: Horn, Mavroidis and Sapir, ‘Beyond the WTO: An Anatomy of EU and US Preferential 
Trade Agreements’ 1567.  
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FTA (EU average: 5.2%; Korea average: 6.8%), tariffs on agricultural products on the Korean side 
have been massive and amounted to an average tariff rate of 48% (EU average: 15.4%).59 
Perhaps even more important are the achievements in he field of non-tariff barriers, which are 
assessed in many cases as being even more trade restrictiv  than tariffs. Besides reaffirming the 
parties’ mutual commitments to the TBT and SPS agreement,60 the FTA provides for the first time 
ever in an EU FTA for provisions on technical regulations in specific sectors, such as electronics, 
automotive, pharmaceuticals and chemicals. It provides for both substantive, binding rules (electronics 
and automotive) and 'best endeavour' provisions (pharmaceuticals and chemicals). The substantial 
rules stipulate in the field of automobiles that technical safety standards will henceforth be broadly 
accepted as equivalent ('mutual recognition').61 Moreover, Korea will align many of its automobile 
standards to the international UN-ECE standards.62 Safety standards for electronics must prospectively 
be based on international standards and will, hence, be broadly harmonized.63 Furthermore, the 
supplier’s declarations of conformity will be widely accepted as positive assurance of conformity with
the respective rules.64 In sum, innovative means are introduced in the FTA to address the increasingly 
crucial issue of standards. The achievements in addressing non-tariff barriers are, arguably, the most 
innovative and far-reaching concerning trade in goods.       
3.1.2. Trade in Services 
The Korea FTA is the most ambitious services FTA ever concluded by the Union and will bring about 
large-scale liberalization concerning all modes of services and in numerous sectors such as, for 
instance, telecommunications and legal services.65 Regarding trade in services the overview in this 
paper will, however, be limited to GATS ‘mode 3’ supply (establishment), i.e. foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Even though FDI became an exclusive competence of the Union with the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty (Art. 207(1) juncto Art. 3(1)(e) TFEU), the agreement does not fully cover 
this aspect. It remains confined to market access66 and non-discrimination67 of foreign suppliers but 
does not entail substantial investment protection. Such protection may be included after a review 
phase of three years. The FTA explicitly provides for the possibility to amend the treaty to include 
provisions on the protection of investment.68 However, today substantial protection of foreign 
investors is provided in bilateral investment treati s (BITs) between Korea and individual Member 
States. While these agreements provide for a higher standard of protection and most notably investor-
state-arbitration,69 none entails pre-establishment rights, i.e. market entry, but instead state that the 
contracting parties shall 'admit investments in accordance with their laws and regulations'.70 The 
purpose of the FTA in investment is, thus, to complement existing BITs by providing for market 
                                                   
59  European Parliament, DG External Relations, An Assessment of the EU-South Korea FTA, (2010) 78, 
www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studies/ ownload.do?language=et&file=32051.  
60  Art. 4.1 and 5.4 of the EU-Korea FTA. 
61  Art. 3 Annex 2-C of the EU-Korea FTA. 
62  Art. 4 Annex 2-C of the EU-Korea FTA. 
63  Art. 2 Annex 2-B of the EU-Korea FTA. 
64  Art. 3 (b)(i) Annex 2-B of the EU-Korea FTA. 
65  The lists of concessions are annexed to chapter 7 EU-Korea FTA.  
66  Art. 7.11 of the EU-Korea FTA. 
67  Art. 7.12 & 7.14 of the EU-Korea FTA. 
68  Art. 7.16(2) of the EU-Korea FTA. 
69  E.g. Art. 11 Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the promotion and 
reciprocal protection of Investments, entered into force 15 January 1967.  
70  E.g. Art. 2(1) Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of the Republic of 
Latvia for the Promotion and reciprocal Protection of Investments, entered into force 26 January 1997.  
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access.71 The Korea FTA explicitly acknowledges more favourable rights of foreign investors 
provided for in BITs and does not limit any of these rights.72 However, today only 20 of the 27 
Member States have concluded BITs with Korea73 and the standard of protection and access to justice, 
accordingly, differs depending on the nationality of the respective investor.74 
3.1.3. IP-Rights 
What is salient about the chapter on intellectual property rights (IPR) in the EU-Korea FTA is first of 
all its impressive level of detail with 69 articles (the TRIPS contains only four articles more). It 
deviates from all previous EU FTAs, which usually only provided for one or two articles on IP.75 
Despite being based on the TRIPS Agreement,76 the FTA provides for enhanced protection and 
enforcement of IPRs. For instance, with regard to patent terms the FTA provides for an effective term 
that takes account of delays in registering a patent. Patent holders must be compensated ‘for the 
reduction in the effective patent life as the result of the first authorisation to place the product on their 
respective markets.’77 Regarding enforcement, the FTA goes well beyond existing FTAs and, 
concerning criminal enforcement, even beyond domestic rules.78 The FTA, for instance, provides for 
the liability of online service providers for IP infringements.79 The extensive chapter on IP will, hence, 
most likely be the model for future FTAs.  
3.2. WTO-extra Rules 
3.2.1. Singapore Issues 
The parts on the 'Singapore issues' are kept relativ ly short in the agreement. The chapter on 
competition mainly states that the contracting parties shall provide for competition laws within their 
respective territories and that certain activities r tricting competition, such as cartels, the abuse of a 
dominant position and mergers impeding effective competition, are incompatible with the proper 
functioning of the agreement.80 Since both parties have competition laws in place, th  FTA’s only 
effect is that none of the parties can abolish its anti-trust laws. Notably, the definitions of anti-
competitive practices coincide with the respective EU law provisions (Arts. 101, 102 TFEU & Art. 
                                                   
71  European Commission, Towards a Comprehensive European International Investm n  Policy, 5. 
72  Art. 7.15(a) EU-Korea FTA. 
73  Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta nd Slovenia have not concluded BITs with Korea. 
74  The issue is addressed in a proposal for a regulation. See Art. 9 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member States and 
third countries, COM(2010)344 final.  
75  Cf. Art. 32 of the EU-Chile; Art. 12 of the EU-Mexico. But see from a more recent agreement Art. 139 - 164 of the EU-
Cariforum. 
76  Art. 10.2(1) of the EU-Korea FTA. 
77  Art. 10.35(2) of the EU-Korea FTA. 
78  Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights [2004] OJ L 195/16. 
79  Art. 10.62 et seq. EU-Korea FTA. 
80  Art. 11.1 of the EU-Korea FTA. 
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2(3) Regulation 139/200481). Furthermore, the FTA provides for cooperation betwe n the respective 
competition authorities.82  
Since Korea is already a member of the plurilateral WTO Agreement on Government Procurement 
(GPA), the chapter on public procurement is also rather short. Besides reinforcing the parties’ rights 
and obligations under the GPA, the most notable deviation is that Korea, which has developing 
country status in the WTO, will not rely on special and differential treatment towards the EU.83 
Concerning substantial coverage beyond the WTO concessions, both parties will have access to public 
infrastructure procurement ('BOT-contracts').84            
3.2.2. Sustainable Development 
The agreement's 'flanking' policies, which are described in the chapter on sustainable development 
provide for provisions on environmental protection a d labour standards. However, the respective 
provisions are rather weak. The rules on environmental protection are drafted in a 'best-endeavour' 
language without concrete obligations. What is new is the reference to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol as constituting the ultimate objectives of the 
parties.85  
Labour standards are addressed by reference to the relevant International Labour Organization (ILO) 
conventions. The provision's language is a little sronger, as it provides that the parties 'commit to 
respecting, promoting and realising' in their laws certain labour-related fundamental rights such as 
freedom of association and the effective abolition of child labour.86 The FTA, however, does not 
oblige the parties to ratify ILO conventions. This seems problematic, since Korea has not ratified 
important ILO conventions on freedom of association and forced labour (Conventions 87, 98, 29 and 
105).87 The legal force of the sustainable development provisi ns is further weakened by their 
exclusion from the regular dispute settlement mechanism. Disputes about labour and environmental 
standards are only subject to a special dispute setlem nt procedure, establishing a panel of experts, 
which may issue non-binding reports.88   
Grave violations of human rights and democratic principles can, nevertheless, be addressed through 
the Framework Agreement, of which the FTA forms an integral part.89 According to Art. 1 of the 
Framework Agreement: '[r]espect for democratic principles and human rights as defined in the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights inspires the domestic and international policies of the Parties 
and constitutes an essential element of this Agreement'. The infringement of these 'essential 
elements'90 allows either party to suspend the Framework Agreement91 and, hence, also the FTA.      
                                                   
81  Council Regulation 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ L 
24/1.  
82  Art. 11.6 of the EU-Korea FTA. Note that cooperation between the respective competition authorities s comprehensively 
regulated in the Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the Republic of Korea 
concerning cooperation on anti-competitive activities [2009] OJ L 202/36. 
83  Art. 9.1(4)(b) of the EU-Korea FTA. 
84  Art. 9.2(2) in conjunction with Art. 1 Annex 9 ofthe EU-Korea FTA. 
85  Art. 13.5 of the EU-Korea FTA. 
86  Art. 13.4(4) of the EU-Korea FTA. 
87  European Parliament, An Assessment of the EU-South Korea FTA 91. 
88  Art. 13.14 (2) of the EU-Korea FTA. 
89  Art. 15.14 (2) of the EU-Korea FTA. 
90  On essential element clauses see L Bartels, Human Rights Conditionality in the EU's International Agreements (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2005). 
91  Art. 23 of the EU-Korea Framework Agreement. 
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3.3. Interim Conclusion 
Already from this cursory overview it has become clar that the EU-Korea FTA differs from all 
previous EU FTAs. Its structure reflects the new role assigned to FTAs as a discrete trade policy tool.
Trade and economic aspects are regulated in a very detailed manner, whereas non-trade issues are 
reduced to a minimum. In line with the general developments in EU trade policy, the concentration on 
economic relations is a paradigm shift and the EU Korea FTA a reflection thereof. The motivation to 
contribute to economic welfare inside Europe is the Leitmotiv of current EU trade politics, which is 
accompanied, but by no means dominated, by flanking policies. Whereas previously the pursuit for 
'global governance' objectives or 'harnessing globalization' were the primary incitements of EU trade 
politics,92 today commercial goals, interrelated with domestic policy concerns, occupy that place.93 It 
goes without saying that this does not mean that normative values no longer play a role in EU trade 
politics; they are, however, receiving less attention han they used to before the policy shift in 2006.94  
4. FTAs and the Duty of Consistency in External Action 
Interestingly, the paradigm shift in EU trade politics coincides with an adverse primary law 
amendment. For the first time ever, the common commercial policy (‘CCP’) is explicitly embedded 
into the broader framework of EU external relations. According to Art. 207(1) TFEU, which refers to 
Art. 21 TEU, '[t]he common commercial policy shall be conducted in the context of the principles and 
objectives of the Union’s external action'. These objectives and principles mostly refer to 'p st-
modern' or 'normative' values such as the protection of human rights, the promotion of democracy and 
the establishment of the rule of law. To be performed in this context, the common commercial policy's 
principal objective, i.e. international economic liberalization,95 must be reconciled with these non-
economic virtues.96 The respective provisions, however, entail little substantive guidance and leave 
wide discretion to the political institutions. Judicial review on grounds of the Union's objectives is, 
accordingly, limited.97   
The EU Treaties, furthermore, emphasize the duty of consistency. For instance, Art. 21(3) TEU states 
that  
‘The Union shall ensure consistency between the diff rent areas of its external action and between 
these and its other policies. The Council and the Commission, assisted by the High Representative 
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall ensure that consistency and shall 
cooperate to that effect.’  
                                                   
92  This holds true in particular for the tenure of frmer trade commissioner Pascal Lamy. See C Herrmann, ‘Die 
Außenhandelsdimension des Binnenmarktes im Verfassung entwurf: Von der Zoll- zur Weltordnungspolitik’ (2004) 
Europarecht 3 Beiheft 175, 179 et seq. with further references. 
93  S Meunier, ‘Managing Globalization? The EU in International Trade Negotiations’ (2007) 45 Journal of Common 
Market Studies 905, 906. 
94  M Elsig, ‘The EU's Choices of Regulatory Venues for Trade Negotiations: A Tale of Agency Power?’ (2007) 45 Journal 
of Common Market Studies 927, 935. Other commentators argue that normative values have never played a decisive role 
in 'hard cases', see H Zimmermann, ‘Realist Power Europe? The EU in the Negotiations about China's and Russia's WTO 
Accession’ (2007) 45 Journal of Common Market Studies 813; idem, ‘How the EU negotiates Trade and Democracy: The 
Cases of China's Accession to the WTO and the Doha-Round’ (2008) 13 European Foreign Affairs Review 255. 
95  Art. 206 TFEU reads: ‘[T]he Union shall contribute, in the common interest, to the harmonious development of world 
trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and on foreign direct investment, and the lowering of 
customs and other barriers.’ 
96  For a discussion of the possible impact of the restructuring of principles and objectives of EU external action through the 
Lisbon Treaty with regard to trade dispute settlement, see the contribution by Valeria Bonavita in this edited Working 
Paper. 
97  Case 112/80 Dürbeck [1981] ECR 1095, para. 44.  
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The Treaty text, thus, encourages closer linkages between EU external policies, in particular with 
regard to non-economic objectives. However, trade politics seem to head in another direction by 
emancipating from other policies and not serving prima ily foreign policy objectives anymore. 
Whereas pre-Lisbon there was no legal link between trade and other policies, they were, nevertheless, 
de facto connected. Today, in contrast, the CCP is explicitly subject to the framework of EU external 
relations but attempts de facto to refocus on economic concerns, at least in the field of bilateral trade 
agreements. Reality and normative demands seem, thus, to have developed not in full convergence.  
The question arises as to how trade and other EU policies, such as development, are linked. How must, 
for instance, agricultural policy be taken into account in the course of trade policy making? How can 
FTAs be accommodated with other Union policies so as to comply with the duty of consistency in EU 
external relations?  
The term 'consistency' is commonly referred to as the absence of contradictions between the different 
external policy areas. However, due to ambiguities b tween the different language98 versions and the 
overarching Treaty aim to bring about mutual support between all Union policies, consistency should 
rather be understood as 'coherence', i.e. the positive obligation to ensure synergy between the different 
external policies.99 I will follow this proposal and will use henceforth the term ‘coherence’. The 
objectives this definition of ‘coherence’ is geared to are twofold. On the one hand, it shall ensure 
efficiency; on the other hand, it shall generate legitimacy by making policy actions amenable to 
rationally motivated acceptance, which is based on the insight that the respective action is concerted 
with the EU’s other policies.  
By the same token, Cremona has elaborated a more differentiated notion of coherence. In the first 
place, she distinguishes between ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ coherence; the former refers to the 
relationship between Member States and the Union, whereas the latter concerns inter-policy coherence 
on the Union level.100 Secondly, she suggests that ‘coherence’ should be und rstood as a three-level 
concept.101 The first level refers to rules of hierarchy such as the primacy of EU law and the 
precedence of primary over secondary EU law. The second level denotes rules of delimitation between 
different actors in order to avoid duplications and gaps. Finally, ‘coherence’ comprises ‘synergy 
between norms, actors and instruments’, i.e. principles of cooperation and complementarity. My 
concern will be solely the legal effect of this ‘consistency’ requirement.      
In the following I shall deal only with the ‘horizontal’ dimension of coherence and, furthermore, only 
with the level Cremona has coined ‘rules of delimitation’, i.e. the delimitation of competences 
between actors. The crucial question in this regard seems to be, however, not how to provide an exact 
definition of the term in the abstract but to ascertain which is the right institution to assess whether t e 
different external actions are coherent. In other wo d, who shall decide what is efficient and how to 
balance different policies against each other? As Komesar noted: 
‘The analyst of legal decisions, [...], should adopt a “comparative institutional approach”, which 
can be simply stated as follows: the determinants of legal decisions can best be analyzed when 
                                                   
98  Wheras the English version speaks of ‘consistency’, the French, German, Italian, and Spanish ones use the term 
‘cohérence’, ‘Koheränz’, ‘coerenza’, and ‘coherencia’, resepectively, which denotes ‘coherence’. 
99  C Hillion, ‘Tous pour un, un pour tous! Coherence in the External Relations of the European Union’ in M Cremona (ed) 
Developments in EU External Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008) 10, 12 et seq. with further 
references; P Van Elsuwege, ‘EU External Action after the Collapse of the Pillar Structure: In Search of a new Balance 
between Delimitation and Consistency’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 987, 1013 et. seq. 
100  M Cremona, ‘Coherence through Law: What Difference will the Treaty of Lisbon Make?’ (2008) 3 Hamburg Review of 
Social Science 11, 16 et seq. 
101  Idem, 14 et seq. 
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legal decision makers are viewed as though they were concerned with choosing the best, or least 
imperfect, institution to implement a given social goal.’102  
The premise is that an objective legal determinatio of consistency is not feasible because synergy 
between policy areas is inviolably bound to political preferences, which are contingent in time.103   
Therefore, one can make a political argument that a given policy is inconsistent with another but not a 
legal one, since there is no objective or inter-subjective criterion to assess it. Perhaps, there should not 
even be a legal criterion for consistency because it had the repercussion of ‘freezing’ the political 
process to the preferences when the criterion was est blished. If a given set of policies were deemed as 
‘consistent’ at a given moment, this would simply reflect the then prevalent policy preferences. These 
preferences are, however, not necessarily the polity’s future preferences. A substantial legal criterion 
for consistency would thus result in an impediment to shifts of views and could hinder the evolution of 
political preferences.   
To ensure consistency in legal terms should, thus, be understood as the quest for the best-equipped 
institution to assume the task. I will presume that t e institution, which provides the most inclusive 
conditions for participation, is generally also the one to be preferred to decide on an issue. This 
assumption is based on Habermas’ discourse theory: ‘according to the discourse principle, just those 
norms deserve to be valid that could meet with the approval of those potentially affected, insofar as the 
latter participate in rational discourse’.104 In this vein, ‘coherence’ can be understood as the rigor of an 
argument in the discourse or, in other words, ‘coherence between statements is established by 
substantial arguments, and hence by reasons that have t e pragmatic property of bringing about a 
rationally motivated agreement among participants i argumentation’.105 Transposed to the political 
process ‘statements’ may be understood as political decisions. The crucial question is, however, where 
the preconditions for such discourse are ensured, or which of the imperfect alternatives should be 
chosen. Should it be the judicial or the political ‘discourse’ that has the last word on ‘coherence’? 
Whereas the treaties impose the duty of coherence explicitly upon the political institutions,106 some 
commentators107 esteem the courts as being competent to evaluate whether coherence between 
different external actions prevails. While it is true that the Courts may invalidate a trade policy 
measure on specific grounds as, for instance, a viol tion of fundamental rights or non-compliance with 
procedural requirements, it is less likely that they will do so because of mere incoherence. 
That the duty of coherence between the CCP and thus also FTAs and other external objectives is better 
situated in the political process seems to be reflected in the case-law of the Court of Justice. The Court 
in most cases concerning external trade upheld the findings of the political institutions and was 
reluctant to substitute the outcome of political deliberations in the realm of external trade with its own 
decisions. For instance, in Denmark v. Commission (Grana Padano Cheese), the ECJ found that it is 
an obligation of the Commission to balance the competing policy objectives of the common 
                                                   
102  N Komesar, ‘In Search of a General Approach to Legal Analysis: A Comparative Institutional Alternative’ (1981) 70 
Michigan Law Review 1350. 
103  Cf. P Koutrakos, ‘Primary Law and Policy in EU External Relations – Moving away from the big picture’ (2008) 33 
European Law Review 666, 675; M Cremona, ‘The Draft Constitutional Treaty: External Relations and External Action’ 
(2003) 40 Common Market Law Review 1347, 1349, who both stress the political nature of the duty of consistency and 
the limited effect of primary law in this regard.  
104  J Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contribution to a Discourse Th ory of Law and Democracy (New Baskerville: 
MIT Press 1996) 127. 
105  Habermas, Between Facts and Norms 211. 
106  Cf. Art. 7 TFEU and Art. 18 (4) TEU, which states: The High Representative shall be one of the Vice-Presidents of the 
Commission. He shall ensure the consistency of the Union's external action. He shall be responsible within the 
Commission for responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union's 
external action. 
107  Van Elsuwege, ‘EU External Action after the Collapse of the Pillar Structure’ 1012 et seq. 
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commercial policy and other policies so as to ensure consistency.108 In this case the Community had 
installed a scheme of export subsidies for Grana Padano cheese, which was, following two decisions 
of the Commission, only applicable to products from Italy but not to their counterparts from other 
Member States. Denmark deemed the Commission decisions as contrary to the regulation establishing 
the scheme, since they discriminated between like products on grounds of origin. The regulation, 
however, provided that in applying the scheme the Commission had to take account not only of the 
objectives of the common agricultural policy but also of the CCP's objectives.109 The Court, following 
the Commission's reasoning accepted the argument that the extension of the aid could lead to 
distortions with the Communities trading partners and was, therefore, rightfully restrained to certain 
disadvantaged producers. To ensure coherence between agricultural and trade policy was, even in 
cases of discrimination of community producers, the task of the political process but not the Courts.  
Even more telling in terms of choice for the appropriate institution to exercise the duty of consistency 
is, perhaps, Germany vs. Council concerning the EC regime for the importation of bananas from ACP 
countries.110 In this case many different interests were at stake. Not only development, agricultural and 
trade policy but also fundamental rights, principles of non-discrimination and, most importantly, the 
establishment of a common market for bananas. The Community had installed a scheme for the 
importation of bananas111 favouring domestic as well as producers from the former colonies in the 
ACP countries ('traditional producers') over exporters in Central and South America ('non-traditional 
producers'). In order to establish a common market for bananas, the remaining quotas for the 
importation of non-traditional bananas were distributed among importers all over the Community, 
regardless of their previous import channels. The result of this was that traders of non-traditional 
bananas had to buy import-licenses of traders of traditional bananas to stay in business, which led in 
fact to a wealth shift from the former to the latter. The Court, nevertheless, upheld the regulation 
establishing the import scheme on rather dubious grounds but most likely because it did not want to 
interfere with the findings of the political process. Even though the Court delved into legal scrutiny, 
the result of acknowledging the other institutions policy space was deference to the political branch. In 
the words of the ECJ: 
‘It should be pointed out in this respect that in matters concerning the common agricultural policy 
the Community legislature has a broad discretion which corresponds to the political 
responsibilities given to it (…). 
The Court has held that the lawfulness of a measure adopted in that sphere can be affected only if 
the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent 
institution is seeking to pursue. More specifically, where the Community legislature is obliged, in 
connection with the adoption of rules, to assess their future effects, which cannot be accurately 
foreseen, its assessment is open to criticism only if it appears manifestly incorrect in the light of 
the information available to it at the time of the adoption of the rules in question (…). 
The Court' s review must be limited in that way in particular if, in establishing a common 
organization of the market, the Council has to reconcile divergent interests and thus select options 
within the context of the policy choices which are its own responsibility.’112 
‘Discretion’, ‘manifestly incorrect’ and ‘limited review’ are all proxies for the Court’s decision to 
abstain from substituting Council’s decision with is own. The choice to accept the contemplations of 
another institution is in itself an institutional choice. To find the right balance between all the 
competing claims was, again, left to the political institutions, even though their decision resulted in a 
                                                   
108  Case 263/87 Denmark v. Commission [1989] ECR 1081. 
109  Art. 33 Regulation (EEC) No 804/68 of the Council of 27 June 1968 on the common organization of the market in milk 
and milk products, [1968] OJ, English Special Edition (I), 176. 
110  Case C-280/93 Germany v. Council [1994] ECR I-4973. 
111  Council Regulation (EC) 404/93 [1993] OJ L47/1.  
112  Case C-280/93 Germany v. Council [1994] ECR I-4973, paras. 88-91. 
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breach of WTO law113 and was, hence, in terms of ‘coherence’ with the EU's other international 
obligation rather problematic.  
Read in conjunction the two cases yield an even clearer picture. In the first case the court justified the 
privileging of trade policy over domestic agricultural concerns with a reference to the CCP's objectiv 
of contributing to the harmonious development of world trade and the threat of possible counter-
reactions of the Union's trade partners to any infringement of international trade obligations.114 By 
contrast in the so-called ‘Banana-case’, even thoug the measure did quite clearly infringe WTO law, 
the Court did not take into account the possibility of countermeasures by other WTO members.115 How 
to balance different policies with trade and the Union’s WTO obligation is something the Courts do 
not see themselves well equipped for. This was reaffi med in cases such as Van Parys and FIAMM, 
where the ECJ stated that  
‘an outcome, by which the Community sought to reconcile its obligations under the WTO 
agreements with those in respect of the ACP States, nd with the requirements inherent in the 
implementation of the common agricultural policy, could be compromised if the Community 
Courts were entitled to judicially review the lawfulness of the Community measures in question in 
light of the WTO rules (…)’.116        
The balancing act was thus explicitly referred to the political branch, which implied the institutional 
choice who shall decide. The reasons for the Courts’ deference in the realm of trade law can be 
explained by a comparative institutional analysis, which assesses each institution’s advantages and 
drawbacks. First of all, the duty of coherence is not definable in objective legal terms but is an 
oscillating one. Coherence, and thus synergy between policy areas is inviolably bound to political 
preferences, which are contingent in time.117 If a given set of policies were deemed as ‘coherent’ at a 
given moment, this would simply reflect the then prevalent political preferences. These preferences 
are, however, not necessarily a polity’s future preferences. The right balance between trade and 
development policy in the 1980s might not be the same in 2010. A substantive legal criterion by 
contrast had to be amenable to judicial review and therefore set out fixed requirements. It had to be 
certain and static in order to provide for a minimum degree of legal security and would thus ‘freeze’ 
the political process to the preferences at the moment when the criterion was established.118 This in 
turn, would result in an impediment to shifts of political views over time and could hinder the 
evolution of political preferences. Pertinently, one can make a political argument that a given policy is 
inconsistent with another but not a legal one because there is no objective or inter-subjective criterion 
to assess it. In order to ensure policy flexibility, there should, perhaps, not even be one. 
Another drawback courts have in ensuring ‘coherence’ of trade politics with other policies is that the 
procedural settings in court proceedings to some ext nt limit the participation of potentially affected 
interests through standing rights. Whereas EU traders, consumers and other interest group may lobby 
Commission, Council or Parliament, they are not necessarily involved in Court proceedings. Neither 
                                                   
113  European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Appellate Body Report adopted 
9 September 1997 DS/27/AB/R.  
114  Case 263/87 Denmark v. Commission [1989] ECR 1081, para. 19. 
115  The US reacted with the suspension of concessions. See e.g. Case C-120 and 121/06 P FIAMM [2008] ECR I-6513; T-
383/00 Beamglow [2005] ECR II-5459. 
116  Case C-377/02 Van Parys [2005] ECR I-1465, para. 50 and Case C-120 and 121/06 P FIAMM [2008] ECR I-6513, para. 
118. 
117  Cf. P Koutrakos, ‘Primary Law and Policy in EU External Relations – Moving away from the big picture’ (2008) 33 
European Law Review 666, 675; M Cremona, ‘The Draft Constitutional Treaty: External Relations and External Action’ 
(2003) 40 Common Market Law Review 1347, 1349, who both stress the political nature of the duty of consistency and 
the limited effect of primary law in this regard.  
118  See also the more general critique by De Witte regarding the Constitutional Law governing EU external affairs: B De 
Witte, ‘Too Much Constitutional Law in the European U ion’s Foreign Relations?’ in M Cremona and B De Witte (eds) 
EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2008) 3.  
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are foreign governments with which the political inst tutions may find mutually satisfactory 
compromises that could be undermined by Court rulings. The review of trade policy measures is all in 
all an extremely complex undertaking, which may be better undertaking by the administrative and 
political institutions, which have more and sometims better resources.  
A third, and rather prosaic reason, for the ECJ to abstain from delving to deep into the review of trade 
policy measures, is the limited scale of the judiciary, which also impacts its competence. The 27 
judges at the ECJ have to deal already today with hundreds of cases per year, concerning such diverse 
issues as the common agricultural policy, competition, or labour law. In view of this, it is practically 
just not feasible to add to this enormous caseload the task of overviewing the EU’s external policy 
coherence, which would require not only taking account of measures brought before the court but also 
of potentially all existing trade measures. Scrutinizing measures for their coherence with the whole 
body of external policy measures would even aggravate this situation because it would open the 
floodgates and invite plaintiffs to bring potentially any external action measure before the court, in 
particular because it will not be too difficult to find two acts out of the whole of EU external measure  
which contravene the coherence-requirement. The limited resources of the court just not allow for that. 
Finally, the dynamics of litigation impact the Court’s ability to ensure coherence. The ECJ cannot take
decisions out of its own motion but is, as any court, depended on cases brought before it. Such cases 
will, however, only reach it, if there are plaintiffs who have an interest in lodging a claim, which will
be the case if their potential benefits outweigh the costs of litigation. For all measures were there is no 
such setting, the Court will simply not have the opp rtunity to deal with an issue. The selective 
treatment of issues appears, however, not to be the most promising approach to ensure coherence.  
For all these reasons, the duty of coherence does nt impose a legal obligation in the course of FTA-
making which could be enforced by Courts. It remains a political notion and the political institutions 
endowed with trade policymaking must determine its content. Courts will not address trade measures 
under some kind of ‘coherence’-test. What they willdo is to scrutinize measures for their formal and 
substantive legality and so ensure its compatibility with EU law but not under different criteria than 
‘coherence’. In relevant cases, the duty of coherence will be lex generalis, which will be derogated by 
more specific rules, e.g. rules of procedure or fundamental rights.  
5. Conclusion 
This contribution has delineated the EU’s motives to launch a new generation of FTAs. These motives 
are commensurate with explanations put forward elucidating why states conclude trade agreements in 
general and preferential agreements in particular. Enhanced market access, the lock-in of domestic EU 
policies and ‘global domino effects’ were driving inc tements, which accurately describe the move 
towards bilateralism. Furthermore, the paper has shown that law and politics of the CCP have emerged 
into opposing directions. Whereas the Treaties provide for closer links between trade and other 
policies, the actual developments illustrate an emancip tion of the CCP from trade-unrelated areas. 
The reflection thereof is the first FTA concluded under the new strategy. This agreement is limited to 
pure trade issues and makes little attempt to animate the Union’s new commitment to post-modern 
values under the Lisbon Treaty. Finally, this does not lead to a lack of ‘coherence’ of EU external 
policies, at least not in legal terms. This was the result of the finding that ‘coherence’ should be 
understood predominantly as a procedural term, hardly amenable to judicial review. The notion of 
‘coherence’ has been elaborated as a question of well functioning procedures and comparison of 
institutions. The result thereof has been that in the realm of trade there is little role for courts to ensure 
such ‘coherence’ due to their ‘comparative disadvantage’ vis-à-vis the political process. 
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Abstract 
The Lisbon Treaty brought significant changes to the European Union's (EU) trade policy-making in 
terms of competence definition and decision-making process. This paper looks at them from the 
perspective of the EU trade policy's offensive agenda of market access. The latter can be divided in 
two main pillars, market opening (mostly, but not exclusively, through free trade negotiations), and 
market access enforcement (removal of barriers to trade in the context of existing free trade 
commitments or in absence thereof). By outlining the policy practice on market access since the 
Global Europe communication, the paper analyses institutional and policy-making changes under the 
new Treaty framework that are relevant for future eff ctiveness of the policy. It argues that, whereas 
Lisbon Treaty bears a potential to render work on market access enforcement more effective, its 
impact on the objectives of market opening by means of free trade agreements is rather ambiguous.    
Keywords  
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1. Introduction 
The Lisbon Treaty (LT) introduced substantial changes to the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) of 
the European Union (EU), making of it one of the most affected Community policies in this respect. 
These innovations relate both to the scope of EU trade policy, by clarifying the field of exclusive 
competence, and to the decision-making process, throug  a radical overhaul of the European 
Parliament's (EP) role. In addition, the launch of the European External Action Service (EEAS) 
created a new institutional context, within which external trade policy is to be pursued.1 Short of being 
an institution in the Treaty sense, the creation of the EEAS nonetheless brought about the need to 
reconsider the existing inter-institutional modes of c operation. Altogether, the transition, which has 
not yet been fully completed, not only has had an impact on the way the EU can pursue its objectives 
in the trade area but also on the effectiveness of these efforts.  
Among the main objectives of trade policy there is certainly that of market access: advancing the EU's 
offensive economic interests on third-country markets, through negotiations of free trade agreements 
and policy enforcement.2 This essay purports to look at how the Lisbon Treaty has affected trade 
policy-making through the lens of work on market access. It also indicates, by means of this example, 
remaining challenges at both institutional and policy-making level. The paper begins by laying out the 
rationale behind the EU's offensive interests, followed by a more detailed account on the policy 
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practice; these are in turn analysed against the Lisbon Treaty provisions on trade and their potential 
implications for achieving the market access objectiv s.  
2. Trade Policy’s Offensive Angle:  Market Access 
For many years the objective of ensuring undistorted access to third-country markets for European 
goods, services and investment has been framed in the context of multilateral trade negotiation rounds 
in the World Trade Organisation (WTO). However, with time, a regional and bilateral approach to free 
trade agreements (FTAs) was also adopted by the EU as part of its strategy for a faster and better 
access to different markets.3 The launch of the Global Europe communication in October 20064 
brought the EU's offensive agenda in the spotlight through the explicit focus on advancing EU trade 
interests by means of bilateral and regional agreements, in addition to the multilateral track. As much 
as this shift provoked renewed debate whether trade serves as a stepping stone, or rather is a stumbling 
block for the development of world trade,5 the EU policy-makers focused on the 'value-added' aspects 
of free trade agreements with selected key partners. Thi  market access logic is widely based, on the 
one hand, on an economic paradigm that free and open trade is supportive of growth,6 and, on the 
other, on a conviction that stability of the trade environment is best preserved by means of legally 
binding commitments.  
Consequently, the EU's contemporary market access agend  is largely based on the opening of new 
markets through bilateral/regional free trade agreement negotiations, with parallel existence of 
multilateral negotiations in the WTO. Yet at the same time, ensuring that new barriers to trade do not 
nullify the gains of such opening has come to be recognised as a crucial complement of this 
regional/bilateral negotiating strategy. For, in many respects, free trade negotiations exhaust their rol  
as a market opening tool once an agreement is concluded, without in themselves addressing the tasks 
of monitoring compliance and market access enforcement activities, for which other trade instruments 
in turn are more appropriate. Moreover, even though free trade agreements constitute the most 
fundamental tool to eliminate barriers and ensure commitment to market openness, they may not 
always be resorted to, i.e. for political (foreign or development policy) reasons.7 The record of 
suspended, not implemented or not concluded agreements with a trade component (including non-
preferential) that the EU pursued is indicative in this respect. Some examples include the suspension 
of EU-Libya negotiations for a Framework Agreement or deferral by the EU of the ratification of the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Belarus, concluded in 1995. Both decisions were based 
on similar grounds related to the respect for democracy and human rights, taking precedence over 
potential economic interests. There is also a wider case of trade relations with countries of 
fundamental importance for EU trade, where a free tade agreement, to date, has not been considered a 
                                                   
3  The EU's offensive market access interests focus n developed and emerging economies, while policy towards least 
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realistic scenario (for instance, with Japan or theUnited States8). Thirdly, preferential trade 
agreements are not an option in the case of non-members of the WTO, in relation to which the basic 
multilateral trade disciplines, such as most-favoured nation or national treatment principles, do not 
apply (Russia, Kazakhstan). Furthermore, free trade agr ements as a medium to long-term option to 
ensure market openness are of limited value in the short term.  
Finally, conclusion of a free trade agreement, as much as it provides important channels for dispute 
resolution and regular dialogues where barriers to trade may be addressed, does not necessarily 
guarantee effective compliance and certainly does not prevent other 'smart' barriers to trade from 
occurring. Their nature has been changing since the 1960s, with traditional tariff-based methods of 
market protection being replaced by more sophisticated ones, such as non-tariff measures (NTMs).9 
Whereas they are frequently motivated by legitimate policy objectives, their intended or unintended 
consequences on trade may be a source of problems (non-tariff barriers, NTBs). Indeed, contemporary 
complaints of EU industries that relate to excessive regulatory frameworks on consumer protection, 
insufficient protection of intellectual property, unj stified use of sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
as well as complex technical regulations are common.10 Consequently, the increasingly intrusive 
nature of contemporary trade in domestic policies implies that respective regulatory frameworks have 
not only had a strong impact on the content of freet ade agreements but also render compliance more 
complex and protracted.  
Altogether, in the face of these limitations, and against the background of exporters' concerns, the 
Global Europe communication11 conceived of a parallel track to address non-tariff barriers, not only 
when market opening has been ensured by means of a bilateral agreement but also in situations when 
such an agreement does not exist or where a country is not subject to the rules of the WTO – the 
ultimate deterrent of trade protectionism.12  
The revamped framework of the Market Access Strategy (MAS)13 followed in 2007 to ensure proper 
enforcement of rules and commitments off the negotiating table. The Strategy reveals two main 
characteristics. The first, and the main, source of its strength is the concept of a so-called Market 
Access Partnership (MAP), which brings together repesentatives of the EU business community, the 
Commission and EU Member States. The partnership operates both in Brussels and in third countries, 
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European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, The Global 
Challenge of International Trade: A Market Access Strategy for the European Union, COM (96) 53 final, 14 December 
1996, and implemented by virtue of Council Decision on the implementation by the Commission of activities relating to 
the Community market access strategy, 98/552/EC, 24 September 1998, OJ L 265/31. In 2007, the European Commission 
published a Communication Global Europe – A Stronger Partnership to Deliver Market Access for European Exporters, 
18 April 2007, which created the Market Access Partnership.  
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coordinated respectively by the Commission's Directorate-General for Trade and EU delegations in 
third countries. The second characteristic of the Strategy is reliance on all available instruments of the 
EU trade strategy. Rather than reinventing the wheel, efforts were made to make better use of existing 
channels, on the basis of a more coordinated cooperation with the stakeholders. These include the full 
use of available geographical and horizontal (especially regulatory) dialogues within existing bilateral 
frameworks, resort to less formal trade diplomacy in the absence of specific agreements, use of WTO 
Committees and WTO Councils' meetings, including the WTO accession process, as well as the Trade 
Barrier Regulation procedures14 and, as a last resort, the WTO dispute settlement chanism. This is 
by no means an exhaustive list, for instance trade diplomacy coordinated by the EU delegations with 
the participation of locally based EU business and EU member states (so called Market Access Teams 
- MATs) in third countries constitutes also an important part of the Strategy.  
The (re)launch of the Strategy in 2007 to address market access enforcement met with considerable 
interest of EU stakeholders at both national and European level. Whereas it may still be too early to 
assess its effectiveness, the short-term experience of the last couple of years indicates that substantial 
progress has been achieved in terms of prioritisation of work, systematic and consistent addressing of 
barriers to trade and regular monitoring of their rmoval.15 Free trade negotiations and the Market 
Access Strategy have indeed come to play complementary roles to ensure that markets remain open. 
This complementarity has been explicitly confirmed in the latest Commission communication on 
Trade, Growth and World Affairs,16 making of market access enforcement one of the priorities of the 
EU trade policy.  
The Market Access Strategy activities, driven to a great extent by the EU business community's 
concerns about different barriers to trade, have in particular enabled trade policy to 'deliver' in the 
short-term, a commitment that is more difficult to respect in the context of free trade negotiations. 
Gradual increase of removed barriers (from 30 to almost 50 between 2009 and 2010 on an annual 
basis) and ongoing analysis and investigation of many others, together with regular feedback, have 
sent an important signal to stakeholders. More generally, the number of potential barriers analysed an
addressed by the Commission since 2007 has been gradually increasing; the reason being not only the 
developments in the global economy but also, mainly, a more engaged approach of EU business and 
EU member states. A more systematic approach to market ccess enforcement, including prioritisation 
of main obstacles to trade, monitoring of compliance with existing agreements and of protectionist 
tendencies during the financial and economic crisis have enhanced the level of overall scrutiny.   
3. EU's Market Access Practice Prior to Lisbon Treaty  
Evolution of the market access dossier in trade policy, both through FTA and MAS channels, has been 
taking place against the strengths and weaknesses of trade policy-making. Beyond the wider global 
trade rules, the EU's own institutional and policy frameworks have come to influence its effectiveness. 
Some of the internal constraints have importantly been addressed by the Lisbon Treaty (of which more 
below). Others, such as the global macroeconomic imbalances or patterns of regional integration 
efforts, remain beyond the EU's direct control, shaping the global context in which the EU trade policy 
operates.  
                                                   
14  Council Regulation No 3286/94 of 22 December 1994 laying down Community procedures in the field of the common 
commercial policy in order to ensure the exercise of the Community's rights under international trade rul s, in particular 
those established under the auspices of the World Tra e Organisation, OJ L 349, 31 December 1994, p. 71. 
15  Commission Staff Working Document, Implementation of the Market Access Strategy, Annual Report 2010 
accompanying the Trade and Investment Barriers Report 2011, SEC(2011)298, March 2011. Compare also Report from 
the Commission to the European Council, Trade and Investment Barriers Report 2011. 
16  European Commission, Trade, Growth and World Affairs. Trade policy as a core component of the EU's 2020 Strategy, 
COM(2010)612, 9 November 2010.  
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Of all factors that have impact on wider market access policy objectives and implementation, four 
have been particularly pertinent: (1) the inter-institutional dimension – relationship between the 
Commission and the Council; (2) definition of the EU's exclusive competence in trade policy; (3) the 
(post-modern) nature of EU trade diplomacy, particularly visible in the case of market access 
enforcement; (4) and last but certainly not least, cooperation between the stakeholders of the Market 
Access Partnership. The first two elements have a particular bearing for the free trade negotiations 
pillar of market access; while the last three are pertinent for the market access enforcement activities.  
Market access opening through a free trade negotiations agenda has been influenced most significantly 
by the EU's inter-institutional dimension on the one hand, and by the definition of EU competence in 
trade policy, linked not least to the degree of integration of the EU Single Market, on the other. These 
elements have determined not only the institutional i terplay, but also conditioned the content and 
effectiveness of EU negotiating strategy, particularly pertinent in the area of services, intellectual 
property, or investment, where a great number of EU offensive interests lie, but where completion of 
the EU Single Market still remains to be achieved. This specific ‘capability-expectations gap’, which 
in trade policy could be measured by distance between the 'possible' in institutional terms but also in 
terms of substance on the one hand, and, on the other, demands for an improved and wider access to 
other countries' markets,17 revealed the borders of the EU's market opening strategy. The gaps were 
limited to some extent with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, but important limitations remain. 
On the institutional level, a close relationship between the Council and the Commission is ensured 
through a system of trade-specific checks and balances, which determine the content and, to some 
extent, length of the negotiating process. Occasionlly, tensions appear in the Trade Policy Committee 
(pre-Lisbon it was known as the ‘Art. 133 Committee’), which fully plays its role as a political 
scrutiniser of the Commission's actions. This has been lately evidenced at the conclusion phase of the 
EU-South Korea FTA18 and the controversies that commitments undertaken in the automotive sector 
caused among certain EU Member States. Exclusive competence of the EU in trade matters has not 
reduced over time the influence of the Council on the content, on the contrary, the Commission's input 
remains subject to close political scrutiny of the Council.  
The Commission's relations with the Council as a decision-making body bear, however, less relevance 
(if not less scrutiny) when it comes to market access nforcement. Not only does the follow-up to an 
agreement remain in the domain of the Commission as a policy executive, which reports regularly to 
the Trade Policy Committee; market access enforcement as an objective, either in the context of 
concluded agreements or in their absence is per definition subject to, at best, minor controversy, given 
the widely shared agreement among EU member states as to its benefits for EU trade. Its 
implementation and effectiveness is, however, shaped by the three factors mentioned above – the post-
modern nature of EU trade diplomacy, definition of trade competence, and cooperation among EU 
stakeholders within the Market Access Partnership.  
One of the fundamental characteristics of market access enforcement policy is its somewhat naturally 
decentralised approach. Coordination of barrier removal and monitoring efforts takes place both from 
Brussels headquarters and from third countries. While t e Commission's Directorate General for Trade 
takes the lead role and cooperates closely in Brussels with the EU Member States and business 
stakeholders, cooperation in third countries takes place through Market Access Teams, which mirror 
the Brussels cooperation structures, led by the EU delegations. The specific feature of the Partnership 
lies therefore in the close involvement, both in Brussels and in third countries, of EU business and of 
EU Member States, in market access enforcement. To some extent this approach blurs the distinction 
between the policy executive – the Commission – and the Member States' controlling functions in 
                                                   
17  To use the term coined by Christopher Hill, C Hill, ‘The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualising Europe’s 
International Role’ (1993) 31 Journal of Common Market Studies 305.  
18  A comprehensive overview of the Agreement can be found at ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/b lateral-
relations/countries/korea/.  
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trade policy, by involving the latter more closely in policy implementation. The scope for their 
practical involvement is two-fold. On the one hand, EU Member States are an important source of 
information by bridging the gap between the national and EU-level stakeholders, including small 
businesses. On the other hand, their strong diplomatic presence in a number of partner countries and 
respective bilateral relationships create certain additional opportunities (but also risks) for trade policy. 
These in turn stem from the, now precise, content of EU competence in trade policy as opposed to 
areas which remain in the Member States' competence. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty's entry into force, 
these included trade promotion (which post-Lisbon is still the case) and aspects of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) policy linked to investment protection. Strong bilateral trade relationships that EU 
Member States forge with different third countries on this basis offered, in theory, room for additional 
leverage that could be applied to address outstanding market access barriers. It is to that purpose that 
the Commission and Member States aligned respective positions and messages on most pertinent 
barriers to trade, with a view to strengthening the EU voice in trade diplomacy.  
From the Brussels perspective, therefore, implementation of the barrier removal strategies lies in the 
hands of the Commission but the EU Member States and business representatives are closely 
associated with this work.19 In turn, the picture in situ, as seen from the EU delegations' point of view, 
looks a bit different. Market Access Teams, although mirroring the Brussels-based modes of 
cooperation, are no rigid structures but merely reflect the concept of the Partnership and are adapted to 
local conditions. The most important advantage of MATs is close direct contact with authorities of the
partner country and access to information. Monthly EU trade counsellors' meetings, which were 
chaired by the rotating Presidency Member State until the Lisbon Treaty's entry into force, are the 
most frequently used opportunity to discuss market access issues.  
While Union delegations are in the driving seat of representing the Union's trade interests, the strength 
of the EU's position and of its representation abrod differs, however, depending on the weight and 
significance of the partner country at stake. In trade and economic affairs, like in foreign affairs, 
bilateral relations of some EU Member States with a given trade partner may be somewhat stronger 
than those forged by the EU as a whole. This aspect may be visible in particular in relations with some 
bigger trade partners, who may tend to perceive the EU through the sum of its components. Strong 
bilateral relations pursued to enhance bilateral trade (trade promotion) or forged to ensure investmen 
stability (through bilateral investment treaties, BITs) contribute to a competitive spirit among EU 
Member States and to some extent reduce the impact of the EU position in what relates to, for 
example, tackling market access barriers. In result, the economic strength of individual Member States 
and respective bilateral relationships with a partner country continue to determine the extent to which 
the EU is seen as a coherent unity that speaks with one voice. Conversely, the extent to which Member 
States decide to assist in solving market access issues is also a function of their bilateral trade relations 
with a given trade partner. For example, the practice of aligning messages on barriers to trade is 
strongly issue-dependent. Even if, on the whole, Memb r States increased their involvement in 
discussing barriers to trade, both sides acknowledge that the task of dealing with problematic issues 
remains principally with the European Commission/EU delegations. One of the reasons of member 
states' hesitant approach is the interest in maintain g a positive climate for the pursuit of mutually 
advantageous bilateral relationship, which could be distorted by discussing trade irritants. This in turn 
allows EU trade partners to favour relations with one or another Member State, which may limit the 
effectiveness of the MAP approach. That said, trade partners do notice when a unified message is 
passed by all EU interlocutors and the more unified the EU trade representation in third countries, the 
stronger the chance of resolving a problem.  
Furthermore, concerning the issues of diplomatic representation in a third country, a Member State's 
intra-agency coordination as well as limited willingness to share information also indicate the 
shortcomings of the Partnership approach. EU Member States share information about outcomes of 
                                                   
19  I.e. in the framework of the Market Access Advisory Committee and its sectoral working groups.  
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bilateral discussions with the Commission, but rarely is such information available for other Member 
States, let alone EU business at large. Some notable exceptions can be observed among the Nordic 
countries. The limitations also pertain to the structure of national administrations, where tensions 
between the foreign ministry, responsible for managi g external representation, and the ministry of 
economy/industry, usually in charge of trade, are not infrequent. In consequence, domestic 
coordination and flow of information regarding trade issues and at large may inhibit coordination of 
respective positions. Interestingly, however, cooperation on market access led some Member States to 
review their internal structures and introduce improvements precisely to address this issue.  
Overall, while the principle of exclusive competenc, as clarified by the Lisbon Treaty,20 guides the 
work on trade issues, there are natural limits to the assistance the EU Member States can and want to 
provide in addressing barriers to trade. Even if the major part of the task lies in the hands of the 
European Commission/EU delegations, there are reasons t  think that the precise definition of 
competence at EU level and internal coordination limitations define somewhat the policy 
effectiveness. This specific capability-expectations gap between the domestic constraints, which 
determine the trade diplomatic capacity and demand for market access deliverables, although partly 
result of legitimate policy choice, has implications for the extent to which the EU is able to present a 
united stance to the outside world.   
4. Market Opening and Market Access Enforcement Post-Lisbon  
Lisbon Treaty has brought a number of innovations that have direct impact on the EU's market access 
agenda, both in terms of market opening through FTA negotiations and policy enforcement activities. 
The extent of this impact varies though, with immediate consequences for the institutional dimension 
and a somewhat delayed influence on policy effectivness.  
4.1. The Inter-institutional Dimension – Relationship Between the Commission, the European 
Parliament and the Council 
The above analysis indicated that institutional relations in the context of the market access objectivs 
have the biggest impact on the negotiations of free trade agreements. The Treaty of Lisbon introduced 
a major shift in the established policy in this resp ct by converting the dual Council-Commission 
relationship into a triangle involving the European Parliament as co-legislator. Accordingly, Art. 
218(6)(a) TFEU provides that the Parliament's assent i  ow required for all agreements concluded in 
areas which fall in the remit of the ordinary legislative procedure. This provision extends therefore the 
Parliament's role to all types of agreements with a trade component, including also 'pure' trade 
agreements. It implies bringing the Council and Parliament, so far absent in trade policy-making, on a 
par. This power shift potentially creates scope for p litical tensions between the two institutions, in 
addition to occasional debates between the Council a d the Commission on sensitive political issues. 
The change of the configuration arguably shifts the rol  of the Commission as well, by putting it more 
in a position of an 'honest broker' between the Council and the Parliament, which traditionally hold 
conflicting views on major issues. The debate surrounding the approval of the EU-Korea FTA has 
offered an interesting probe of possible inter-institutional tensions which are likely to occur in at least 
three areas.  
The first concerns the main exception to the parity rule, as specified in Art. 207(3) TFEU. It stipulates 
that authorisation of the Commission to open free trade negotiations remains in the hands of the 
Council. The Parliament plays no formal role in that process and has merely the right to information 
on progress in negotiations.21 The Parliament's insistence22 that the Commission submit the proposal 
                                                   
20  Art. 3(1)(e) TFEU. 
21  Art. 207(3) TFEU reads:  
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for negotiating directives to both institutions at the same time clearly indicates its interest in narrowing 
down this legal distinction as far as possible.  
The second relates to the Parliament's possible attemp s to influence the negotiating directives and/or 
condition the adoption of a free trade agreement through the inclusion of specific, advanced provision 
pertaining, i.e., to foreign policy objectives, such as respect for human rights and democracy (typical 
for comprehensive EU agreements with third countries where trade is only part of the overall package) 
or particular clauses designed to satisfy particular e ectoral groups. Such EU domestic bargaining 
process would, however, surely need to take into account the negotiating agenda of a given trade 
partner, thereby trapping the negotiations in an even more complex two-level game scenario.23 
Inserting such clauses in stand-alone trade agreements with more assertive trade partners would not 
only be a matter of internal bargaining between the Council and the Parliament but would also depend 
on the will of the trading partner to accept such propositions. In the trade-off between demands and 
concessions, the EU's already very open internal market does not offer many carrots in exchange for 
more market access in the partners' relatively closed markets. The risk of Parliament demonstrating an 
excessively ambitious approach is perhaps theoretical; yet, this is only to be verified by future events.  
A further element to be borne in mind pertains to the time-frame for the agreements' entry into force, 
especially in case of provisional application. In principle, again it is the Council, without the 
Parliament, that decides on an agreement's provisional entry into force.24 However, the Council's 
unilateral move would risk prejudging the Parliament's role as a consent-giving body for the 
agreement's definitive entry into force. Balancing between the two institutions and managing the 
timing component is certainly left for the Commission, as is the need to hold an open and regular 
dialogue on subsequent progress in the negotiations with both institutions. As of yet, it is impossible to 
assess whether the new institutional set-up will have an impact on the adoption and entry into force of 
an agreement, but significant delays may provoke criticism from the stakeholders. 
4.2. Clarification of EU Competence in Trade Policy  
No less substantial changes pertain to the clarifict on of competence in trade policy. The Treaty 
brought all trade-related aspects of intellectual property protection, services and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) within the scope of the Union's exclusive competence.25 This is a significant change 
in particular for FDI in that previously the Union competence in the field explicitly covered only 
(Contd.)                                                             
‘[…] The Commission shall make recommendations to the Council, which shall authorise it to open the 
necessary negotiations. The Council and the Commission hall be responsible for ensuring that the 
agreements negotiated are compatible with internal U ion policies and rules.  
The Commission shall conduct these negotiations in consultation with a special committee appointed by the 
Council to assist the Commission in this task and within he framework of such directives as the Council may 
issue to it. The Commission shall report regularly to the special committee and to the European Parliament 
on the progress of negotiations.’ (emphasis added) 
22  In European Parliament resolution of 9 February 2010 on a revised Framework Agreement between the European 
Parliament and the Commission for the next legislative erm, P7_TA(2010)0009, pt. (h), the Parliament calls on the 
Commission to make a commitment ‘for reinforced association with Parliament through the provision of immediate and 
full information to Parliament at all stages of negotiations on international agreements (including the definition of the 
negotiation directives), in particular on trade matters and other negotiations involving the consent procedure, in such a 
way as to give full effect to Article 218 TFEU, while respecting each institution's role and complying in full with new 
procedures and rules for the safeguarding of the nec ssary confidentiality’.  
23  For the seminal contribution, see R Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The logic of Two-Level Games’ (1988) 
42 International Organization 427. 
24  Art. 218(5) TFEU: ‘The Council, on a proposal by the negotiator, shall adopt a decision authorising the signing of the 
agreement and, if necessary, its provisional application before entry into force.’ 
25  Art. 3(1)(e) TFEU juncto Arts. 206 and 207(1) TFEU. 
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abolition of restrictions to market entry (pre-establishment stage). All other investment-related issue  
(post-establishment) remained in the remit of the EU Member States. In result, important aspects of 
FDI linked to investment protection were usually regulated through bilateral treaties between the EU 
Member States and individual third countries. Given the increasingly stronger economic links between 
trade and investment, the emerging patchwork of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) prevented to 
some extent policy coherence in the investment area t the Union level. Full EU competence in all FDI 
matters therefore improves the situation at the EU level, not least for future negotiations of free trade 
provisions in this area in new and existing agreements with third countries.26  
Additionally, market access enforcement policy will now be able to progressively address the Union's 
offensive interests in the whole range of issues related to foreign direct investment. This competence 
shift may contribute to more policy cohesion not only from the Brussels perspective, but also from the 
perspective of trade representation in third countries between the EU delegations and Member States' 
embassies. The EU delegations' role in representing the complete spectrum of EU investment interests 
may reduce to some extent the scope for third-countries approaching individual EU Member States in 
matters having clear impact on the EU as a whole. By ensuring a more unified EU approach, it may 
thus arguably strengthen the EU delegations' position v s-à-vis the trade partners in general and in 
particular with regard to advancing the EU's arguments on market access, and further encourage 
Member States to actively participate in the Market Access Partnership.      
4.3. The Post-modern Nature of EU Trade Diplomacy in Market Enforcement and Cooperation in 
the Market Access Teams 
The Lisbon Treaty brings a number of salient changes to the EU's external representation in trade 
matters, which in turn may influence the capacity to advance EU's offensive interests. These are 
pertinent in particular for former Commission, now EU, delegations in third countries and their work 
on market access enforcement led in the Market Access T ams.  
The institutional set-up of EU trade representation in third countries is increasingly acquiring post-
modern diplomatic features,27 going further beyond nation state-based diplomatic representation. The 
competence-broadening and creation of the EEAS have changed the EU delegations' established 
patterns of EU representation. Change of the name plat  is the first most sign thereof, since all 
officials work now in the European Union delegations, whether in the traditional Community policy 
areas (trade, technical assistance) or foreign policy-related. The EEAS, in turn, includes now not only 
Commission officials, but also officials from the EU Member States diplomatic services and part of 
the staff from the Council secretariat. Creating institutional allegiance and a spirit of loyalty (esprit de 
corps) among staff coming from different institutional cultures is certainly one of preconditions for the 
effectiveness of the EEAS. As for trade policy, while ensuring that it contributes to the foreign policy 
formulation, trade remains in the remit of the European Commission's activities and so formally 
outside the EEAS. This institutional division is not a novelty, and as such does not have an impact on 
the way EU delegation's work is coordinated. Policy instructions continue, as before the Lisbon 
Treaty, to be coordinated and sent from the Commission's DG Trade, while keeping the EEAS 
informed. The creation of the EEAS therefore does not change the policy practice applied before the 
                                                   
26  The ongoing work relates now to ensuring a legal transition between the Member States’ bilateral investment agreements 
and Union-level policy instruments. See European Commission, Towards a comprehensive European international 
investment policy, COM(2010)343 final, 7 July 2010.  
27  Jozef Batora has been one of the advocates of this concept, implying that EU diplomacy is increasingly departing from 
the nation state-based, Westphalian diplomacy in international relations and increasingly acquiring supranational, and so 
post-modern, features within the EU. See J Batora and B Hocking, ‘Bilateral Diplomacy in the European Unio : Towards 
“Post-Modern” Patterns?’, CDSP Paper, Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, April 2008; also J 
Batora, ‘Does the European Union transform the institution of diplomacy?’ (2005) 12 Journal of European Public Policy 
44. 
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Lisbon Treaty. EU position on trade issues, represent d by trade officials in the EU delegations, 
continues to be aligned with the main EU foreign policy paradigms, and communicated to the (in part) 
successor of DG RELEX.  
Furthermore, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty created an opportunity to look into some 
coordination aspects in EU's external representatio from the point of view of its effectiveness and its 
impact on trade. For example, the EU delegation in Ge eva was formally separated so as to make a 
distinction between the EU delegation to the World Trade Organisation and the new EU delegation to 
the United Nations in Geneva. EU delegations in third countries also formally took over the chairing 
and coordinating functions for the EU represented abro d, so far in the hands of the rotating 
presidency. Previously, the EU Member State performing the rotating presidency function held the 
chair of all, including EU trade counsellors', meetings and agenda-setting. This political objective was 
facing a number of pragmatic constraints, given the un ven representation of EU Member States in 
different third countries. In consequence, Presidency coordination functions could not always be 
ensured by the country currently presiding the EU.28 Additionally, for smaller EU Member States 
these tasks represented certain burden for the limited staff in the embassies. Progressively, since 1 
December 2009, EU delegations have taken over the chair function, confirming, at least in the case of 
trade policy, a de facto coordination role among EU member states.   
The EEAS creation brings, however, another element, mentioned already above, and linked to the 
'corporate identity' it needs to integrate and ensure loyal cooperation of personnel from the 
Commission, the Council Secretariat and the Member States' diplomatic services. The 'Brussels 
socialisation effect' has been subject of a wide academic debate,29 addressing a phenomenon which 
remains hardly understood in the national capitals. Bringing together Member States' personnel in a 
truly Europeanised environment within the EEAS, as opposed to mere attendance of meetings, may 
also bring more cooperative attitudes in external representation.30 Such ‘Brusselsisation’ process, also 
in third countries by virtue of the Union delegations, could in turn contribute to more engaged 
cooperation of Member States in market access enforcement activities. The limitations inherent in the 
concept of the Market Access Partnership, as indicated earlier both in terms of spheres of competence 
and internal coordination constraints, may be partly mitigated thanks to the EEAS. Accordingly, closer 
cooperation may enhance the alignment of common messag  on trade barriers and lead to better 
coordination at national level. Similarly, the competence shift in investment policy will limit the scope 
for policy incoherence at EU level and enhance the EU common voice in external trade representation. 
Such developments could in the long run effectively l ad to better coordination of the EU position, 
advancing its interests in trade and foreign policy alike.   
Against these major developments, the creation of the European External Action Service does not 
bring any direct changes to the way trade policy and market access issues will be handled in Brussels 
headquarters. EEAS as an institution does not have a direct bearing on the content of FTA 
negotiations, except for preparing the foreign policy context (for Council consideration) within which 
they are pursued and, even less so, on the content of the market enforcement agenda. Thus, its 
influence on trade is rather of an i direct character. Trade policy remains outside the remit of the 
EEAS competence in formal terms, although it will be, as before, closely associated with it as part of 
                                                   
28  All EU Member States have diplomatic representations only in two countries in the world: China and Russia. In others, 
Member States' representation is dictated i.e. by presence/absence of substantial economic interests. This in turn had an 
impact on the Member States ability to ensure coordination functions in third countries during the Presidency. Where a 
country did not have a diplomatic representation, usually another EU Member State from the Presidential Trio would 
ensure coordination of EU representation in such a ountry.  
29  For a wide and interesting account see the contributions in B Hocking and D Spence (eds), Foreign Ministries in the 
European Union. Integrating Diplomats (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2002).  
30  For a roadmap to training the future EEAS and fostering a common EU diplomacy official see J Lloveras Soler, ‘The 
New EU Diplomacy: Learning to Add Value’, EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2011/05. 
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EU external relations as a whole.31 The role of the EEAS consists foremost of preparing and 
implementing the EU’s foreign and defence policies (CFSP/CSDP), now pledging more coherence 
also with development policy objectives.32 The decision-making per se remains, however, in the hands 
of appropriate Council bodies. From that point of view, trade policy at the Council level continues to 
be coordinated by the Trade Policy Committee, chaired by the Presidency and subordinate to the 
Foreign Affairs Council (FAC).33 These two bodies, including the intermediate COREPER, remain the 
main responsible for trade decision-making (now of c urse together with the European Parliament), 
while the Commission's Directorate-General Trade is now associated in preparation of some of the 
Council's geographical working groups.34 Yet, while trade policy continues to be guided by the 
exclusive competence paradigm as opposed to foreign policy's continued intergovernmental character, 
complete separation of trade from EEAS would render it largely inoperable. Consequently, the policy 
coordination mechanisms35 on the Commission-EEAS front follow the above logic, bridging the 
practical gaps between the Lisbon Treaty’s provision  and political reality, in line with the necessity 
for the Council and the Commission to ensure policy coherence in the EU's external relations.  
5. Conclusions: Achieving the Market Access Objectives Post-Lisbon, Bridging the 
Capability-Expectations Gap? 
The academic debate on the implications of the new tr aty framework, also for trade policy, tends to 
focus on its impact on policy formulation, the insttutional and decision-making set up. Rightly so, 
since advancing policy objectives depends to a great extent on the quality of decision-making methods 
and inter-institutional cooperation. However, no less attention should be paid to the way the Lisbon 
Treaty will influence trade policy effectiveness. Despite the European Commission's traditional 
executive functions, a closer look reveals that the institutional picture is by no means straightforwad, 
as evidenced by the work on market access issues. Inter-institutional relations, the nature of EU 
diplomacy, competence definition and the Commission'  relations with different stakeholders, among 
them EU Member States as well as EU business representatives, all play a role in advancing trade 
policy's objectives. The above analysis suggests that the Lisbon Treaty may have a nuanced impact on 
the market opening agenda. On the one hand, it clarfies the EU competence and allows its institutions 
to act more consistently on behalf of the EU. On the other hand, it remains to be seen how the new 
institutional triangle will affect the conduct and outcome of market opening efforts. As for market 
access enforcement, the Lisbon Treaty indicates scope for significant improvement in the EU external 
representation and strengthening of the EU position v s-à-vis third countries. Important limitations 
however, remain, with boundaries set by what is achievable without questioning the last bits of 
Member States' sovereignty; moreover, it is a matter of future evaluation whether this opportunity has 
been seized by the EU as a whole.  
 
                                                   
31  This is an imperative of consistency of EU (external) policies, see Arts. 18(4) and Art. 21(3) TEU. 
32  See in this regard Bart Van Vooren’s contribution in this edited Working Paper. 
33  The High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission, if she so decides, may let the Presidency chair t e FAC 
when trade policy is discussed.  
34  DG DEVCO will participate in Council Working Groups that work on development cooperation issues.  
35  Enshrined explicitly also in: Council, Decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External 
Action Service, 2010/427/EU, 26 July 2010, 13 recital and Art. 5(3) in particular.  
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The Protection of EU Citizens: The Perspective of International Law 
 
Patrizia Vigni* 
Abstract 
International law traditionally recognises the exclusive competence of the State of nationality where 
the protection of individuals who have suffered injuries abroad is concerned. Two different types of 
assistance can be provided under international law: diplomatic protection and consular assistance. On 
the other hand, EU norms, in particular, Art. 23 TFEU, provide for other forms of protection vis-à-vis 
EU citizens. One must ascertain whether these norms are consistent with international law. Some 
problems may arise as regards this issue. First, the concepts of diplomatic protection and consular 
assistance are mainly derived from international norms, which at this stage include, besides treaty law, 
provisions of customary origin binding for all States and other international legal entities, such as 
international organisations. Second, regardless of whether the EU intends to adopt the concepts of 
diplomatic and consular protection with their original meaning as generally recognised under 
international law – or rather with an autonomous meaning and in accordance with EU law – 
diplomatic and consular protection must always be ex rcised with respect to third countries, which 
clearly are not bound by EU law. In order to determine to what extent international law allows the EU 
to provide specific forms of protection to its citizens in the territory of third countries, one must 
ascertain if the EU, as an international legal entity, and EU citizenship, as the legal link between this
entity and individuals, have achieved full recognitio  at the international level. Only the recognition f 
EU citizenship as a solid link between the EU and iividuals would make the exercise of the 
protection of the EU effective under international law. In order to reach this acknowledgment, the EU 
should demonstrate that it enjoys full jurisdiction ver these individuals and thus, is fully accountable 
for their conduct under international law. 
Keywords  
International law – diplomatic protection – consular assistance – EU citizenship – accountability and 
responsibility of International Organisations 
 
1. Introduction 
International law traditionally recognises the exclusive competence of the State of nationality where 
the protection of individuals who have suffered injuries abroad is concerned. This competence is 
justified by the fact that the recognition of the legal personality of individuals has always been quite 
controversial. Therefore, it is necessary to identify the appropriate legal entity that can stand for the 
safeguarding of the individuals’ interests at the int rnational level. Similarly, under international l w, 
the tight nexus between the State of nationality, its organs and citizens, serves as a legal basis for 
recognising State responsibility for the conduct of its nationals. In sum, the criterion of nationality 
helps to recognise the entity that is both competent and accountable to act in the name of individuals 
vis-à-vis third countries.1 
                                                   
*  Lecturer at the Law Faculty, University of Siena, It ly. 
1  For the view that accountability is ‘the need to a tribute certain activities under international law to [...] actors’, see G 
Hafner, ‘Can International Organizations be Controlled? Accountability and Responsibility’ (2003) 97 American Society 
of International Law Proceedings 236, 237. 
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States usually exercise the protection of their natio ls by means of their diplomatic and consular 
organs. Two different types of assistance can be provided under international law: diplomatic 
protection and consular assistance. According to Ar. 1 of the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection 
(Draft Articles) adopted by the International Law Commission (ILC) in 2006 diplomatic protection   
‘consists of the invocation by a State, through diplomatic action or other means of peaceful 
settlement, of the responsibility of another State for an injury caused by an internationally 
wrongful act of that State to a natural or legal person that is a national of the former State with a 
view to the implementation of such responsibility.’2      
On the other hand, consular assistance entails the support that national consular organs offer to 
individuals when they deal with their personal affairs in the territory of another country. 
Even at the first glance, the competence of the State of nationality with respect to its citizens still 
remains one of the primary principles of international law, in spite of the recent developments relating 
to the recognition of the legal status and rights of individuals (particularly in the fields of human rights 
and international criminal law). Thus, this paper will first of all define the precise features of 
diplomatic protection and consular assistance under int national law, paying special attention to the
person entitled to the exercise of these kinds of pr tection. 
Second, one must analyse whether EU norms providing some forms of protection other than 
diplomatic protection and consular assistance are consistent with international law. Some problems 
may arise as regards this issue. First, the concepts of diplomatic protection and consular assistance are 
mainly derived from international norms, which at this stage include, besides treaty law,3 provisions of 
customary origin binding for all States and other international legal entities, such as international 
organisations.4 Second, regardless of whether the EU intends to adopt the concepts of diplomatic and 
consular protection with their original meaning as generally recognised under international law – or 
rather with an autonomous meaning and in accordance with EU law – diplomatic and consular 
protection must always be exercised with respect to third countries, which clearly are not bound by EU
law. This makes it necessary to determine whether t protection that the EU aims to extend to its 
citizens when abroad also entails certain internatio l obligations binding the EU and its Member 
States. In fact, although the EU has achieved considerable influence and authority within the 
international community, one must admit that international law falls short of providing the specific 
obligations offered by the EU with respect to diplomatic and consular protection. Therefore, some EU 
provisions may not correspond to international obligations of either a customary or treaty origin. In 
particular, Art. 23 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides for the 
right of EU citizens to diplomatic and consular protection of Member States other than the State of 
nationality in the territory of a third country. First of all, one must ascertain whether the scope of 
protection granted under Art. 23 TFEU corresponds to ei her diplomatic protection or consular 
assistance as they are regulated by international law. Second, special attention must be paid to the 
question of who are the legitimate actors involved in the exercise of these types of protection, since the 
wording of Art. 23 TFEU seems to highlight some discrepancy between the EU and international law 
as to the criteria identifying these actors.   
In addition, in recent years one can observe that the Commission has militated persistently posited th 
transfer of the competence of diplomatic and consular assistance from States’ authorities to the EU or, 
                                                   
2  Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-first Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/61/10). 
3  1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. See infra for a 
thorough analysis. 
4  For the view that the legal personality of international organisations does not automatically entail th t these organisations 
are bound by customary international law see J Alvarez, ‘International Organizations: Accountability or Responsibility’, 
www.asil.org/aboutasil/documents/CCILspeech061102.pdf, 14. However, one must recall that the European Court f 
Justice (ECJ) recognised that the European Union (EU) at that time, the European Community) has to apply its norms in 
accordance with customary international law, see th Case C-162/96 Racke [1998] ECR I-3655. 
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more precisely, to the Union delegations, emphasising the close link between the EU and its citizens.5 
In view of the objective of the EU to assume new functions vis-à-vis its citizens at the international 
level, one must ascertain as to whether internationl law allows legal entities other than national States 
to provide diplomatic and consular assistance. In light of these proposed ‘external’ functions of the 
EU, some (although brief) attention must also be paid to the issue of the international accountability 
and responsibility of international organisations such as the EU, in particular with regard to the 
unlawful conduct of their members and organs. In fact, s States may be responsible for the activities 
that their organs and, in some circumstances, nationals carry out in the territory of third countries, 
similarly, the EU might be accountable for the conduct that its organs and citizens perform in the name 
and interest of the EU itself. This problem has become particularly marked considering the recent 
adoption, by the ILC, of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations (‘RIO 
Articles’).6 
In short, in order to determine to what extent inter ational law allows the EU to provide specific forms 
of protection to its citizens in the territory of third countries, one must ascertain if the EU, as an 
international legal entity, and EU citizenship, as the legal link between this entity and individuals, 
have achieved full recognition at the international level. 
2. Diplomatic Protection and Consular Assistance Under International Law 
2.1. Diplomatic Protection 
In order to better understand how diplomatic protection works, it is essential to clarify who, and on the
basis of which criteria, can exercise such protection, whose interest is actually protected, and by which 
means diplomatic protection is performed. 
As to the ‘actor’ that can carry out diplomatic protection, Art. 3(1) of the Draft Articles specifies that 
‘[t]he State entitled to exercise diplomatic protection is the State of nationality’. Therefore, in orde  to 
determine the actual State that can exercise diplomatic protection in a specific case, one must ascertain 
the nationality of the injured person.7 International law leaves States free to choose the rules for the 
attribution of their nationality. Nevertheless, theInternational Court of Justice (ICJ), in the Nottebohm 
case,8 required, in cases of multiple or controversial nationality, the presence of a genuine link 
between the injured individual and the State that intended to exercise diplomatic protection in respect 
of him/her.9 Moreover, in Art. 4 of the Draft Articles, the ILC affirms that State law that attributes 
                                                   
5  See Paragraph 5 of the EU Commission’s Green paper, Diplomatic and consular protection of Union citizens in third 
countries COM(2006) 712, OJ C 30, 1 February 2007. 
6  The ILC adopted the RIO Articles on first reading i 2009. See Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-fourth 
Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/64/10), ch. IV, Section C. For further developments of the RIO Articles see the 
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on the ILC Report in December 2009, A/RES/64/114. 
7  For the view that nationality is the necessary link between a State and an individual in order to all w the former to 
exercise diplomatic protection in favour of the latter see CF Amerasinghe, Diplomatic Protection (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008) 66. See also the Commentaries to the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, i Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission (2006) Vol. II Part Two, 30-31. For recent case law reaffirming the relevance of 
nationality as a criterion to recognise the right to exercise diplomatic protection see Case concerning Ahmadou Sadio 
Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Preliminary Objections, 24 May 2007 www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/103/13856.pdf, para. 41. 
8  ICJ Reports (1955) 23. 
9  The ILC considered that the doctrine of ‘genuine link’ may be of some help to avoid, in cases of multiple nationality, that 
solid and tenuous ties between an individual and different States are equated. See para. 5 of the Commentary to draft Art. 
4. Moreover, in cases of dual nationality, draft Ar. 6 does not allow the State of nationality that does not have a genuine 
link to exercise diplomatic protection against the other State of nationality which by contrast has such link. For an 
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nationality must not be ‘inconsistent with international law’. The freedom of States to acknowledge 
nationality, therefore, encounters limits in international norms, such as those prohibiting any form of 
racial or gender discrimination.10 
In the ILC’s view, the term ‘national’ covers both natural and legal persons.11 As to the diplomatic 
protection of legal persons and, in particular, a corporation, Art. 9 of the Draft Articles affirms that     
‘the State of nationality means the State under whose law the corporation was incorporated’. This 
formal criterion of attribution of nationality with respect to corporations is generally recognised by 
international law, as the Barcelona Traction case demonstrates.12 However, Art. 9 also deals with the 
question of whether diplomatic protection can be exrcised by the State of nationality of shareholders 
instead of the State where the corporation was established.13 The ILC, in its commentaries, specifies 
that this second solution is ancillary with respect to he criterion of incorporation.14 More favourable 
criteria on the basis of specific treaty law applicable to the disputing Parties and allowing the 
diplomatic protection of shareholders were established by the ICJ.15 
One of the most innovative provisions of the Draft Articles is certainly Art. 8, which provides for the 
possibility of a State to exercise diplomatic protection in respect of stateless persons and refugees who 
are lawfully and habitually resident in its territoy. This proviso seems to express a rule of customary 
international law which, in these very specific cases, departs from the general principle under which 
diplomatic protection can only be exercised by the State of nationality.16 The proactive character of 
this Article might encourage States to exercise diplomatic protection also in respect of people with 
whom they have solid ties other than nationality, even in those cases that do not concern stateless 
persons or refugees, such as, for instance, the relationship between any Member State and EU citizens. 
However, except for the case of stateless persons, diplomatic protection, which is exercised on 
grounds other than nationality, has not yet been recognised by customary international law. Therefore, 
in order to make this exercise lawful, an agreement between the intervening State, the State of 
nationality of the injured person, if any, and the State against which the protection is invoked, seem to 
be required.17  
Moreover, as regards the persons that are entitled o xercise diplomatic protection under international 
law, mention must be made of the special case of international organisations. In its commentaries, the 
(Contd.)                                                             
overview, see C Forcese, ‘The Capacity to Protect: Diplomatic Protection of Dual Nationals in the “War on Terror”’ 
(2006) European Journal of International Law 369, 389. 
10  See, for example, Art. 9 of the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 1249 
UNTS 13. For the view that nationality attributed or gained by fraud or negligence cannot be internatio lly accepted see 
Amerasinghe, Diplomatic Protection, 95. 
11  This precise matter was discussed by the ILC in 2004. See Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-ninth 
Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/59/10) 25. 
12  ICJ Reports (1970) para. 70. 
13  Art. 9 states that ‘when the corporation is contrlled by nationals of another State or States and has no substantial 
business activities in the State of incorporation, a d the seat of management and the financial control of the corporation 
are both located in another State, that State shallbe regarded as the State of nationality’. 
14  See para. 5 of the Commentary of Art. 9 of Draft Articles. For an overview, see F Francioni, Imprese multinazionali, 
protezione diplomatica e responsabilità internazionale (Milan: Giuffré 1979). 
15  In the ELSI case, the ICJ considered the interests of shareholdrs as worthy of protection since the injured corporati n no 
longer existed, ICJ Reports (1989) para. 118. Moreover, in the Diallo case, the ICJ has affirmed that, when a direct and 
personal right of the shareholder is at stake, suchas t e economic rights arising from the status of hareholder, diplomatic 
protection of the State of nationality of the shareolder is admitted. Case concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, para. 66. 
16  See A Künzli, ‘Exercising Diplomatic Protection. The Fine Line between Litigation, Demarches, and Consular 
Assistance’ (2006) ZaöRV 321, 343. 
17  For the view on the absolute impossibility of third States to exercise diplomatic protection with respect to non-nationals 
see C Forcese, ‘The Capacity to Protect’ 389. 
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ILC specifies that it does not intend to deal with this issue in the Draft Articles18. So far, international 
law has only recognised the possibility for an inter ational organisation to bring an action against a 
State which has caused damage with respect to the agents of the organisation itself19. This type of 
protection is more similar to the intervention of States in case of injuries to their organs than 
diplomatic protection of private individuals.20 Intervention of an international organisation is in fact 
aimed at safeguarding the functioning and dignity of the organisation indirectly injured by means of 
the offences which were perpetrated against its agents. For this reason, intervention of an international 
organisation can be performed without the consent of the State of nationality of the injured agent, 
since such intervention does not affect the interess of the individual as such, but the organ by means 
of which the organisation exercises its powers21. For the same reason, the action of an internationl 
organisation for the protection of one of its agents should also be brought against the State of 
nationality of the agent him/herself since, in this specific case, the relevant relationship for 
international law is not the nationality link, but rather the functional link.22 
Notwithstanding the efforts of legal doctrine to extend the number of entities that can exercise 
diplomatic protection on the basis of criteria other than nationality, customary international law only 
recognises the admissibility of diplomatic protection for the State of nationality. 
A further fundamental issue concerning diplomatic protection is the question of whether the injured 
person has an individual right to be protected by his/her State of nationality. If such a right existed, the 
State’s intervention would be just an instrument for the protection of the right of the individual. More 
importantly, the State of nationality would be compelled to exercise diplomatic protection and its 
failure to act would consist in a breach of international law. By contrast, if no individual right to 
diplomatic protection were deemed to exist under international law, the exercise of such protection 
would be aimed not at safeguarding the rights of the individual, but rather the interest of the State of 
nationality in having its citizens respected when they are abroad. Thus, the bearer of the right to 
complain and achieve satisfaction would be no longer th  individual, but his/her State of origin. 
Although the ILC discussed this issue for a long time, its members did not reach an agreement on the 
existence, under international law, of a duty to exercise diplomatic protection.23 In fact, in its 
commentary to Art. 2 of the Draft Articles, the ILC comments that, according to the current state of 
the law, the State of nationality has the right, but not the obligation, to exercise diplomatic protection. 
However, recent case law is not consistent on this matter. Some State case law has denied the 
                                                   
18  See para. 3 of the Introduction of the Commentaries to the Draft Articles. 
19  See the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion in the case R paration for Injuries suffered in the Service of the United Nations, ICJ 
Reports (1949) 174 ff. 
20  This view was also expressed by the ILC with regard to the definition of the scope of ‘diplomatic protection’ during the 
drafting of the Draft Articles in 2004. The ILC excluded, from the persons that could enjoy diplomatic protection, 
nationals engaged in official business on behalf of the State. See Fifty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/59/10) 26. 
21  For this view, see the Reparation case, 185-186. See also Amerasinghe, Diplomatic Protection, 151-152. 
22  See the ICJ’s Advisory opinion Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the 
Commission on Human Rights, ICJ Reports (1999) 62. The ICJ stated that the immunity of a UN officer can also be 
invoked against the State of nationality of such an officer when this expert acts in the name of the organisation. The same 
conclusions had been reached by the ICJ some years bfore in the Advisory Opinion on the Applicability of Article VI, 
Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges andImmunities of the United Nations, dealing with the case of Mr 
Mazilu, the Romanian member of the UN Commission on Human Rights, who was hindered by Romania from leaving the 
territory of the State in order to exercise his function at the UN, ICJ Reports (1989) 177. 
23  Some countries recognise the existence of an individual right to diplomatic protection. See the judgments of the German 
Constitutional Court and British Court of Appeal respectively in the Rudolph Hess and Abbasi cases, as quoted by 
Künzli, ‘Exercising Diplomatic Protection’ 329. For an overview see A Bassu, La rilevanza dell’interesse individuale 
nell’istituto della protezione diplomatica: sviluppi recenti (Milan: Giuffré 2008). 
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existence of a duty incumbent on the State of natiol ty to exercise diplomatic protection.24 On the 
other hand, in the 2010 judgement of the Diallo case, the ICJ and, in particular, Judge Conçado 
Trindade in his separate opinion, adopted a more nuanced approach then the aforementioned stance of 
the national judiciary, affirming that the discretionary power of States to exercise diplomatic 
protection should be mitigated when the protection of the human rights of an individual is at issue in 
order to reaffirm the priority of the protection of such rights under international law.25 
To sum up, in most cases, the exercise of diplomatic protection is subject to the complete discretion of 
the State of nationality. For this reason, the effectiv ness of such protection as an instrument for 
safeguarding individual prerogatives is to be questioned in the view of the legal tenets and judicial 
bodies. The ECJ itself has highlighted the inadequacy of diplomatic protection in the Kadi case.26 
2.2. Diplomatic Functions Other Than Diplomatic Protection 
In order to better distinguish between diplomatic protection on the one hand, and consular assistance 
on the other, one must ascertain what typical requiments and features characterise diplomatic 
protection and what, conversely, are not present in other functions exercised by diplomatic and 
consular organs. 
One of the fundamental requirements for the exercis of diplomatic protection is the prior exhaustion 
of domestic remedies by the person invoking protection.27 As stated by Art. 14 of the ILC Draft 
Articles, domestic remedies are ‘legal remedies which are open to the injured person before the 
judicial or administrative courts or bodies, whether ordinary or special, of the State alleged to be 
responsible for causing the injury’. For the purposes of the present analysis, when an individual is 
assisted by his/her national organs during the exhaustion of local remedies, this assistance cannot be 
considered to entail diplomatic protection precisely because the exhaustion of local remedies is a 
precondition for the exercise of diplomatic protection. By contrast, consular assistance sometimes 
requires diplomatic or consular organs to provide lega  and judicial support to the citizens of their 
sending State when these individuals are in a thirdcountry. 
Moreover, diplomatic protection not only differs from consular assistance because of its distinct 
features, but also because of its diverse aims. The purpose of diplomatic protection is not to assist 
injured individuals in their relations with third countries, but rather to bring the issue to the inter-s ate 
level, through legal or political means. Conversely, consular assistance is aimed precisely at providing 
any citizen with the support of the organs of his/her State of nationality when he/she must face foreign 
States’ organs. 
                                                   
24  For an example of this case law see the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa in Van Zyl v 
Government of RSA [2007] SCA 109 (RSA), www.justice.gov.za/sca/judgments/sca_2007/sca07-109.pdf. The applicants 
claimed that the South African Government did not comply with its duty to exercise diplomatic protection in their respect 
against Lesotho. The Court of Appeal affirmed that citizens have the right to request the government to consider the 
possibility of exercising diplomatic protection with respect to them. Nevertheless, both under South African and 
international law, the government is free to decide wh ther and through which means it intends to protect i s citizens. See 
paras. 51 and 52 of the judgement. See also the 2004 judgment of the South Africa’s Constitutional Court where the issue 
of the existence of a duty to exercise diplomatic protection was analysed both under international and State law in 
Kaunda and Others v President of the RSA 2004 (10) BCLR 1009 (CC), 2005 (4) SA 235 (CC), 
www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/uhtbin/cgisirsi/Cey2GG5dyr/MAIN/0/57/518/0/J-CCT23-04.  
25  www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/103/16244.pdf. 
26  Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat v Counci and, Commission [2008] ECR I-06351, paras. 
256 and 323. 
27  See Arts. 14 and 15 of the Draft Articles. For an overview of the issue of the exhaustion of local remedies see R Pisillo 
Mazzeschi, Esaurimento dei ricorsi interni e diritti umani (Turin: Giappichelli 2004). 
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In apparent contradiction to this view, in the LaGrand and Avena case,28 the ICJ recognised the 
diplomatic protection rights of Germany and Mexico n order to bring a complaint against the US 
regarding the violation of the individual right of their citizens to consular assistance. In particular, the 
Court affirmed that diplomatic protection, being a concept of customary law     
‘does not prevent a State party to a treaty, which creates individual rights, from taking up the case 
of one of its nationals and instituting international judicial proceedings on behalf of that national, 
on the basis of a general jurisdictional clause in such a treaty.’29 
Despite this statement, the ICJ still considered the exercise of diplomatic protection and the judicial 
action arising from such protection as inter-state acts. In fact, both in the LaGrand and Avena cases, 
after having acknowledged that the US had breached t  individual right of German and Mexican 
citizens to consular assistance, the ICJ recognised the right of the applicant-State (not of the citizens of 
that State) to reparation both for the violation of its own right and the individual right of its citizens.30 
Thus, notwithstanding the fact that in some circumstances, national States exercise diplomatic 
protection to claim the violation of the interests of their citizens, diplomatic protection is still deemed 
a State action, which can only indirectly result in he protection of individual rights.31  
Diplomatic protection also differs from diplomatic relations. While diplomatic protection is a legal and 
political action of a State exercised in exceptional circumstances, diplomatic relations involve several 
ordinary activities, which the State performs through specific organs: diplomatic agents. The typical 
functions of diplomatic agents are listed in Art. 3 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations32, and include representing and protecting the interes s of the sending State, and promoting 
relations with the host State33. In short, diplomatic organs represent the sending State in the host State 
and maintain relationships with the latter State in the name of the former.34 Art. 3(b) explains that 
diplomatic functions consist in ‘[p]rotecting in the receiving State the interests […] of […] nationals, 
within the limits permitted by international law’. The wording of this paragraph seems to imply a type
of ‘ in situ’ assistance, guaranteed within the territory of the host State, rather than diplomatic 
protection, as intended by international law. These activities ought not to be confused with those 
declarations that, in some circumstances, States make through their diplomatic agents to express their 
formal complaint to the host State, such as the initial act of the proceedings of diplomatic protection. 
In this case, diplomatic organs do not protect citizens, rather, they exercise their function of 
‘representing the sending State in the receiving State.35 Thus, their action is a form of ‘ex situ’ 
                                                   
28  LaGrand and Avena cases, ICJ Reports, respectively, (2001) 466 and (2004) 12. For an overview of these cases see infra. 
29  See the LaGrand and Avena cases, respectively, paras. 42 and 40. 
30  See the LaGrand and Avena cases, respectively, paras. 126 and 115. 
31  For this view see B Conforti, Diritto Internazionale (Naples: Editoriale Scientifica 2006) 215-216. Forthe view that other 
instruments, such as the mixed tribunals of ICSID and 1981 Alger Iran-US Agreement, have replaced diplomatic 
protection, see Amerasinghe, Diplomatic Protection 154. 
32  Done in Vienna on 18 April 1961, 500 UNTS 95. 
33  Art. 3 states: ‘The functions of a diplomatic mission consist, inter alia, in: 
 (a) Representing the sending State in the receiving State; 
 (b) Protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State and of its nationals, within e limits 
permitted by international law […]’. 
34  For an overview of this subject-matter see GR Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory & Practice (Basingstoke: Palgrave 2005); E 
Denza, Diplomatic Law: Commentary on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 1998); Société Française de Droit Internationl, Aspects récents du droit des relations diplomatiques (Paris: Pedone 
1994). 
35  This is particularly frequent in cases in which the injured person is still in the territory of the foreign State. In this case, 
the individual will likely present his/her petition to the national diplomatic organs that are present in such a territory, in 
order to achieve diplomatic protection. Such organs can be used by the State of nationality to raise its formal complaint 
against the responsible State. 
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protection since it comes from outside the host Stae even though the complaint concerned a violation 
occurring within the territory of the latter State. 
2.3. Consular Assistance 
The function of safeguarding the interests of citizens in the territory of a third country is also described 
in Art. 5 of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR).36 In fact, in this field, the 
competences of diplomatic and consular authorities ar  almost the same. Art. 5 VCCR is quite detailed 
in its description of the typical administrative functions of consular posts.37 In particular, paragraphs a) 
and e) provide for the general obligations of, respectively, protecting the interests and helping the 
nationals of the sending State.38 Such paragraphs must be read together with Art. 36 VCCR in order to 
define the concept of consular assistance that must necessarily be compared with the notion of 
diplomatic protection. Although Art. 36 seems to regulate the rights of consular organs rather than 
those of individuals – since it is included in Section 1 of Chapter 2 of the VCCR, which deals with 
facilities, privileges and immunities relating to a consular post – nevertheless, its paragraph 1 specifies 
that its purpose is to ’facilitating the exercise of c nsular functions relating to nationals of the sending 
State’, which are the functions, described in the above mentioned paragraphs (a) and (e) of Art. 5 
VCCR. Art. 36 VCCR continues by establishing the right, both of consular organs and individuals, to 
communicate in case of need of the latter.39 In addition, Art. 36(b) VCCR provides for the right of 
consular agents to be informed of the arrest and detention of one of the citizens of their sending State. 
Most importantly, paragraph b) subjects this right to he request of the individual.40 In recent years, 
Art. 36(b) VCCR has been the object of extensive litigation before judicial bodies and discussion in 
legal doctrine. In particular, in the LaGrand case, the ICJ recognised the existence of two separate 
rights. On the one hand, the ICJ affirmed the right of a State to be informed of the arrest and detention 
of one of its citizen in a third country in order to ensure him/her legal or practical assistance. On the 
other hand, the ICJ recognised that Art. 36 provides for the right of the individual to be informed of 
the possibility of being assisted by his/her national consular organs. 
The ICJ’s decision is particularly important because it points out the clear difference between 
diplomatic protection and consular assistance. The latt r is a right of the individual, as sanctioned by 
Art. 36 VCCR.41 The ICJ reaffirmed the same conclusions in the Avena case, which concerned some 
                                                   
36  Done in Vienna on 24 April 1963, 596 UNTS 262. 
37  For an overview of this issue see LT Lee, Consular Law and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1991); GE Do 
Nascimento e Silva, ‘Diplomatic and Consular Relations’ i  M Bedjaoui (ed), International Law: Achievements and 
Prospects (Dordrecht: Nijhoff 1991) 444-447. 
38  The content of paras. (a) and (e) of Art. 5 of the Convention on Consular Relations is quite similar to the wording of Art. 
3 of the Convention on Diplomatic Relations. For this view see also Künzli, ‘Exercising Diplomatic Protection’ 322. 
39  Para. (a) of Art. 36 states that ‘consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the sending State and to 
have access to them. Nationals of the sending Statesh ll have the same freedom with respect to communication with and 
access to consular officers of the sending State’. 
40  Art. 36(b) provides that: ‘[…]if he so requests, he competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, 
inform the consular post of the sending State if, wthin its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or 
committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner. Any communication addressed to the 
consular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall be forwarded by the said authorities without 
delay. The said authorities shall inform the person c cerned without delay of his rights under this subparagraph’. 
41  The ICJ held that Art. 36 VCCR  ‘provides that, at the request of the detained person, the receiving State must inform the 
consular post of the sending State of the individual’s detention without delay’. It provides further that ‘any 
communication by the detained person addressed to the consular post of the sending State must be forwarded to it by 
authorities of the receiving State without delay’. Significantly, this subparagraph ends accordingly: ‘The said authorities 
shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this subparagraph […]’ Based on the text of these 
provisions, the Court concludes that Art. 36(1)1 creates ‘individual rights’ LaGrand, para. 77. This view has been 
successively embraced by some other international bodies, such as the Inter-American Court on Human Rights. For the 
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Mexican citizens whose right to consular assistance had been disregarded in the course of criminal 
proceedings before the United States courts.42 This view of the ICJ was also espoused by the European 
Union in an official document that was addressed to the US Supreme Court as an amici curiae brief in 
a case that concerned the domestic legal effects of the judgment of the ICJ on Art. 36.43 
By contrast, the 1961 Diplomatic Relations Convention does not provide for the right of an injured 
person, but the right of the State of nationality to complain against the violations of the rights of its 
citizens. For this reason, in the LaGrand and Avena cases, the ICJ admitted both the direct action of 
the State (Germany and Mexico) against the violation of its own right to be informed of the detention 
of its citizens, as sanctioned by Art. 36 VCCR, and the indirect action, corresponding to the exercise 
of diplomatic protection, against the breach of the right of its citizens to be informed of the possibility 
of enjoying consular assistance, as established by Art. 36(b) VCCR.44 In this way the ICJ made 
evident the differences between diplomatic protection and consular assistance. 
As is well known, the only requirements for the exercise of diplomatic protection are the breach of an 
international norm that provides for the right of an individual; the nationality of the individual 
concerned, which determines the State entitlement to intervene; and the prior exhaustion of local 
remedies. By contrast, consular protection can be ensur d by consular organs even in the absence of 
any violation of international law. In addition, such organs must carry out their functions in 
accordance with the host State’s law, as required by Art. 36(2)VCCR.45 
Moreover, one must recall that while the right to consular assistance is expressly recognised by the ICJ 
as an individual right, at least in the specific circumstances of a detained or arrested national, despite 
the recent developments of international jurisprudence, diplomatic protection is still considered an 
exclusive prerogative of the State of nationality, which does not have any duty to exercise such 
protection vis-à-vis its nationals. 
Finally, consular assistance and diplomatic protection also differ with respect to the time and place in 
which they occur. In respect of chronology, consular assistance consists of providing support for a 
citizen abroad either ex ante, that is before an injury to the citizen occurs, or ex post, when the citizen 
is already in danger or injured. However, in both these cases, consular assistance is aimed at 
supporting the action undertaken by the citizen. Thus, such assistance never entails an autonomous 
action of the State of nationality. As to the place, onsular assistance can be defined as ‘in situ’ 
protection, i.e., protection given in the host State where the beneficiary of the assistance is physically 
located. By contrast, diplomatic protection corresponds to the complaint of a State against a violation 
of the rights of one of its nationals by another State. This complaint can be only made when a violatin 
(Contd.)                                                             
view of the latter, see the opinion of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 The right 
to information on consular assistance in the framework of the guarantees of the due process of law, 
www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_16_ing.pdf. 
42  These Mexican nationals were sentenced to death by US courts without having being informed of the possibility of being 
assisted by the national consular organs of their State of nationality during the judicial proceedings, a  Art. 36 VCCR 
states. After the unsuccessful exhaustion of domestic remedies of these Mexican citizens, Mexico brought an action 
against the US before the ICJ claiming the violation of Art. 36 both with respect to Mexico itself and its citizens. The ICJ 
recognised the US responsibility for both the violati ns and invited the latter State to review and reconsider the decisions 
with which US courts had sentenced Mexican citizens. 
43  Brief of Amici Curiae, The European Union and Members of the International Community in support of petitioner, Josè 
Ernesto Medellín v. State of Texas, on Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, no. 06-984, 26 June 
2007. Mr Medellín was one of the Mexican citizens that led to the ICJ’s decision in the Avena case. The EU Brief was 
aimed at supporting Mr Medellín application in his la t chance to avoid execution that actually took place in July 2008. 
For an overview, see B Simma and K Hoppe, ‘From LaGrand and Avena to Medellin-A Rocky Road toward 
Implementation’ (2005) 14 Tulane Journal International and Comparative Law 31. 
44  On this point see Künzli, ‘Exercising Diplomatic Protection’ 338. 
45  Art. 36, para. 2 provides: ‘[t]he rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be exercised in conformity with the 
laws and regulations of the receiving State […]’. 
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of the rights of the individual and the exhaustion of domestic remedies have already taken place. In 
addition, the presence of an individual in the territory of the foreign country at the time of the 
complaint of the State of nationality is not necessary for the exercise of diplomatic protection. Thus, 
diplomatic protection is an action that brings the dispute to the international level, outside the territory 
both of the responsible State and the State of natio lity. In short, diplomatic protection can be 
classified as ‘ex situ’ protection. 
As a concluding remark, diplomatic protection and consular assistance cannot be equated under 
international law. If the EU or its Members States intend to establish new rules which recognise the 
right to exercise one of these forms of protection interchangeably and by organs different to those 
which have such competence under international law, they ought to clarify their intention explicitly by 
the adoption of specific norms. 
3. The Right to ‘Diplomatic and Consular Protection’ of EU Citizens Under EU and 
International Law  
3.1. The Scope of the Right to ‘Diplomatic and Consular Protection’ 
EU Treaties and subsequent norms are demonstrably binding vis-à-vis contracting States only. Thus, 
EU provisions dealing with the protection of EU citizens can become effective at the international 
level only if third countries, against which the EU and Member States intend to apply these norms, 
recognise their binding character either as rules of customary law or provisions belonging to treaties 
concluded between these countries and the EU and Member States. 
Art. 20(2) (c) TFEU stipulates clearly as an indiviual right of the Union citizen the same protection 
mentioned also in Art. 23(1) TFEU and Art. 46 EU Charter.46 This Article states that,  ‘[e]very citizen 
of the Union shall […] be entitled to protection bythe diplomatic or consular authorities of any 
Member State […]’. 
Although Art. 23(1) TFEU appears to use the adjectiv s ‘diplomatic’ and ‘consular’ as synonyms, 
under international law, diplomatic protection and consular assistance are two completely different 
legal concepts, as demonstrated above. Nevertheless, at a careful analysis of the wording of Art. 23(1) 
TFEU, one can infer that this Article only deals with a form of protection which implies the assistance 
of diplomatic or consular authorities of other Member States in respect of EU citizens when they are in 
third countries and cannot rely upon their national consular or diplomatic organs because such organs 
are not present.47 This protection can be categorised as consular assist nce consisting in an individual 
right as declared by the ICJ and other international bodies.48 Thus, Art. 23 TFEU seems to exclude 
from its scope diplomatic protection which, as affirmed above, is the right of the State of nationality to 
claim the violation of the interests of its nationals.49 
                                                   
46  Such correspondence is not a casualty. In fact, the explanations relating to Art. 46, which were prepar d under the 
authority of the Praesidium of the Convention that produced the text of the EU Charter, specify that the right at issue is 
the same as that guaranteed by the EC Treaty in accordance with Art. 52(2) of the Charter. The latter Article, in fact, 
provides that ‘[r]ights recognised by this Charter for which provision is made in the Treaties shall be ex rcised under the 
conditions and within the limits defined by those Treaties’. Thus, not only the text of Arts. 46 of the Charter and 23 
TFEU, but also the scope of the right guaranteed is the same. 
47  For this view see also S Kadelbach, ‘Union Citizenship’ in European Integration: The new German School (Heidelberg: 
Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public and Inter ational Law 2003), Jean Monnet Working Paper 9/2003, 
www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/03/030901-04.pdf, 29. 
48  The ICJ judgments in LaGrand recognise an individual right only in the limited circumstance of Art. 36(2)(b) VCCR 
which is considerably limited in relation to the circumstances under EU law. 
49  This view seems to be confirmed by other EC norms i plementing Art. 23 TFEU. For example, Decision 95/553 
highlights that the main concern of Member States is to regulate the cases in which prompt and effectiv  assistance is 
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In apparent contraction to this conclusion, a websit  fact-sheet of the EU Commission, which provides 
EU citizens useful information concerning the protection that they can expect to achieve by dint of 
their EU citizenship when outside the EU,50 seems to suggest the possibility of exercising diplomatic 
protection on the basis of Art. 23 TFEU. An ambiguous sentence in the text of the fact-sheet states 
that, in cases of arrest or detention, the embassy or consulate of any EU Member State must  
‘ensure that the treatment offered [to the detained EU citizens] […] does not fall below minimum 
accepted international standards […] In the event that such standards are not respected, [the 
embassy or consulate] will inform the foreign ministry of the country of origin [of the detained 
person] and, in consultation with them, take action with the local authorities.’  
 This part of the fact-sheet could imply that the diplomatic mission of any EU Member State may help 
the Foreign Affairs Ministry of the State of nationality of the detained person to bring a formal 
complaint, against a third country, of the violation f the rights of this person. Such a complaint would 
raise this issue at the inter-state level and thus, could be considered as diplomatic protection.51 
However, further in the text, the Commission seems to acknowledge the leading role of the State of 
nationality when the violation of a fundamental right of an EU citizen is at stake, by stating that other 
Member States’ diplomatic agents must seek the intervention of the State of nationality of the detained 
person. Thus, regardless of who informs the State of nationality of the violation, whether it be the 
citizen or other Member States’ agents, it is only the State of origin that can exercise diplomatic 
protection, pursuant to international law. In short, the action of other EU States’ agents only seems to 
respond to the general obligation of cooperation betwe n Member States to keep other States informed 
of the conditions in which their nationals are, rather than the intention of exercising diplomatic 
protection in the interest of the sending State or the EU. 
3.2. The Legitimate Actors of ‘Diplomatic and Consular Protection’ Under EU and International 
Law 
If one assumes that existing EU norms merely allow Member States to provide EU citizens a type of 
protection that international law defines as ‘consular assistance’, the only difference between EU and 
international law relating to the right to consular assistance, affects the actors that can ensure this kind 
of protection. While under international law consular assistance can only be provided by the State of 
nationality, EU law also recognises the power of the consular organs of other Member States to 
intervene. This difference could encourage the third country, in the territory of which such assistance 
should be guaranteed, to deny the legitimacy of the other EU Member’s intervention under 
international law. For this reason, the text of Art. 23(1) TFEU suggests Member States to negotiate 
agreements with the countries where consular assistnce for EU citizens may be needed. It appears 
that the negotiation of these international agreements would contribute to make effective the right 
established by Art. 23 with respect to third countries.52 Nevertheless, the intervention of a Member 
State other than the State of nationality might also be justified under international law. In fact, the 
consular agents of the intervening Member State maybe considered indirect organs (of the State of 
nationality of the injured EU citizen) acting as sub titutes for the organs of the latter State that are not 
present in the territory of the third country involed. Accordingly, the third country could not dispute 
the legitimacy of the intervention by a ‘non national’ EU Member State under international law, 
because this Member State does not act in its own interest, but as ‘an agent’ of the State of nationalty 
(Contd.)                                                             
needed by EU citizens. See Decision 95/553/EC of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States 
meeting within the Council of 19 December 1995 regarding protection for citizens of the European Union by diplomatic 
and consular representations, OJ L 314/73, 28 December 1995. 
50  See ec.europa.eu/youreurope/redirect_it.htm.  
51  This ambiguity is also highlighted by Künzli, ‘Exercising Diplomatic Protection’ 348. 
52  For this view see E Horváth, Mandating Identity: Citizenship, Kinship Laws and Plura  Nationality in the European 
Union (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2007) 90. 
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of the injured person. Certainly, a third country would recognise this form of agency between EU 
Member States on the basis of the general principle of international law which allows any State of 
nationality to assist its nationals by instruments of its choice. 
In the end, the criterion on the basis of which consular assistance of EU citizens would be allowed, 
would still remain an individual’s nationality. No r le of EU citizenship would be recognised under 
international law. Actually, in the present author’s view,  EU citizenship has not yet acquired the 
status of nationality (or of a similarly solid link) at international level, so as to justify the intervention 
of any Member State for the protection of any EU citizen, regardless of his/her nationality. One cannot 
deny that, in recent years, there seems to be a development of the idea that a solid link may also exist 
between an EU citizen and his/her Member State of residence.53 However, international law does not 
seem to have recognized the legitimacy of these new d velopments occurring within the EU legal 
system. 
It is up to Member States to convince third countries that the status of an EU citizen is, for them, as 
important as nationality. So whenever an EU citizen r quires consular assistance, third countries 
would automatically accept the intervention of consular organs of EU Members other than the State of 
nationality. 
3.3. The EU as International Defender of EU Citizens   
The EU (in particular, the Commission) has always considered Art. 23(1) TFEU as the first step 
towards the recognition of a wider power of intervention on the part of the Union itself for the 
protection of its citizens at the international level.54 
Some innovative proposals by the Commission are included in paragraph 5 of the 2006 Green Paper 
on diplomatic and consular protection of Union citizens in third countries. As affirmed above, in this 
paragraph, the Commission suggests the transfer of the competence of diplomatic and consular 
assistance from States’ authorities to Union delegations. Given that in 1992, the EU did not have 
diplomatic missions that possessed the same status and competences of States’ missions in third 
countries, in order to ensure the best protection of EU citizens, the drafters of Art. 20 TEC (current 
Art. 23(1) TFEU) presumably decided to attribute such competence primarily to the Member States’ 
organs. Nevertheless, after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, Union delegations have somehow 
increased their role in the fulfilment of diplomatic and consular protection of EU citizens. In fact, 
Decision 2010/427/EU established the European External Action Service,55 which is considered as the 
first form of EU common diplomacy.56 Moreover, Art. 35(3) of the EU Treaty provides that Union 
delegations must ‘contribute to the implementation of the right of citizens of the Union to protection in 
the territory of third countries cooperate with States’ diplomatic authorities’.57 
                                                   
53  See C O'Brien, ‘Real links, abstract rights and false larms: the relationship between the ECJ's “real link” case law and 
national solidarity’ (2008) 33 European law Review 643; and S O’Leary, ‘Developing a closer Union between the people 
of Europe’, Europa Institute, Edinburgh Mitchell Working Papers 6/2008. 
54  For this view see A Ianniello Saliceti, ‘The Protection of EU Citizens Abroad: Accountability, Rule of Law, Role of 
Consular and Diplomatic Services’ (2011) European Public Law, 91 et seq.  
55  Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organization and functioning of the European External 
Action Service OJ L 201/30, 3 August 2010.  
56  For this view see in particular the Final Report of the CARE (Citizens Consular Assistance Regulation in Europe) 
Project, ‘Consular and Diplomatic Protection. Legal Framework in the EU Member States’, 
www.careproject.eu/images/stories/ConsularAndDiplomaticProtection.pdf, 31. 
57  See on the same line also Art. 5(10) of the Council Decision on the EEAS: The Union delegations shall, cting in 
accordance with the third paragraph of Article 35 TEU, and upon request by Member States, support the Member States 
in their diplomatic relations and in their role of providing consular protection to citizens of the Union in third countries 
on a resource-neutral basis. See Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and 
functioning of the European External Action Service [2010] OJ L 201/30. 
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Nevertheless, ‘contribution’ is not ‘direct intervention’. Since the content of Art. 23(1) TFEU makes 
reference to diplomatic authorities of Member States only, the contribution of Union delegations to the
protection of EU citizens may presumably be ancillary and supportive with respect to the intervention 
of Member States’ diplomatic organs.58 
In order to allow the direct intervention of EU delegations, the Commission suggests introducing a 
clause that might acknowledge this competence in future EU ‘mixed’ agreements. The need for 
specifying this competence in the text of an international agreement and not only in an EU act, is due 
to the fact that the Commission considers that the third State’s consent is necessary to make this new 
EU power binding at the international level. In fact, as affirmed above, only when the status of EU 
citizen becomes opposable vis-à-vis third countries, both Member States other than the State of 
nationality and maybe the EU itself, will be able to intervene for the protection of EU citizens as such. 
Actually, Member States already provided assistance to EU citizens regardless of their nationality in 
some cases of urgent evacuation and natural disaster . In these cases, no third country made objections 
to this intervention.59 Nevertheless, this lack of opposition cannot be so far equated to the formal 
recognition of the legal power of Member States to pr vide assistance to all EU citizens.  However, 
one must observe that this type of clause cannot be deemed a general solution to the problem of 
diplomatic and consular protection of EU citizens. I  fact, such clauses could be introduced only in the 
treaties dealing with issues that fall within the competence of the EU. So, if this solution was adopted, 
different organs (State or Union delegations) would exercise consular assistance in the cases which, 
despite their similarity, concern diverse subject-matter that pertain to the competences of either the EU 
or Member States. For this reason, the creation of common diplomatic offices in third countries where 
diplomatic agents of all Member States work side-by-side, would be advisable in order to ensure the 
protection of EU citizens.60 The positive result of such a solution would be that, since EU citizens 
would be assisted by the diplomatic agents of their State of nationality, there would be no problems of 
competence relating to international relations, which by contrast, arise when EU organs intervene. 
The need for such a solution highlights that the lack of exclusive attribution of competence to the 
Union relating to the protection of EU citizens raises problems at the international level. In order to 
persuade third countries to trust new procedures for the protection of EU citizens that the EU may 
establish, the EU and Member States ought to make clear to what extent the EU is accountable at the 
international level with regard to the conduct of its organs, Member States, and citizens. It is therefore 
necessary to define both the powers and responsibilities of the EU under international law.61 
First, the EU, as any international organisation, must be considered responsible for the unlawful 
conduct of its organs and agents when they are performing their functions. This principle is established 
by Art. 5 of the ILC’s Draft Articles on Responsibil ty of International Organisations (RIO Articles) in 
accordance with the same criterion which, under international law, attributes the responsibility for the 
conduct of their organs to States.62 
                                                   
58  The Lisbon Treaty has also added a new norm, Art. 221 TFEU that sanctions the ‘close cooperation’ of Union 
delegations ‘with Member States’ diplomatic and consular missions’ with regard to any foreign policy issue. 
59  See the case of the 2004 Tsunami or the 2006 Lebanon War. 
60  This solution was proposed by the European Economic and Social Committee commenting in the Green Paper on 
diplomatic and consular protection of Union citizens i  third countries. See para. 4.4. of the Opinion of the Committee, 
2007/C 161/21, 13 July 2007), OJ C 161, 75. 
61  For the view that accountability is a prerequisite of responsibility see Hafner, ‘Can International Organizations’ 237. For 
the opposite view see Alvarez, ‘International Organiz tions’ 34, who affirms that, as far as international organisations are 
concerned, accountability is so limited as to exclude international responsibility almost in all cases.  
62  Seventh Report on Responsibility of International Organizations of the Special Rapporteur Gaja A/CN.4/610, 8. Along 
with the similarity between international organisations and States, Art. 7 of RIO Articles also provides for the 
responsibility of an international organisation forthe unlawful conduct of its organs even when they act beyond their 
official functions. 
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Second, in line with the RIO Articles, an international organisation must be deemed as responsible 
either for the conduct that a State organ performed under the control of the organisation63 or when ‘the 
organization acknowledges and adopts the conduct in question as its own’.64 Although there is no 
extensive international practice on this matter, the ILC has affirmed that an international organisation 
cannot escape responsibility when it has exercised th  effective control over unlawful activities 
performed by State organs65. Effective control may also consist in the fact that an organisation has 
established specific obligations and directions with which Member States must comply.66 If, in light of 
the principle of effective control, the EU accepted r sponsibility for any conduct of Member States 
providing consular protection to EU citizens in accordance with Art. 23(1) TFEU, third countries 
might be encouraged to accept this atypical form of c nsular assistance. In this way, both the 
international person entitled to exercise protection and its agent may be clearly identified. Actually, 
the EU has already endorsed international responsibility for the conduct of its Member States in some 
specific fields, such as commercial relations.67 As an example, one can mention the fact that the EU 
regularly stands before the WTO dispute settlement organs when one of its Member States is involved 
in a commercial dispute.68 Commercial relations undoubtedly pertain to the exclusive competence of 
the EU,69 while the exercise of diplomatic and consular protection is still considered as a typical 
function of sovereign States. Thus only if EU Member States renounced their sovereign powers in a 
clear manner, would third countries rely upon the innovative EU regime of consular protection. 
Finally, in order to define the extent of the accountability of international organisations, and thus of 
the EU, at international level, one must ascertain whether or not the responsibility of the organisations 
may be recognised with regard to the conduct of private persons. The RIO Articles totally exclude the 
legitimacy of this type of responsibility due to the fact that international law does not acknowledge 
any solid link between international organisations a d individuals in order to justify the attribution f 
the conduct of private persons to an organisation.70 However, in order to achieve the recognition of its 
full accountability under international law and, consequently, its right to exercise diplomatic 
protection with respect to EU citizens, the EU should stress the point that a solid link between 
individuals and an international organisation may exist, for example, in the case of EU citizenship. 
Thus, by emphasising the role of EU citizenship as the legal criterion which provides recognition of 
the responsibility of the Union for the conduct of EU citizens, the EU might indirectly achieve the 
acknowledgment of its right to exercise diplomatic and consular protection with respect to those 
individuals for whom the EU is accountable and respon ible at the international level. Clearly, EU 
                                                   
63  See Art. 6 of RIO Articles. 
64  Art. 8 of RIO Articles. 
65  See ILC’s Commentary to RIO Articles, 48-49. 
66  The principle of effective control of international organisations over State activities is also stated by the European Court 
of Human Rights in the Behrami case concerning the conduct of forces placed in Kosov  at the disposal of the United 
Nations. See the Decision of the Grand Chamber of 2 May 2007 on the admissibility of applications No. 71412/01 
Behrami and Behrami v France, as quoted in the Seventh Report of the Special Rapporteur Gaja, 49. 
67  See S Talmon, ‘Responsibility of International Organizations: Does the European Community Require Special 
Treatment?’ in M Ragazzi (ed), International Responsibility Today (Leiden: Nijhoff 2005) 406. This author highlights the 
fact that the EU was the international organisation hat asked the ILC, drafting the RIO Articles, for special treatment by 
reason of its total independence and accountability as an international person. However, this author also underlines that 
the main concern of the EU is the allocation of powers rather than the recognition of its responsibility, S Talmon, 
‘Responsibility’ 411. 
68  For this view see also the Seventh Report of the Special Rapporteur Gaja, 12. 
69  See P Craig and G de Burca, EU Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008) 89-17. See also Talmon, ‘Responsibility’ 
408. 
70  The ILC has also affirmed that an international organisation is not responsible for the private conduct of the individuals 
that are organs of this organisation. See the Commentary to RIO Articles, 73. 
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citizenship has not so far achieved the status of asolid link that may substitute the criterion of 
nationality as a legal criterion for the exercise of diplomatic protection. 
Therefore, it is up to the EU and Member States to tress the importance of this link in order to make 
third countries confident of a mechanism of protection for individuals that sets aside the traditional 
principle of nationality and promotes the new concept of EU citizenship. 
In all probability, the need for Member States to safeguard their exclusive powers as sovereign States 
with respect to their nationals has so far prevailed over the interest of delegating their functions to the 
EU. However, the EU must demonstrate itself to be more courageous if it intends to modify one of the 
fundamental principles on which international law has been based for centuries, such as nationality. 
4. Conclusions 
With regard to the protection of individuals, international law primarily recognises the power and 
responsibility of the international legal entity tha  has the strictest legal link with these persons: 
namely, the State of nationality. 
In light of the above, the State of nationality provides consular assistance to its nationals when they 
need support in the territory of a third country by means of its diplomatic and consular organs. In 
addition, if an individual suffers an injury abroad, the State of nationality can exercise its own right to 
diplomatic protection in order to complain against the violation of the interests of an individual that 
‘pertains to its sovereignty’. Thus, consular assistance and diplomatic protection are two different 
legal concepts under international law. 
In this regard, concerning the scope of the right of EU citizens to ‘diplomatic and consular protection’, 
as established by Art. 23(1) TFEU, one may observe that this right mainly corresponds to consular 
assistance, as defined by international law. If in the future the EU intends to establish a form of 
assistance to EU citizens that entails diplomatic protection, as characterised under international law, it 
must adopt specific norms that expressly provide for this kind of protection. However, the main 
inconsistencies between EU and international law relating to the protection of EU citizens vis-à-vis 
third countries, seem to affect the identification of the actors which, under EU law, ought to be entitled 
to exercise this protection. 
Firstly, Art. 23 TFEU recognises the right of any Member State to provide consular assistance to EU 
citizens, regardless of their nationality. In order to make this right effective at the international level, 
Art. 23(1) TFEU invites Member States to conclude international treaties with third countries in the 
territories of which this right might be exercised. This solution would help to achieve both the consent 
of third countries and the worldwide recognition of EU citizenship as a jurisdictional link. Certainly, 
one must distinguish between a case whereby EU Members and a third country adopt a specific treaty 
establishing that the consular and diplomatic protection of EU citizens will be hereafter performed in 
accordance with Art. 23 TFEU and a case where the EU, its Members and a third country include a 
clause requiring the application of Art. 23(1) TFEU in an agreement regulating subject-matter 
pertaining to the competence of the EU. In the latter case, the application of Art. 23(1) TFEU is 
absolutely guaranteed. In the case where a clause is added to an EU agreement, Member States may 
extend protection to the nationals of another EU Memb r only when EU citizens need protection 
concerning a matter that is within the scope of the agreement concerned. As to the issues falling 
outside of the scope of the agreement, the exclusive competence of the State of nationality would 
remain. Clearly, this solution does not provide a good example of legal certainty. The consequences 
might be even worse if the agreement to which the clause is added concerned a subject belonging to 
the shared competence of the EU. In this regard, even in some cases that are covered by the 
agreement, the intervention of the State of nationality might be required. 
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Thus, the EU and Member States must necessarily clarify at the international level to what extent 
Member States can provide protection to EU citizens instead of the State of nationality in order to 
avoid legal uncertainty both vis-à-vis EU citizens and third countries.  
In the present author’s view, in the absence of specific treaties or clauses recognising the right 
established in Art. 23(1) TFEU, third countries might be equally compelled to accept that the consular 
assistance of EU citizens may be provided by EU Members other than the State of nationality. In fact, 
if this State officially declares (the inclusion of a norm within a treaty, such as Art. 23(1) TFEU, may 
be considered as an official declaration) that it intends to exercise this assistance by means of the 
consular organs of any EU Members, a third country might be obliged to accept this form of assistance 
in order to respect the will of the State of nationality of the individual that needs protection. As 
affirmed above, in this case, one might envisage a rel tionship of agency between the State of 
nationality and EU Members that exercise consular protection. Although this solution may be of some 
value under international law, one must admit that it is still anchored to the concept of nationality 
rather than to the criterion of EU citizenship. Thus, it scarcely contributes to the recognition of EU
citizenship as a valid legal status for the acknowledgment of the rights of individuals at the 
international level. 
The international recognition of EU citizenship would be decisive if, as the EU Commission has 
proposed, the EU was definitively allowed to perform diplomatic and consular protection of its 
citizens under EU law. Only the recognition of EU citizenship as a solid link between the EU and 
individuals would make the exercise of the protection of the EU effective under international law. In 
order to reach this acknowledgement, the EU should demonstrate that it enjoys full jurisdiction over 
these individuals and thus, is fully accountable for their conduct under international law. 
The Union is certainly the most effective international organisation within the worldwide community; 
it possesses an institutionalised structure and wide powers that can be exercised by independent 
organs. In light of the existing authority of the Union, international law undoubtedly recognises the 
full accountability and responsibility of this organisation for the conduct of its organs and Member 
States when they act in the interest and under the control of the EU itself. 
This accountability and responsibility are conversely limited as regards State activities concerning 
subject-matters that do not belong to the exclusive competence of the EU, because in this case, powers 
and obligations are shared between the Union and its Members within and outside the Union. The 
protection of EU citizens pertains to this type of subject-matter.  For this reason, the full accountabili y 
of the EU for the conduct of individuals, i.e. EU citizens, has not yet been recognised at the 
international level. 
So far, no international organisation has established a solid link with private persons so as to achieve 
the right to exercise control and protection with respect to them instead of their State of nationality. 
The EU might be the first organisation to reach this goal if the status of EU citizen became an 
undisputable jurisdictional link both within the EU and international legal orders. 
Indeed, it is up to the EU and Member States to demonstrate to the international community that they 
are also prepared to endorse further international bligations in order to make EU citizenship effective 
at the international level. 
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Abstract 
The unprecedented magnitude of disasters that recently hit third countries have shown that not even 
the Member States with the widest network of consular and diplomatic representations can ensure 
alone the protection of their nationals located in the affected areas. The present paper addresses the 
question of whether the Union citizenship confers to the citizens of the Member States benefits when 
they find themselves in distress outside of the Union’s borders. It critically assesses the legal nature, 
content and effects in the domestic legal orders of the least developed ‘Union citizenship right’: the 
right to protection abroad (Art. 20(2)(c) TFEU). The paper will demonstrate that the Union citizen has 
a clear, individual and directly effective right to receive un-discriminatory protection in third countries 
abroad from any of the Member States that is represnt d in loco. Nevertheless, since for the moment, 
the right to protection abroad is limited to an application of the principle of non-discrimination based 
on nationality, the paper will show that in practice, the effectiveness of the Union citizen’s right to 
protection abroad is hindered due to the divergent r gulatory frameworks of the Member States on 
consular and diplomatic protection of nationals which have not, so far, been harmonised by a Union 
measure. The paper concludes by presenting what are the new roles acquired by the Union after the 
Lisbon amendment in the field of consular and diplomatic protection of the Union citizens abroad and 
what is their impact on the Union citizen’s right and the role of the Member States in a traditional 
State-like activity.  
Keywords  
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‘There are fifty-four cities on the island, all spacious and magnificent, identical in language, 
customs, institutions, and laws.’ 
Sir Thomas More, Utopia (1516) 
1. Introduction 
In light of the recent and devastating natural and man-made disasters which unfortunately seem to be 
more and more frequent, and so far have affected all the regions of the world,1 any of the Union 
                                                   
*  PhD candidate, European University Institute. 
1  Many regions of the world were hit by major naturl or man-made disasters in the last five or six years which caused a 
great number of deaths and injuries to the population. For instance, the democratic uprising in spring 2011 in the 
Southern Neighborhood, the earthquake and the tsunami th t hit Haiti in January 2010, the Icelandic volcanic ash cloud 
of 2010, acts of local or international terrorism (Sharm el-Sheik 2005, 11 September 2001 Attacks on Wrld Trade 
Centre in New York), military conflicts (Lebanon conflict of summer 2006, the Georgian conflict of August 2008).  
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citizens who finds himself unrepresented2 by his home Member State in a third country would like to 
know whether his ‘additional’3 and ‘fundamental’4 status of Union citizen may give him any 
additional benefits to those flowing from national citizenship while outside of the Union’s borders, or 
are the rights and freedoms resulting from Union citizenship stopping at the borders of the Union’s 
internal market?  
For instance, when Haiti was hit by a tsunami in 2010, less than half of the Member States had a 
consular or diplomatic mission i  loco to which their nationals could resort to for help. When the 
democratic revolution shook Libya in the spring of 2011, only 8 Member States were represented, 
while a total of 6000 EU citizens were in need of protection.5 The aforementioned crises are not 
isolated events, but they are part of a phenomenon which has developed in the last decade. More and 
more EU citizens travel outside of the Union,6 while increasingly, certain of them establish in third 
countries and thus need protection abroad on a regular basis.7 While the number of Union citizens in 
need of protection abroad increases, the number of consular and diplomatic representations of the 
Member States decreases, mainly due to the financial crises that recently affected each of them.8 The 
result is that a number, higher that even before, of Union citizens cannot obtain protection in third 
countries from their home Member States. 
                                                   
2  According to a 2007 survey there is a high percentage of Union citizens that may find themselves in this situation, since 
only in Beijing, Moscow and Washington all 27 Member States have at least one embassy (Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the Regions - Effective consular protection in third countries: the contribution of the European Union - Action Plan 
2007-2009, COM (2007) 767 of 5 December 2007). In regard to the recent international crisis: in Libya only 8 Member 
States were represented, while in Bahrain only 4, see Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council - Consular protection for EU citizens in third countries: State of play and way forward, oc. COM 
(2011) 149/2 of 23 March 2011). 
3  After the Lisbon amendment, there is a noteworthy turn of phrase in the key provisions on Union citizenship. Art. 9 TEU 
(placed in the very first Title of the TEU on Common fu damental provisions on the EU) and Art. 20 TFEU (the specific 
Treaty Article on citizenship) stipulate that the citizenship of the Union shall be ‘additional to’ instead of ‘complementary 
to’ the national citizenship. According to Shaw and de Waele, the difference in terminology is not a mere cosmetic 
change, but signals that the Union citizenship should now be seen as a self-standing, independent status from national 
citizenship, see more in J Shaw, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon and Citizenship’, The Federal Trust European Policy Brief, June 
2008; and H de Waele, ‘European Union Citizenship: Revisiting its Meaning, Place and Potential’ (2010) 12 European 
Journal of Migration and Law 319-336. 
4  This pronouncement of Union citizenship which ‘is destined to be the fundamental status’ of the natio ls of the EU 
countries has been repeated in a long line of case-law. See, for instance, Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-6193, 
para. 31; Case C-224/98 D'Hoop v. Office national de l'emploi [2002] ECR I-6191, para. 28; Case C-103/08 Gottwald, 
Judgment of 1 October 2009, nyr, para. 23; Case C-544/07 Rüffler, Judgment of 23 April 2009, nyr, para. 62; Case 
C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] ECR I-0000, para. 43; Case C-34/09 Zambrano, Judgment of 8 March 2011, para. 41. In the 
last two cases there has been a change of terminology, the European Court of Justice has no longer describ d the Union 
citizenship in terms of a future achievement (‘is de tined to be’), but already as a present result (‘is’) which the citizens of 
the Member States can benefit of. 
5  Communication from the Commission to the European Prliament and the Council - Consular protection for EU citizens 
in third countries: State of play and way forward, COM (2011) 149/2 of 23 March 2011). 
6  According to a 2007 survey, there are around 7 million of Union citizens travelling in a third country where their home 
Member State is not represented. See Action Plan 2007- 09 and related Impact Assessment, European Commission, 
Communication to the European Parliament, the EU Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
Regions, Document COM (2007) 767 final of 5 December 2007 and Document SEC (2007) 1600 of 5 December 2007. 
7  According to the European Commission 2010 Report on Union citizenship ‘more than 30 million EU citizens live 
permanently in a third country, but only in three countries (United States, China and Russia) are all 27 Member States 
represented’. See European Commission, EU citizenship Report 2010 - Dismantling the obstacles to EU citizens’ rights, 
doc. COM (2010) 603 of 27 October 2010, p. 9. 
8  According to a comparative research, all of the Mmber States have had to close certain of their consular or diplomatic 
representations abroad. See www.careproject.eu/images/stories/ConsularAndDiplomaticProtection.pdf . 
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The question that this paper seeks to answer is firstly, whether the nationals of the unrepresented 
Member States have a right to protection while in third countries under the EU law, and secondly, 
from whom should they ask for this kind of help: should it be the Union delegations since, after all, in 
addition to being nationals of at least one of the Member States, they are also the EU’s citizens,9 or 
should they turn to the consular or diplomatic representations of the other Member States that are 
represented in third countries, based on the idea that the European Union, as an international 
organisation is not entitled under public international law to exercise a State reserved competence such 
as consular and diplomatic protection of nationals?10 
The paradox is that even if the Union citizens travel now more frequent outside of the Union, they are 
not more aware of the rights the foundational Treaties of the EU confer them while located in third 
countries. From the very beginning of the Union citizenship, the citizens have been endowed with a 
Treaty based right which reads as follows  
‘Every citizen of the Union shall, in the territory of a third country in which the Member State of 
which he is a national is not represented, be entitl d to protection by the diplomatic or consular 
authorities of any Member State, on the same conditi s as the nationals of that State’.11  
Notwithstanding, a 2006 and 2008 Eurobarometer surveys12 revealed that the majority of Union 
citizens do not know they have this right, and, even if they know of its existence, they do not know 
what exactly are they entitled to receive under this right.13 When the Union citizens were asked what 
kind of assistance would they expect to receive from the Member State they turn to for help, the 
majority of them responded that they expect to receiv  the same kind of help, regardless of which of 
the Member State they will approach.14  
This paper will show (section two) that, for the moent, despite the wish of the majority of Union 
citizens, the EU law does not confer them a right to uniform protection abroad, due to the fact that te 
Treaty provides for a mere prohibition of discrimination based on nationality which does not require 
the Member States to harmonise their national laws on consular and diplomatic protection of nationals. 
Section two continues by presenting the exact rights a Union citizen can claim under the Treaty based 
right of protection by the consular and diplomatic authorities of the Member States while outside of 
the Union borders and assesses their legal effects within the Member States’ domestic legal orders.  
After looking at the material scope of the Union citizen’s right to protection in third countries, the 
paper continues by addressing the question of the actors competent to ensure the European model of 
consular and diplomatic protection of the Union citizens. Under public international law, the question 
                                                   
9  According to the declaration of F Frattini, Director of the DG Justice in 2007, 17% of the interviewed Union citizens 
believed that that they could seek protection from the European Commission delegations. See Public hearing: Diplomatic 
an consular protection (Centre Borschette) Brussels, 29 May 2007. 
10  Public international law recognises a right to exercise diplomatic protection to an international organisation only in 
regard to its agents, generally described as ‘functio al protection’. A mechanism which the International Law 
Commission (ILC) has described as a different mechanism than the diplomatic and consular protection of natio als. See 
Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with commentaries, text adopted by the ILC at its fifty-eighth session, Official 
Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-first Session, Supplement No. 10, 2006 (A/61/10). 
11  Former Art. 8c TEC became after the Amsterdam amend t Art. 20 TEC, after the Lisbon amendment, Art. 23(1) 
TFEU. In addition, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights stipulates the same right in Art. 46. 
12  Eurobarometer No. 188 of July 2006 and Flash Eurobarometer No. 213 of February 2008. On the same line, see also the 
more recent Flash Eurobarometer 294 'EU citizenship' of March 2010. 
13  This is confirmed by the Commission’s Report to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Eco omic and 
Social Committee on progress towards effective EU Citizenship 2007-2010 (doc. COM (2010) 602 of 27 October 2010), 
Section 2.7. 
14  Flash Eurobarometer 294 'EU citizenship' of March 2010. 
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has received a clear answer15, which has remained mostly un-changed16 for the last decades - it is only 
the State of nationality that has competence to exercise consular and diplomatic protection of its own 
nationals.17 However, under EU law, the State of nationality is no longer the sole actor entitled to 
exercise consular and diplomatic protection of its own citizens. First, the Maastricht Treaty entitled 
other Member States than the Member State of nationality to exercise consular and diplomatic 
protection for the Union citizens, and, now, the Lisbon Treaty has expressly conferred a role for the 
European Union, an international organisation, in the exercise of protection abroad of the Union 
citizens.18 Section three assesses in which way has the Lisbon Treaty changed the exercise of consular 
and diplomatic protection of the Union citizens in third countries and what is the division of roles 
between the EU and the Member States in this field. 
2. What Rights for the Union Citizen in Distress in Third Countries Under the EU Law 
Framework? 
18 years have passed since the moment when the Maastricht Treaty conferred to the Union citizen a 
right to protection in third countries when he is not represented in loco by his home Member State. 
Despite the long existence of this right and the fact that its material scope has remained un-changed by 
the several Treaty amendments,19 the Union citizens have barely exercised their right.20 A recent 
analysis of Art. 23(1) TFEU has identified as the main cause for the low level of claims by the Union 
citizens the different standards of protection abrod f nationals existent between the Member States.21 
The EU Treaties have provided only for a mere prohibition of non-discrimination based on nationality 
which does not necessarily require harmonisation of the national practice and legislation, but primarily 
to confer to the other Union citizens the same treatm nt the Member State confers to its own 
nationals.22 The result of the EU legal framework is 27 different forms of protection abroad given to 
the EU citizens by the Member States. 
In light of the discrepant national regulatory frameworks on consular and diplomatic protection of 
citizens,23 it is no surprise that the Union citizen is not aware or is confused about the rights he enjoys 
                                                   
15  E Vattel, The Law of Nations, or the Principles of Natural Law (1758), Book II, Chapter VI, republished by T and JW
Johnson, (Lonang Institute 2005); FC Amerasingh, Diplomatic Protection (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008) 
Chapter 2 on ‘History and Development of Diplomatic Protection’. 
16  Despite the work of the International Law Commission (ILC) on codification of the law on diplomatic protection finished 
in 2006, the Vatellian legal fiction whereby diplomatic protection is a right of the State of nationality and not of the 
individual, has been maintained by the ILC Draft Articles on diplomatic protection. See Arts. 1 and 2 of the Draft 
Articles on the Diplomatic Protection. Text adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-eighth session, 
(A/61/10). Online available at: untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_8_2006.pdf . 
17  For the international law perspective on consular and diplomatic protection of individuals and whether the European 
construction of consular and diplomatic protection is in conformity with public international law norms, see the 
contribution of P Vigni in this edited Working Paper; as well as P Vigni, ‘Diplomatic and consular protection: Misleading 
Combination or Creative Solution?’, EUI Law Working Paper 2010/11. 
18  See Art. 3(5) TEU, Arts. 23(2), 221 TFEU and Art. 5(10) of Council Decision establishing the organisation and 
functioning of the European External Action Service 11665/1/10 REV 1 Brussels, 20 July 2010. 
19  Including the latest amendment by the Lisbon Treaty, which has kept unchanged the material scope of the right of 
external protection of the Union citizen. 
20  Between 2007- 2009 approximately 600 unrepresented Union citizens were provided consular protection under Art. 20 
(2)(c) TFEU. See Section 3 of Chapter three of the CARE Final Report. 
21  See the CARE Project (No. JLS/2007/FRC-1/50) funded by DG JUST of European Commission. 
22  Art. 23 (1) TFEU facilitation of the protection, harmonisation. 
23  For instance: different legal status and effects of the consular and diplomatic protection of citizens (certain Member 
States recognise a fundamental right, others only a right, while others have an approach whereby consular and diplomatic 
protection is a matter of policy under the executive’s control); different material and personal scope f the consular and 
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while he is in distress in third countries. Ironically, even if the Union citizen is aware of what the EU 
law confers, this paper argues24 that the effectiveness of the right is hindered because of, inter alia: the 
principle of non-discrimination based on nationality provided in Art. 23(1) TFEU has a very limited 
standardization force, that leads to a Union citizen’s right to protection abroad whose content is only 
the minimum denominator of what the Member States’ confer to their nationals, which, due to the 
wide difference between the domestic standards of protection abroad, is close to nothing; absence of 
domestic legal remedies available to the Union citizens in certain of the national judicatures against 
acts of consular and diplomatic protection; and, currently, limited legal remedies also at the Union 
level.25 
In light of the problems raised above, this paper plans to shed light on the material scope of the EU 
Treaties’ Articles, as amended by the Lisbon Treaty, on consular and diplomatic protection of the 
Union citizens abroad. The paper will argue that the still persistent confusion surrounding the area is 
the inevitable result of accommodating divergent domestic frameworks on consular and diplomatic 
protection of nationals under the EU law umbrella: ranging from matter reserved to the executive’s 
control to a fundamental right to protection abroad of the national enshrined in the Constitution. 
Arguably, the confusion surrounding the material and personal scope of the Union citizen’s right to 
protection abroad will decreased only if the national legislation and practice of the Member States will 
be harmonised.26  
In this section, the paper will seek to identify the material scope of the Union citizen’s right to 
protection outside the Union’s borders by analysing: 1) the legal status of the Union citizen’s 
protection in the world; 2) whether Art. 20(2)(c) TFEU confers a right or only a prohibition of 
discrimination based on nationality; 3) whether theequal treatment principle is applicable only to 
consular protection requests or also to the diplomatic protection requests of the Union citizens; and 
finally whether the Union citizen’s right to consular and diplomatic protection is directly effective 
within the domestic legal orders.    
(Contd.)                                                             
diplomatic protection; certain of the Member States still have in force international agreements concluded with other 
Member States before their accession to the EU, whose c mpatibility with the relevant EU law is questionable. See more 
on this in CARE Report, section 7 of Chapter 3. 
24  Based on the factual information provided by the CARE Report. 
25  The limited legal remedies available under current EU law result from the hybrid legal nature of the D cisions on 
consular protection (Decision 95/553/EC and Decision 96/409/CFSP), which, on the one hand, are internatio l 
agreements and not EU acts, even though concluded within the institutional framework of the Council, while, at the same 
time, despite their public international law nature, they form an integral part of EU law due to their l gal basis – Art. 
23(1) TFEU. Despite being part of the EU law, the legal nature of international agreements of these Decisions restricts 
the available EU legal remedies to infringements procedures. The possibility of actions of annulment brought by 
individuals and preliminary references addressed by national courts is debatable. On the legal status, effects and judicial 
remedies against Decisions of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States concluded within the 
Council, in general, see RH Lauwaars, ‘Institutional Structure’ (Chapter IV) in PJG Kapteyn, AM McDonnell, KJM 
Moterlmans, CWA Timmermans (eds), The Law of the European Union and the European Communities, fourth edition 
(Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2008) 221; and B de Witte, ‘Chameleonic Member States: 
Differentiation by Means of Partial and Parallel International Agreements’ in B de Witte, D Hanf and E Vos (eds), The 
Many Faces of Differentiation in EU law (Antwerpen: Intersentia 2001) 261-62. 
26  After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Council has the legislative power to adopt by qualified majority voting 
directives for the purpose of facilitating the protection abroad of the Union citizens (Art. 23(2) TFEU). 
Madalina Moraru 
112 
2.1. The Legal Status of the Union Citizen’s Protecion Abroad by the Consular and Diplomatic 
Officials of the Member States - Right or Entitlement to Legitimate Expectations? 
The legal status of the Union citizen’s protection in third countries – whether right or entitlement – is 
not entirely clear27 for either academics28 or practitioners, be they from the Member States,29 or from 
the Union’s Institutions.30 
The difference between ‘right’ and ‘entitlement to legitimate expectation’ as legal status of the 
protection the Union citizen can enjoy in third countries is of utmost importance for what the Union 
citizens can claim in practice. The doctrine of ‘legitimate expectations’ applies to areas perceived as 
matters reserved to the executive power, where the later enjoys discretionary powers to define the 
content of the policy. If the protection of the Unio  citizen in the world is considered an entitlement to 
legitimate expectations, then the Union citizen is entitled only to having its claim properly taken into 
account by the administrative power while considering his individual case.31 He does not have a right 
to receive in practice consular assistance. On the o r hand, if the protection of the Union citizen in 
third countries is interpreted as a ‘right’, then the margin of discretion left to the State is significantly 
limited, as the citizen has the right, and the State a correspondent obligation to provide consular 
protection. In short, the difference between ‘right’ and ‘legitimate expectations’ sits in the starting 
premise of the citizen’s claim. While in the case of legitimate expectations, the premise is that the 
citizen is not entitled to receive consular protection, and, it is the citizen who bears the burden of 
proving otherwise, in the case of a ‘right’, the prmise is that the citizen is entitled to receive consular 
protection, and the burden of proving otherwise is on the administrative authorities.  
Let us now turn to the wording of Art. 20(2)(c) TFEU in order to establish whether the EU law 
provides or not for an individual right of the Unio citizen to protection abroad by the represented 
Member States, or, only an entitlement to legitimate expectations to receive this kind of external 
protection, as sustained by certain of the Member States.32 
                                                   
27  The situation was more convoluted in the pre-Lisbon era, due to a more vague language used in the relevant Treaty 
provisions. 
28  There are certain academic opinions which portrayed former Art. 20 TEC as an illustration of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP), a requirement for joint action between the Member States rather than as an individual right like 
the Union citizen’s right to move and reside within the EU. See S Kadelbach, ‘Union Citizenship’, Jean Monnet Working 
Paper, 2003, 30 and Siofra O’Leary, EU Citizenship – The Options for Reform, IPPR, 1996, 63. 
29  For e.g., Ireland and UK Ministries of Foreign Affairs. However, UK has argued different opinions. In mid-2005, during 
hearings before the ECJ, the UK acting as a defendant in a case brought before the Court by Spain, argued that consular 
and diplomatic protection is a right and not a policy (Case C-145/04 Spain v UK [2006] ECR I-17917, para. 54). During 
the same year, as a response to the Commission GreenPap r, the UK argued that the same Treaty based provision did not 
provide for a’ right’ to the Union citizens. 
30  See for the different opinions of the MEPs. European Parliament – Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home 
Affairs, Resolution of 11 December 2007 P6_TA(2007)0592, available at 
http://www.careproject.eu/database/schedaEU.php?eulex=EUEPreport&lang=6 . 
31  See de Smith, Judicial Review, fifth edition, 1995, at 574-5, citing Re Findlay [1985] AC 318, 388, per Lord Scarman. 
For an application of the doctrine of legitimate exp ctations to the specific case of diplomatic protection of citizens, see R 
(on the application of Abbasi and another) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and another 
[2002] EWCA Civ 1598; and R (on the application of Al-Rawi and others) v Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs and another [2006] EWCA Civ 1279, both cases are available in the CARE Database. 
32  For instance, UK and Ireland. See the UK position: ‘the United Kingdom will not engage in publicity campaigns to 
inform EU citizens of Art. 23 TFEU until its definition and meaning has been legally clarified. The language of ‘consular 
and diplomatic protection’ and ‘entitlement’ hold a stronger guarantee than is actually available to EU citizens and could 
create a potentially confusing state of affairs for EU citizens.’ Sir Jim Murphy, Minister of Europe at the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, European Standing Committee, ‘Diplomatic and Consular Protection’, session 2007-08, 23 June 
2008, at col. 5, available in the CARE Database. This po ition has not changed, according to the Report on the UK 
regulatory framework on consular protection to be found in the CARE Report. 
The Protection of EU Citizens in the World: A legal Assessment of the EU Citizen’s Right to Protection Abroad  
 
113 
Under the EC Treaty framework, the unclear wording of the provision on protection of the Union 
citizens in third countries left room for interpretation. For instance, the following could be seen as 
arguments in favour of the entitlement argument: the use of the expression ‘shall be entitled to’ in Art. 
20 EC Treaty, instead of ‘shall have the right to’ which was the expression used for all other rights of 
the Union citizens provided in Part two on citizenship; the fact that Art. 17(2) EC Treaty even if 
providing in mandatory terms that the Union citizens ‘shall enjoy the rights conferred by this Treaty’, 
the Article did not include a list of these rights; Art. 46 of the EU Charter, which has the same wording 
as Art. 20 EC Treaty, even if clearly entitled ‘right to consular and diplomatic protection’ thus 
indicating that Art. 20 EC Treaty established a right for the Union citizens, and not an entitlement, was 
not legally binding, but had only an interpretative role. 
Pre-Lisbon, the EU law framework on consular and diplomatic protection of the Union citizens was 
drafted in ambiguous wording subject to opposing interpretation, where an obligation for the Member 
States could be clearly identified rather in soft law documents33 and international agreements34 than in 
the founding Treaties.  
One of the innovations brought by the Lisbon Treaty which clarifies what are the exact rights of the 
Union citizens under EU law is the re-structuring of f rmer Art. 17 of the EC Treaty in a non-
exhaustive list of rights clearly stated as being the rights of the Union citizens. Instead of having the
rights spread in different Articles, as it was in the EC Treaty, Art. 20 TFEU starts by putting forward 
the list of rights that the Union citizens enjoy: 
‘Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights and be subject to the duties provided for in the 
Treaties. They shall have […] the right to enjoy, in the territory of a third country in which the 
Member State of which they are nationals is not represented, the protection of the diplomatic and 
consular authorities of any Member State on the same conditions as the nationals of that State.’ 
(emphases added) 
To be noticed that Art. 20 TFEU does not use the word ‘entitlement’ of the Union citizens, nor does it 
make a distinction between the protection by the consular and diplomatic authorities of the Member 
States in third countries and the other Union citizen’s rights. Consequently the FEU Treaty clarifies 
the previous debate on whether the Union citizen has or has not a right to protection while in third 
countries. This conclusion is supported also by the now legally binding EU Charter on Fundamental 
Rights and Freedoms. Art. 46 of the EU Charter is entitl d ‘the right to consular and diplomatic 
protection’ and is part of the Union primary law35 that binds the Member States in their conduct 
towards the Union citizens. Since there is no legal hierarchy between the EU Charter and the EU 
Treaties, and the wording of Art. 46 of the EU Charter is identical with the wording of Art. 23 (1) 
TFEU, then, by way of consequence, the headline of Art. 46 – right to consular and diplomatic 
protection – indicates that Art. 20(2)(c) TFE enshrines an individual right to consular and diplomatic 
protection recognised to the unrepresented Union citizen.36 
                                                   
33  Guidelines on Protection of EU citizens in the event of a crisis in a Third Country adopted by the COCON Working 
Group on 26 June 2006 – 10109/2/06 REV 2. 
34  See the preamble and Art. 2 of the EC Decision. 
35  See Art. 6 TEU. 
36  It is important to distinguish between the Union citizen and unrepresented Union citizen as the holder of the right. The 
Treaties and the EU Charter do not confer a right to consular and diplomatic protection to all Union citizens, but only to a 
restricted category, namely, as expressly mentioned by the Treaties, to the ‘unrepresented Union citizens’. The notion of 
‘unrepresented’ as a condition that a Union citizen has to fulfil in order to enjoy the right to consular protection is, 
currently, exhaustively defined in Art. 1 of Decision 95/553/EC: ‘Every citizen of the European Union is entitled to the 
consular protection of any Member State's diplomatic or consular representation if, in the place in which he is located, his 
own Member State or another State representing it on a permanent basis has no: - accessible permanent representation, or 
- accessible Honorary Consul competent for such matters.’  
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2.2. Legal Content of the Right to Consular and Diplomatic Protection – Is it Something More 
Than the Principle of Equal Treatment Based on Nationality? 
It was mentioned in the introduction that according to a recent survey, the majority of the Union 
citizens expect to receive the same kind of help they will be given by their Member State of origin 
from the consular and diplomatic representations of any of the other Member States under Art. 
20(2)(c) TFEU.37 For the moment it is rather a utopian desire than the reality. Such a common 
framework for the exercise of consular protection fr the benefit of the Union citizens presupposes 
either the existence of a Union law that establishes t is binding common framework which, with the 
help of the EU Courts, will be applied and interpreted uniformly across the Union territory, or that the 
27 national legal frameworks on the exercise of consular and diplomatic protection of nationals are 
almost identical. Unfortunately, none of these scenarios applies. 
At the moment of writing, the EU law framework governing the topic of consular and diplomatic 
protection of the Union citizens does not establish a common set of rights and procedures for consular 
and diplomatic protection of the unrepresented Union citizens. The relevant EU law is made of first, 
general provisions found in Union primary law (the founding Treaties38 and the EU Charter), 
secondly, of two international agreements implementing former Art. 20 EC Treaty, which 
substantially restrict the EU primary law scope (two Decisions of the Representatives of the Member 
States meeting within the Council39), without though harmonising the relevant national legislation and 
practice, and lastly, of an impressive amount of soft law: Council Conclusions and Guidelines40, and 
numerous papers issued by the Commission.41 There is no space here to engage in a detailed 
discussion of these provisions and reasons of the existent EU legal framework42, suffices is to say at 
this point that these measures do not establish, neither separately nor combined, a uniform framework 
                                                   
37  Eurobarometer from March 2010. 
38  Art. 20(2)(c) and 23 TFEU and 35 TEU. 
39  More details on the content and legal nature and effects of Decision 95/553/EC and Decision 96/409/CFSP can be found 
in the CARE Report. 
40  The COCON committee has adopted in 15 years of its ex stence an impressive number of conclusions and guidelines in 
the field of consular protection, which however maint n a very broad language, sometimes simply limiting o reiterate 
the relevant Treaty provisions: see Guidelines approved by the Interim PSC on 6 October 2000, Cooperation between 
Missions of Member States and Commission Delegations in Third Countries and to International Organisations, 
12094/00; Consular Guidelines on the protection of EU citizens in third countries adopted by the COCON and e dorsed 
by the PSC 15613/10, of 5.11 2010; Guidelines on Protecti n of EU citizens in the event of a crisis in a Third Country 
adopted by the COCON on 26 June 2006 – 10109/2/06 REV2; Lead State Concept in Consular Crises, Conclusions 
adopted by COCON, 10715/07, 12.07.2006; ‘Common Practices in Consular Assistance’ and ‘Crisis Coordination’ 
adopted by the COCON, 10698/10, 9.06.2010; Guidelines for further implementing a number of provisions under 
Decision 95/553/EC adopted by COCON, 11113/08, 24.06.20 8. The initial work of the COCON was not disclosed to 
the public. 
41  Green Paper - Diplomatic and consular protection of Union citizens in third countries (COM/2006/712 final), 
28/11/2006; Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Effective consular protection in third countries: thecontribution of 
the European Union - Action Plan 2007-2009 - Communication from the Commission, 05/12/2007; Accompanying 
document to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European 
Economic and Social Committee - Effective consular protection in third countries: the contribution of the European 
Union - Action Plan 2007-2009 - Summary of the Impact Assessment (SEC/2007/1601) - Commission staff working 
document, 05/12/2007; Accompanying document to the Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee - Effective consular protection in third 
countries: the contribution of the European Union - Action Plan 2007-2009 - Impact Assessment (SEC/2007/1600) - 
Commission staff working document, 05/12/2007; European Commission, EU citizenship Report 2010 - Dismantling he 
obstacles to EU citizens’ rights – 27/10/2010; Report fr m the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and 
the European Economic and Social Committee under Article 25 TFEU On progress towards effective EU Citizenship 
2007-2010 – 27/10/2010. 
42  These issues are addressed in a PhD thesis currently undertaken at the EUI by the author. 
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for the exercise of consular and diplomatic protection of the Union citizens in the world, but they all 
preserve the existing different domestic standards of protection of the Union citizens. 
As to the scenario that the 27 Member States might have a similar regulatory framework on consular 
and diplomatic protection of nationals, it has been pointed out at the beginning of this section that 
there are extensive discrepancies between the Member States’ national law and practice on protection 
abroad of nationals. The divergence between the domestic frameworks is, in fact, a natural result of 
the different national foreign policy interests, historical ties developed by each of the Member States 
with different regions of the world, different ambitions and seize in population. Thus it would have 
been almost impossible to develop a shared model of consular protection of nationals. The resistance 
of the Member States to the adoption of a common harmonised EU model of consular and diplomatic 
protection of EU citizens results from their understanding of consular and diplomatic protection of the
nationals as one of the ultimate attributes of a sovereign State. The loss of the State’s discretionary 
power to contour the model of protection abroad of nationals is thus equated with loss of an important 
part of the State’s sovereignty. In light of the Member States’ approach of consular and diplomatic 
protection of nationals, the EU design of protection abroad of the EU citizens as a right uniformly 
applied irrespective of the requested Member States is for the near future a utopian aim.  
Having established what Art. 20(2)(c) TFEU does not confer to the Union citizens, we now turn to the 
question of what the provision does confer to the Union citizens in distress abroad?  
The wording of the Union citizen’s right to consular and diplomatic protection abroad has remained 
almost the same from its very first construction as Art. 8c of the Maastricht Treaty until present:  
‘Every citizen of the Union shall, in the territory of a third country in which the Member State of 
which he is a national is not represented, be entitl d to protection by the diplomatic or consular 
authorities of any Member State, on the same conditi s as the nationals of that State.’43  
From the use of the ‘on the same conditions’ expression, we can legitimately conclude that the Article 
provides for the application of the principle of non-discrimination based on nationality in the specific 
field of consular and diplomatic protection of Unio citizens in the world. Certain academics44 argued 
that the right to consular and diplomatic protection as framed by the founding Treaty is not innovative 
as to its content, since it is a mere reiteration of the explicit general EU law principle of non-
discrimination based on nationality laid down in Art. 18 TFEU (former Art. 12 EC Treaty) to the 
specific situation of protection of the Union citizens abroad. Interestingly, it has to be noticed that at 
the moment of introducing the European citizenship, the scope of other citizenship rights of the Union 
citizens were also interpreted as mainly an application of the principle of non-discrimination based on 
nationality, however, they were still seen as a major step in the European integration process.45  
In the meantime, the scope of the Union citizen’s rights, especially of the freedom to reside and move, 
has been developed by the Court so as to include also prohibition of serious inconvenience without 
actual discrimination based on nationality.46 
                                                   
43  The Article made express the obligation for the EU countries to start, within a short deadline before 31 December 1993. 
There is only one difference between the wordings of Art. 20(2)(c) and 23(1) TFEU: if Art 20(2)(c) TFEU provides that 
consular and diplomatic authorities of the Member States will confer protection, Art. 23(1) TFEU provides that national 
consular or diplomatic authorities will confer protection.This paper argues that the use of ‘or’ is rather intended to clarify 
the situation when a Member State has both diplomatic and consular representations in a third country. In this case, the 
Union citizen should seek protection only from one of these authorities representing the Member State, and not take 
advantage of help from both of representations. However, in light of the perfect match of the rest of he wording of Art. 
20(2)(c) TFEU with Art. 23(1) TFEU, the change of ‘and’ with ‘or’ is regrettable and should have been avoided by the 
Treaty drafters. 
44  M Condinanzi and A Lang, Cittadinanza dell’Unione e libera circolazione delle p rsone (Milan: Guiffre editore 2009) 
49. 
45  A Duff, Saving the European Union – The Logic of the Lisbon Treaty (London: Shoehorn 2009). 
46  Case C-391/09 Runevič-Vardyn and Wardyn, Judgment of 12 May 2011, nyr. 
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A similar evolution can be identified, though to a lesser degree, also in regard to another Union 
citizenship right which, in a way, shares more similarit es than the freedom to reside and move, with 
the right to consular and diplomatic protection, sice it is framed in evident equal treatment language, 
and applies also in the sensitive area of high politics of the Member States: the right to vote for the
European Parliament elections enshrined in Art. 22 TFEU.47 Despite the explicit equal treatment 
wording and the high sensitiveness of the ‘political rights’ field, the Court of Justice in the Aruba 
case48 held that Union citizens have a right to vote for the European Parliament’s elections as ‘a 
normal incident of Union citizenship’.49 
We can thus notice a trend in the jurisprudence of the ECJ whereby, the rights of the Union citizens as 
recognised by Art. 20 TFEU, have a scope going beyond the application of the principle of non-
discrimination based on nationality.50 The question is: can we identify an extension of the 
aforementioned jurisprudential thread experienced by the freedom to reside, move and the right to vote
for the European Parliament also in regard to the Union citizen’s right to consular and diplomatic 
protection? In other words, has the Union citizen’s right to consular and diplomatic protection 
developed into something more than the principle of n n-discrimination, so that the Union citizen 
enjoys wider protection abroad than equal treatment solely based on the fundamental status of Union 
citizenship? 
For the moment such a judicially developed evolution cannot be traced in regard to the right to 
consular and diplomatic protection, simply because the EU Courts have never dealt with the Union 
citizens’ right to protection abroad.51 The majority of the national case law that have reach d the EU 
Courts do not concern the right to consular protection, but other consular affairs matters, such as: 
issuing of visas,52 financial obligations arisen for the Member States as a result of signing a 
memorandum of understanding between the Commission and the Member States on setting up a 
common diplomatic mission in Abuja (Nigeria),53 hierarchy between the methods of sending judicial 
                                                   
47  Whereby citizens of the Member States resident in other Member States have the right to vote in European Parliament’s 
elections under the same conditions a  nationals. 
48  Case C-300/04 Eman and Sevinger v. College vanburgemeester en wethouders van Den Haag (Aruba) [2006] ECR I-
8055. 
49  J Shaw, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon and Citizenship’, The Federal Trust European Policy Brief, June 2008. 
50  Case C-135/08 Rottmann, judgment of 2 March 2010, nyp. 
51  The landmark cases of the Court of Justice in the field of the EU citizenship have so far created either economic or social 
rights for the Union citizens within the borders of the internal market. For economic rights see the pronouncements of the 
Court of Justice in: Case C-138/02 Collins v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2004] ECR I-2703; Case C-
258/04 Ioannidis [2005] ECR I-8275; Joined Cases C-482/01 and C-493/01 Orfanopoulos and Oliveri [2004] ECR I-
5257; Case C-362/88 GB-INNO [1990] ECR I-667. For social rights, see the pronouncements of the Court of Justice in 
Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello v Belgium [2003] ECR I-11613; Case C-85/96 Martínez Sala [1998] ECR I-2691; Case C-
184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-6193; Case [ECJ] C-413/99 Baumbast [2002] ECR I-7091; Case C-200/02 Chen [2004] 
ECR I-9925; Case C-158/07 Förster [2008] ECR I-8507; Case 186/87 Cowan [1989] ECR 195; Case C-57/96 Meints 
[1997] ECR I-6689. 
52  Case T-372/02 Internationaler Hilfsfonds v Commission [2003] ECR II-438; Case C-327/02 Panayotova [2004] ECR 1-
11055; Case C-139/08 Kqiku [2009] ECR I--2887; C-219/08 Commission v Belgium [2009] ECR 1-9213; Case C-228/06 
Soysal [2009] ECR 1-1031; Case C-244/04 Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany 
[2006] ECR I-885; Case C-459/99 Mouvement contre le racisme, l'antisémitisme et la xénophobie ASBL (MRAX) v 
Belgium [2002] ECR I-6591; Case C-257/99 Barkoci and Marcel Malik [2001] ECR I- 6557. 
53 Case C-203/07 P Greece v Commission [2008] ECR I-0000. 
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documents by post or by consular or diplomatic agents u der Union law,54 and the duty of diplomatic 
protection of the Union in regard to vessels (not idividuals) of the Member States.55 
The fact that for the moment the legal content of the Union citizen’s right to consular and diplomatic 
protection is the principle of non-discrimination based on nationality does not mean first, that Art. 
20(2)(c) TFEU in its initial form as Art. 8c of the Maastricht Treaty was not innovative, second, thatit 
will remain at the level of the principle of non-discrimination based on nationality, and thirdly, that the 
Member States can deny the right to consular protecti n to un-represented Union citizens simply 
because they do not confer a right to consular protecti n to their own citizens either. It what follows I 
will explain each of the foregoing conclusions. 
If the founding Treaties had not provided for the right to consular and diplomatic protection as it 
stands now, the mere existence of the general princi le of non-discrimination based on nationality laid 
down at the start of the citizenship part of the Traty56 would not have been of too much help for the 
Union citizens located outside of the Union borders. The general principle of equal treatment applies, 
as Art. 18 TFEU (former Art. 12 EC Treaty) says, within the scope of EU law. In the absence of the 
primary law provision creating the right to protection abroad of the Union citizens, of legislative 
competence for the Council in this specific field57, and of a Community objective that could have been 
developed by making use of the flexibility clause58, then no EU law could have been developed, which 
would have then justified the application of the general principle of equal treatment.59 The innovative 
element brought by inserting Art. 8c in the EC Treaty sits in creating the scope of EU law, or better 
said in creating the general legal basis which depending of the evolution of factual circumstances and
the law it can be further developed by the Union legislative and judiciary.60  
The right to consular and diplomatic protection of the Union citizens has so far remained quite 
underdeveloped in comparison with the other "citizenship rights" and has not been the subject of the 
EU Courts jurisprudence. However, the legal content of he Union citizen’s right to consular and 
diplomatic protection does not necessarily have to remain at the current status of the equal treatment 
                                                   
54  See Case C-473/04 Plumex v Young Sports NV [2006] ECR I-1579 – the Union law that was interpreted in this case was 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000 of 29 May 2000 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial 
documents in civil or commercial matters (OJ 2000 L 160, p. 37). 
55  This duty arose however only as a result of an express contractual obligation on the part of the Union, Case T-572/93 
Odigitria AAE v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities [1995] ECR 11-2025. 
56  To be noticed that the provision of the general pinciple of non-discrimination based on nationality a  the beginning of the 
Citizenship chapter has been introduced only since the Lisbon amendment.In the EC Treaty, it was located in a different 
part (Part One on Principles) separated from Part two on Citizenship. 
57  Pre-Lisbon the Council of the EU was not conferred internal legislative competence. It is the Lisbon Treaty which 
provided for the first time express internal legislative competence for the Council in the field of theUnion citizen’s right 
to consular and diplomatic protection (Art. 23(2) TFEU). 
58  Former Art. 308 EC Treaty required the express provisi n of a Community objective (to be distinguished from Union 
objective) as one of the positive conditions that had to be fulfilled so as to justify the use of the flexibility clause as legal 
basis for Community legislative measures. See more on the conditions for the use of Art. 308 EC Treaty as legal basis for 
Community acts in K St Clair Bradley, ‘Powers and Procedures in the EU Constitution: Legal Bases and the Court’ in P 
Craig and G de Burca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011) 100. See also, Case T-
306/01 Yusuf [2005] ECR II-3533, para. 164; Case T-315/01 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council and Commission [2005] 
ECR II-03649; Case C-436/03 Parliament v Council (European cooperative society) [2006] ECR I-3733; and Case C-
217/04 UK v Council and European Parliament (European Network and Information Security Agency) [2006] ECR I-
03771. 
59  The ECJ has constantly held that the principle of non-discrimination based on nationality applies only within the scope of 
EU law, see Case C-85/96 Martínez Sala [1998] ECR I-2691; Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-6193. 
60  As happened with the other Treaty based rights of he Union citizen. 
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principle. The Council, depending of the content of the future directives it may adopt,61 and the EU 
Courts, which may apply their purposive interpretation62 to Arts. 20(2)(c) and 23(1) TFEU and to the 
future Council Directives, may lead the way to an evolution of the Union citizen’s right to protection 
abroad similar to the one recently experienced by the o her Union citizen’s rights. 
The current understanding of the right to consular and diplomatic protection as an equal treatment 
principle does not though justify a rejection of consular protection by a Member State simply on the 
basis that it does not confer such assistance to its nationals under its national law.63 Being fundamental 
right of the Union citizens,64 a rejection of this right by the Member States is ju tified only if 
respecting the pre-requisites provided by Art. 52 of the EU Charter.65 A different understanding will 
empty the fundamental right of the Union citizen of any meaningful effect. The principle of equal 
treatment does not legitimise the conduct of the Memb r States that question whether to respond or not 
to the requests of the Union citizens to receive protection in third countries. 
Let us now look at how the principle of non-discrimination based on nationality might work in the 
specific situation of evacuating the Union citizens from crises situations, which recently have greatly 
challenged both the Union and the Member States.66 Art. 23(1) TFEU does not require a different 
conduct from the Member States in cases of crises than in day-to-day situations. In both 
circumstances, only the Union citizens that do not have an accessible consular or diplomatic 
representation of their Member State are entitled to receive protection from another Member State. In 
crises, however, the Member States have not followed such a strict approach, but they aimed to ensure 
the evacuation of all Union citizens, being guided by the motto of ‘no citizen will be left behind’, 
irrespective of whether they were or not represented in the third country hit by crises.67 Despite their 
good intention, the Member States operated on the basis of an ad-hoc type of cooperation, and not on a 
pre-established contingency plan.68 This practice has to be reconsider in light of theEU general 
principles and Treaty rights, so as to ensure the respect of the fundamental right to protection abroad 
                                                   
61  Based on Art. 23(2) TFEU. To be noticed that the Article does not require the Council to adopt implementing legislation, 
but it only gives it a possibility. 
62  The purpose of the Treaty Articles, especially those on Union citizen’s rights and fundamental freedoms has plaid a 
significant role in the European Court of Justice’s interpretation of these Articles, whether in cases assessing direct effect, 
or breach of these rights and freedoms. See more in B de Witte, ‘Chapter 12 – Direct Effect, Primacy, and the Nature of 
the Legal Order’ in Craig and de Burca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011). 
63  As certain Member States have argued, see the position of the Member States having an approach of the consular and 
diplomatic protection of nationals as a matter of the executive’s policy in the CARE Final Report, available at 
http://www.careproject.eu/images/stories/ConsularAndDiplomaticProtection.pdf . 
64  Enshrined in Art. 46 EU Charter. 
65  According to Art. 52(1) of the EU Charter, limitatons and restrictions of the Charter’s fundamental rights are possible as 
long as the following conditions are fulfilled: the limitation must be provided by law; respect the essence of the 
fundamental rights; respects the principle of propotionality; it is necessary for the purpose of genuinely meeting 
objectives of general interest as recognised by the Union or there is a need to protect rights and freedoms of others. 
66  See, inter alia, the recent democratic revolutions in Egypt, Libya, tsunami that affected Japan. 
67  According to the information gather by the author du ing interviews with Commission and Member States representatives 
in the period of March – July 2011. 
68  One author argues that the Member States will respect the principle of non-discrimination based on nationality only if an 
equal number of places is given to each of the Member States in the transport means made available by another Member 
State (A Ianniello-Saliceti, ‘The Protection of EU Citizens Abroad: Accountability, Rule of Law, Role of Consular and 
Diplomatic Services’ (2011) 17 European Public Law 91, 97). This paper argues that Art. 23 TFEU would not require the 
aforementioned method of division of places, as the Article entitles only the unrepresented EU citizens to equal 
treatment. According to Art. 1 of the EC Decision, urepresented Union citizens are those that do not have an accessible 
consular or diplomatic mission of their Member in the third country where they are located. Thus, in practice, a strict 
application of the Treaty Article would require a division of places by the number of the unrepresented M mber States 
plus one (the Member State providing the transport means). However, in practice, the Member States are not that 
formalistic, as proved by the recent evacuation procedure of the Union citizens from Egypt and Libya. 
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of the Union citizens and of their right to family life when considering the evacuation of the third 
country nationals family members of the Union citizen in the specific situation of evacuation 
procedures.  
2.3. Does Diplomatic Protection Fall Under the Scope of the Union Citizen’s Right to Protection 
Abroad? 
In the previous section it was shown that the content of the Union citizen’s right enshrined in Art. 20
(2)(c) TFEU is the principle of non-discrimination based on nationality. In this section it will be 
shown that the issue whether the Article confers independent rights beyond the equal treatment right is 
not the only unclear aspect of the legal content of this right. The most fervent critique brought by both 
academics69 and Member States70 to the scope of this right concerns the lack of clarity as to what type 
of protection of individuals in third countries is the Treaty referring to - consular o /and diplomatic 
protection-, and what is the exact scope of each of t ese mechanisms. As pointed out by Vigni in her 
contribution to this edited paper,71 Art. 20(2)(c) TFEU does not use the settled public international law 
concepts of ‘consular protection’ and ‘diplomatic protection’, but a new concept which is not an 
established legal concept under the public internatio l law norms – ‘protection by the consular and 
diplomatic authorities of the Member States’ and consequently should not be understood as 
encompassing both of the consular and diplomatic protection. Once again it seems that the EU legal 
order establishes its own autonomous legal concept which even though similar to ones existing under 
public international law, it is not clear whether they share or not the same meaning.72 The present 
section will tackle the question whether under the European model of protection of the Union citizens 
abroad, the latter are entitled to receive both consular and diplomatic protection or only one of them, 
and whether these types of protection should be understood as having the same meaning as those 
existent under public international law.  
A brief retrospective of the Maastricht inter-governmental debate on the citizenship provisions might 
help to understand the wish of the Member States. At the time of drafting the Maastricht Treaty, Spain 
made a proposal for an Article on the protection of the unrepresented Union citizens while outside of 
the Union. The article was drafted in clear terms, expressly providing for ‘consular and diplomatic 
assistance and protection’73 of the citizens of the European Union from any of the Member States.74 
However, not all of the Member States agreed with Spain’s proposal to refer precisely to consular and 
diplomatic protection of the unrepresented Union citizens. The compromise they managed to reach 
                                                   
69  T Stein, Interim Report on ‘Diplomatic Protection Under the European Union Treaty in: ILA Committee on Diplomatic 
Protection of Persons and Property, Second Report, New Delhi, 2002, 32-39; A Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Exercising Diplomatic 
Protection The Fine Line Between Litigation, Demarches and Consular Assistance’ (2006) 66 ZaöRV 321-350; Vigni, 
‘Diplomatic and consular protection: Misleading Combination or Creative Solution?’; C Closa, ‘Citizenship of the Union 
and Nationality of the Member States’ (1995) 32 Common Market Law Review 487-519; 
70 See the national Reports on France, Ireland, Poland, UK in the CARE Report, available at 
www.careproject.eu/database/browse_eu.php . 
71  See the contribution by Patrizia Vigni to this edit  Working Paper. 
72  For instance, see the EU specific legal definitio of ‘goods’, ‘worker’, ‘primacy’, ‘subsidiarity’, ‘proportionality’, ‘alien’, 
‘national security’, ‘genuine link’ – in EU citizenship case law the meaning of ‘genuine link’ is different in comparison to 
the public international law concept of ‘genuine link’. The following examples show that the EU Courts have not limited 
their interpretation to mere transposition of the international law concepts, but adapted them to the EU legal order 
specificity. 
73  It can be noticed that the Spanish proposal referred to both ‘protection’ and ‘assistance’ since under Spanish national law 
the two concepts are legally different. The Spanish legal literature distinguishes between protection, which involves 
formal complaints before public authorities, while assistance refers rather to provision of food, clothes, and medicines. 
See E Vilarino Pintos, Curso de Derecho Diplomatico y Consular. Parte general y textos codificadores (Tecnos: Madrid 
1987) 102-103; A Maresca, Las relaciones consulares (Piernas:Madrid 1974) 215-219. 
74  See Documentation de la RIE, col 18 1991, 333-338 and 405-409. 
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was a broader concept which permits both interpretations – with/without diplomatic protection. This 
kind of ‘enigmatic’ legislative drafting is followed by the Member States when they do not agree on 
the exact scope of a Treaty provision. The result i that they leave it framed in broad terms that can be 
subject to different interpretation, which depending on the evolution of the Member States’ view of the 
topic can be interpreted in different ways leading to different legal consequences.75 The Member 
States maintained this attitude also latter on during the elaboration of the EC Decision on the 
implementation of the Union citizen’s right to protec ion abroad. Several delegations of the Member 
States opposed to Arts. 11-18 of the original draft of he ad-hoc group which expressly referred to 
diplomatic protection.76 Since the Decision is an international agreement which could have been 
adopted only by unanimous consent, those Articles and consequently diplomatic protection did not 
made their way into the final Decision. The Member States decided instead to focus on the matter that 
was causing them, at that time, more problems – consular protection.77 
In the previous paragraphs we attempted to find out what the Member States intended to confer to the 
Union citizen and it resulted that their conduct during the several Treaty amendments and during the 
elaboration of the EC Decision is firmly suggesting decision and divided opinions. However, so far 
we looked only at the English official version of the Treaties, if one was Polish, Finish or Czech, they 
would read differently Art. 20(2)(c) and 23(1) TFEU since the official version of these Articles in the 
aforementioned languages use the clear concept of consular and diplomatic protection. In case of 
different language versions of a text of EU law, the ECJ decided that uniform interpretation must be 
given to the text and hence, ‘in the case of divergence between the language versions, the provision in 
question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it 
forms part.’78 In our case, the purpose of Art. 20(2)(c) TFEU hasto be seen in light of the newly 
introduced Union objective of ‘protection of the Unio  citizens in the world’. The objective seems to 
refer to a general protection of the Union citizens in third countries, without distinction or limitations. 
In the same way neither Art. 20(2)(c) or Art. 23(2) TFEU make a distinction or exclude diplomatic 
protection from their scope, even if the Member States had multiple occasions during several Treaty 
amendments to introduce such a limitation. This interpretation whereby diplomatic protection is 
included in the right of the Union citizen to protection abroad seems to be supported also by Art. 46 
EU Charter, which is now part of the EU primary law. As previously mentioned, the wording of Art. 
46 EU Charter is identical with Arts. 20(2)(c) and 23(1) TFEU, while Art. 46 EU Charter is 
conclusively entitled ‘right to consular and diplomatic protection’. It can be argued that the EU Courts 
may have a similar interpretation of the scope of Art. 20(2)(c) TFEU since in cases concerning 
                                                   
75  A similar example of divided opinions between theM mber States leading to broad definition of a lega  concept is the 
well known broad, encompassing all, definition of the CFSP, R Gosalbo Bono, 'Some Reflections on the CFSP Legal 
Order' (2006) 34 Common Market Law Review 358–9. 
76  T Stein, Interim Report on ‘Diplomatic Protection U der the European Union Treaty’, in: ILA Committee on Diplomatic 
Protection of Persons and Property, Second Report (New Delhi 2002), 36-7. 
77  The Commission seems to have the same interpretation, d plomatic protection is not per se excluded from the legal 
content of the Union citizen’s right, but for the mo ent, attention is given to the most problematic aspect of the right – 
consular protection for Union citizens found in distre s in third countries. See Accompanying document to he 
Commission Action Plan 2007-2009 - Impact Assessment, doc. SEC (2007) 1600 of 5 December 2007 and the European 
Commission’s EU citizenship Report 2010 - Dismantling the obstacles to EU citizens’ rights, doc. COM (2010) 603 of 
27 October 2010. 
78  Case C-341/01 PlatoPlastik Robert Frank [2004] ECR I-4883, para. 64; Case C 340-08 M and others, (Fourth Chamber) 
judgement of 29 April 2010, nyr, para. 44. In the latter case there was discrepancy between different language version of 
both the EU law at issue (Council Regulation no 881/2002) and the United Nations Security Council Resolutin 1390 
implemented by the foregoing Council Regulation. Since it could not take a decision solely on literary interpretation, the 
European Court of Justice interpreted the provision on the basis of the aim of the Regulation and Resolution. 
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citizenship rights, or fundamental human rights, the Court has had in mind the effectiveness of these 
rights, sometimes even to the detriment of the Member States’ interests.79  
In Ayadi80 and Hassan81, the General Court of the EU has recognised an obligation on the part of the 
Member States to exercise diplomatic protection for foreign citizens resident in the Union territory. If 
the Court was willing to go as far as recognising a obligation for the Member States in regard to third 
country nationals, it can be argued that, furthermore it will do so for the Union citizens.  
Despite the appealing impulse of making an analogy between these cases where diplomatic protection 
of individuals was indirectly touched and the legal content of the Union citizen’s right to protection in 
the world, we have to take distance and see that the foregoing judgments were decided in a specific 
context which weighed heavily in the Courts’ decision. These specific and limited circumstances do 
not suffice to make a general statement that the Court will hold diplomatic protection as part of the 
Union citizen right to protection abroad, nevertheless, they can suggest that the Court will be poised 
between two difficult options where its decision will be finally influenced by the need to ensure 
effective protection abroad of the unrepresented Union citizen. 
So far we have looked at the EU law framework to find out whether the right to protection abroad of 
the Union citizens can be interpreted as encompassing also diplomatic protection. It has been pointed 
out that the EU law favours such an interpretation. However, public international law academics82 
have argued that the EU model of protection abroad c nnot be interpreted as encompassing also 
diplomatic protection as such an interpretation is unlawful under the public international law norms for 
the following main reasons: firstly, since the nationality condition required under public international 
law is not fulfilled, and secondly, because the previous consent of third countries to the EU model has
not been obtained83.  
This paper argues that even if the general norm under public international law is still that only the 
State of nationality can exercise diplomatic protection for its own nationals as long as the nationality 
link is genuine, there are recent developments also under public international law which indicate a 
shift from this traditional approach. Draft Art. 8 of the ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, 
whereby refugees and stateless persons lawfully resident  in a country can receive also diplomatic 
protection, signals that the traditional understanding of the nationality as a ius sanguinis or ius soli is 
no longer the sole type of genuine link which can legitimize the exercise of diplomatic protection for
an individual. Therefore, it seems that the ILC suggests that there is a genuine link between an 
individual and the State not only on the basis of nationality but also on other criteria as long as the 
relation between the individual and the State is still solid. The issue of whether currently there is such 
a solid link between the Union citizens and all other Member States so as to justify the European 
                                                   
79  See for example, C-200/02 Chen [2004] ECR I-9925; Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] ECR I-0000; Case C-34/09 
Zambrano, judgment of 8 March 2011; and the already famous Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi [2008] 
ECR I-6351. 
80  Case T-253/02 Ayadi v Council and Commission [2006] ECR II-2139, para. 149 
81  Case T-49/04 Hassan v Council and Commission [2006] ECR II-52, para. 119. 
82  J Dugard, Seventh Report on diplomatic protection, United Nations General Assembly, A/CN.4/567, United Nations, 
New York, 7 March 2006, 10; Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with commentaries, text adopted by the ILC at its 
fifty-eighth session, in 2006 (A/61/10),footnote 31, p. 41; A Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Exercising Diplomatic Protection, the fine 
line between litigation, demarches and consular assist nce’ (2006) 66 ZaöRV 321, 339-340. 
83  According to Art. 8 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) and Art. 6 of the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Protection (VCDR), the receiving third country has a discretionary power to oppose to the exercise of 
consular and diplomatic protection by another State than the State of nationality, as long as it has not formally consented 
to this type of protection of individuals. 
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model of protection abroad of the Union citizens is a complex one and due to limited place, it cannot 
be touched here.84  
The main argument of this paper in favor of the legitimacy of the European model of consular and 
diplomatic protection of the Union citizens is not based on the ‘solid link’ argument, but on the fact 
that the ILC Draft Articles on diplomatic protection establish minimum standards under public 
international law which permits the States to go beyond these rules as long as they respect the 
condition of obtaining the express unanimous consent of all the States involved in the new model (i.e. 
the State of nationality, the States exercising the protection and the receiving third country).85 
Consequently, from a public international law perspctive, the problem of the EU model consists not 
in the fact that public international law generally excludes diplomatic protection of the kind envisaged 
by the EU law, as exceptions are possible, but rathe  whether there is, on the one hand, an express 
unanimous consent of the Member States for the EU model to include diplomatic protection, and on 
the other hand, whether there is the consent of the third countries for the exercise of consular and 
diplomatic protection by non-nationality Member States.  
In regard to the unanimous consent between the Member States, it was pointed out above that the 
Member States have divided opinions on the issue of the legal content of the right, and for the moment 
it cannot be said that they have a unanimous view on whether to include or not the diplomatic 
protection in the Union citizen’s right to protection abroad.86 As to the consent of the third countries in 
regard to the exercise of diplomatic protection by a non-nationality Member States, according to Art. 6 
of the VCDR, there is no need of express consent for the exercise of diplomatic protection, it can be 
also implied from the third countries absence of opposition. However, in case of absence of a signed 
agreement, the third countries can, at any moment and without any explanation, object to this exercise 
of diplomatic protection. In spite of the express Treaty obligation of the Member States to start the 
international negotiations with third countries so as to ensure the consent of the latter, the majority f 
the EU countries have never started such formal negotiations, with only two exceptions,87 
consequently nor have they concluded such internatio l agreements, or revised the existent ones.  
In sum, from a public international law perspective, it can be argued that the Union citizens do not 
enjoy the right to diplomatic protection in third countries from the other Member States in light of 
absence of an express and clear consent of all the parties involved in the EU model. One might 
question why is the public international law perspectiv  relevant since the EU has for a long time 
developed a practice of establishing autonomous legal concepts that even though they were 
                                                   
84  To be noticed though that the Lisbon Treaty has brought a proliferation of references to ‘peoples of Europe’, ‘Union 
peoples’ which signals a strong desire to continue the creation of a sense of belonging between the citizens of the 
Member States and the Union, and not necessarily between the citizens of the Member States and the othr Member 
States: preamble 13, TEU - Arts. 1(2), 3(1), 3(5), 9(1), 3(2), 10(4), 13(1), 14(2), 35(3); TFEU – Arts.15(3), 20(1), 21(1), 
22, 23, 24, 170(1), 227(1), 228(1). 
85  Case US v Italy (ELSI Elletronica) [1989] ICJ Reports 1989, para. 50 of the judgment; Advisory Opinion - Reparation for 
Injuries Suffered in the Service of the UN, ICJ Reports 1949:‘In the second place, even in inter-State relations, there are 
important exceptions to the rule, for there are cases in which protection may be exercised by a State on behalf of persons 
not having its nationality.’ 
86  This requirement of unanimous consent under public international law might not though impede the European Court of 
Justice to rule in the future in favour of diplomatic protection. 
87  There are two exceptions: Italy signed several bil teral agreements after the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty 
which include provisions protecting Union citizens working and/or living in third countries - namely the Conventions 
with Ukraine in 2003 (Art. 62), Republic of Moldova in 2000 (Art. 61), Georgia in 2002 (Art. 60), Great People's Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya Socialist in 1998 (Art. 2) and Russian Federation in 2001 (Art. 37); the second exception is Portugal, 
namely the Consular Convention between Portugal and the Russian Federation (concluded in 2001). These agreements 
can be found online in the CARE database. 
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challengeable under public international law, did not stop their application under the EU law.88 The 
present topic, diplomatic protection of unrepresented Union citizens in third countries, is a mechanism 
that does not operate within the EU territory, as the previous EU autonomous concepts, but entirely 
outside of the Union’s borders. Consequently, the pact between the EU countries is a res inter alios 
acta for the third countries, which enjoy sovereign powers whether to prohibit or not a procedure 
carried out entirely within their sovereign territoy. In future, if diplomatic protection will be 
recognized under the EU law framework for the benefit of the Union citizens, the consent of the third 
countries has to be ensured so as to prevent the prospect of discretionary rejection from the third 
countries, against whom the EU law is not binding. 
2.4. Questioning the Direct Effect of the Union Citizen’s Right 
In light of the different positions currently taken by the Member States on whether the Union citizen 
has or not a right to protection abroad and on the material scope of this right, then, situations where the 
Union citizens will be refused assistance will most likely arise in the future. The question that this 
section plans to assess is whether the Union citizen can invoke his Treaty based right before the 
national courts in order to find redress against such refusals.  
It is settled case law of the EU courts, that Union rights may be invoked directly before the national 
courts if they satisfy the conditions of clear, precis  and unconditional wording.89 As Bruno de Witte 
notes, the Court has, over time, changed its strict Van Gend en Loos understanding of these conditions 
so that currently, the direct effect test boils down to one single condition: ‘is the norm sufficiently 
operational in itself to be applied by a court?’90 
The main arguments raised by the academics91 against the direct effect of the right to consular and 
diplomatic protection are first, that the right is not clear in what it confers to the Union citizens (see 
the above mentioned debate on whether diplomatic protection is or not included),92 second that the 
right needs further implementing measures to be adopte  by the Member States in order to be effective 
according to the requirement laid down in Art. 23(1) TFEU,93 and third, that the exercise of the right 
by the Member States depends upon the consent of the receiving third country which, for the moment, 
none of the Member States has expressly acquired.94 We will continue by addressing in turn each of 
these three critiques. 
                                                   
88  See the practice of disconnection clauses. For an extensive discussion on the regime of disconnection clauses in EU law 
see M Cremona, ‘Disconnection Clauses in EC Law and Practice’ in C Hillion and P Koutrakos (eds), Mixed Agreements 
Revisited - The EU and its Member States in the World (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2010). 
89  C-26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1. TC Hartley, The Foundations of European Union Law, seventh edition 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010) 110.  
90  The justiciability test as the author calls it. See de Witte, ‘Direct Effect, Primacy, and the Nature of the Legal Order’ 331. 
91  C Closa, ‘Citizenship of the Union and Nationality of the Member States’ (1995) 32 Common Makret Law Review 502 
and S Kadelbach, ‘European Integration: The New German Scholarship’, Jean Monnet Working Paper 9/03; J-P 
Puissochet, ‘La pratique francaise de la protection diplomatique’ in J-F Flauss (ed), La Protection diplomatique- 
Mutations contemporaines et pratiques nationales (Bruxelles: Bruylant 2003) 119-120. 
92  In addition to this argument, certain Member States argue that the Treaty based Article needs further clarification whether 
it confers consular assistance and/or protection as i  certain national legal orders the two legal concepts are distinct, as 
for instance in: Germany, Ireland, Romania, Spain, UK. See more on this topic in CARE Report, Chapter three, Section. 
4.1.1. 
93  Art. 23(1) TFEU second indent provides: ‘Member States shall adopt the necessary provisions […] requi d to secure this 
protection.’ 
94  Art. 23(1) TFEU second indent provides: ‘Member States shall […] start the international negotiations required to secure 
this protection.’, recognising the public international law requirements: Art. 8 of the VCCR and Art. 6 of the VCDR. 
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Concerning the questioned clarity of the EU citizen’s right to protection abroad, it was previously 
shown that, for the moment, the right is at a statu of a specific application of prohibition of 
discrimination based on nationality in the field ofconsular and diplomatic protection of the 
unrepresented Union citizens. To be noticed that in Reyners,95 the European Court of Justice 
recognised direct effect to former Art. 52 EEC Treaty on freedom of establishment based on the 
interpretation of this Article as a prohibition of discrimination.96 Nowadays it can be argued with 
certainty that the principle of non-discrimination based on nationality enjoys direct effect.97 
As to the contention that the right is not unconditional since it requires the Member States to adopt 
implementing measures, it has to be noticed that the Lisbon Treaty brought a change in the wording of 
Art. 23(1) TFEU. Former Art. 20 EC Treaty stipulated that ‘the Member States shall establish the 
necessary rules among themselves […] required to secure this protection.’ while current Art. 23(1) 
TFEU reads as follows: ‘The Member States shall adopt the necessary provisions […] required to 
secure this protection.’ (emphases added) Art. 23 TFEU continues in paragraph two with an express 
conferral of legislative competence for the Council which can act in the field of consular and 
diplomatic protection of the Union citizens by way of adopting directives. There are two important 
changes in the wording of the right: first is the replacement of ‘establish rules’ with ‘adopt provisions’ 
and second, the word which indicated the purely inter-governmental character of the field ‘among 
themselves’ was eliminated. As noted by another author,98 the change of wording may indicate that the 
referred measures are those that the Member States h ve to adopt so as to implement the Council 
directives, the expression ‘adopt provisions’ is commonly used in the field of implementation of 
directives by the Member States.99 On the contrary, the previous expression ‘establish rules’ rather 
conveys the idea of new norms to be adopted for the purpose of detailing the content of the Union 
citizen’s right. Whether this is or not the intentio  of the Member States, the European Court of Justice 
constantly rules that the need for further implementing measures to be adopted by the Member States 
is not per se capable of denying direct effect to a Treaty based provision. There are numerous 
examples pointing in this direction, most of them to be found in the field of fundamental freedoms,100 
however the most relevant example for the present topic is the Union citizen’s right to reside and 
move which the Court has recognised as directly effective.101  
Former Art. 18(1) EC Treaty was firstly conditioned by limits which the Member States could impose 
and secondly by measures which the Member States themselves could adopt ‘to give effect to the 
right’. The latter condition is similar to the one existent in Art. 23(1) TFEU. Contrary to the Member 
States, the European Court of Justice in the Baumbast judgment held that the need of further 
implementing measures by the Member States does not prejudice the direct effect character of the 
right to reside and move as the margin of discretion left to the Member States is subject to strict 
                                                   
95  Case C-2/74 Reyners v Belgium [1974] ECR 652, para. 30: ‘After the expiry of the transitional period the directives 
provided for by the chapter on the right of establishment have become superfluous with regard to implementing the rule 
on nationality, since this is henceforth sanctioned by the Treaty itself with direct effect.’ (emphasis added) See also Case 
43/75 Defrenne v SABENA [1976] ECR 445. 
96  See also P Craig, ‘Once upon a Time in the West: Direct Effect and the Federalization of EEC Law’ (1992) 12 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 464.  
97  For a recent case on direct effect of the principle of non-discrimination based on nationality, see Case C-164/07 Wood 
[2008] ECR I-4143. 
98  Ianniello Saliceti, ‘The Protection of EU Citizens Abroad’ 91-109. 
99  See for instance Art. 291(1) TFEU: ‘Member States shall adopt all measures of national law necessary to implement 
legally binding Union acts.’ 
100  For instance, Case C-13/68 Salgoil [1968] ECR 463. Hilson notes that the recognition of direct effect to he fundamental 
freedoms by the European Court of Justice surprised, as ‘none of them sit particularly happily with the requirements as to 
clarity, precision and unconditionality.’ See C Hilson, ‘What's in a right? The relationship between Community, 
fundamental and citizenship rights in EU law’ (2004) 29 European Law Review 636, 640. 
101  Case C-431/99 Baumbast [2002] ECR I-7091. 
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judicial review by the national and EU courts. Consequently, even if rejecting the interpretation of the
new wording of Art. 23(1) TFEU as a reiteration of the Member States’ duty to adopt national measure 
implementing the relevant EU law, in light of the Court’s reasoning in Baumbast, the right to consular 
and diplomatic protection still cannot be rejected direct effect because the limitations that the Membr 
States can adopt are subject to the full jurisdiction of the EU and the national courts.102  
In the foregoing paragraphs, the R yners and Defrenne cases were invoked as examples of cases where 
the direct effect was recognised by the European Court of Justice to unclear and legally incomplete 
Treaty Articles.103 The reason why the European Court of Justice, despite expressly recognising the 
conditionality of these Articles, held in favour ofdirect effect was to ensure the objective of these 
Articles when the Member States failed to fulfil their obligations to adopt implementing legislation 
within the provided transitional period. In light of this reasoning, the un-fulfilment by the Member 
States of their expressly provided Treaty obligation t  start international obligations for the last 18 
years, and contrary to the initial time limit provided in Art. 8c of the Maastricht Treaty,104 might 
influence the Court’s decision in favour of recognisi g direct effect to the right to consular and 
diplomatic protection of the Union citizen. 
3. What Role for the Union in the Protection of the EU Citizens Abroad – A Unique 
Model of Protection of Individuals Abroad 
‘The EU remains the only organisation that can call on a full panoply of instruments and resources 
[to] complement the traditional foreign policy tools of its member states.’105 
The above statement made by Solana one month before the ntry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 
regard to the role of the EU as an international actor perfectly reflects the statu quo of the relation 
between the Union and the Member States in the area of consular and diplomatic protection of Union 
citizens. Currently, the Union complements the exercis  by the Member States of the international 
protection of the Union citizens with the help of its institutions106 when the Member States so 
request.107 For the moment it plays only a supporting role for the Member States but as it will be 
shown in this section it has the potential to develop into something even more revolutionary. We say 
‘even more’ revolutionary as even if one may take at face value the current role of the Union in regard 
to Union nationals as something normal, expected in light of the Union’s external ambitions, it should 
not. This merely ‘supporting’ role plaid by the EU is a unique role in the arena of international 
                                                   
102  The general rule is that the EU courts have jurisdiction, unless expressly excluded as is the case of the CFSP (Art. 24 
TEU). 
103  Reyners – former Art. 52 EC Treaty and Defrenne – former Art. 119 EC Treaty. 
104  Art. 8C of the EC Treaty reads as follows: ‘Before the 31 December 1993 the Member States shall establish the necessary 
rules among themselves and start the international negotiations required to secure this protection.’ (emphasis added) 
105  Statement made by Javier Solana, ‘EU Makes Its Mark on the World Stage’, The Guardian, 11 October 2009. 
106  So far EU Institutions that have plaid a role in consular and diplomatic protection of the Union citizens are: the Union 
Presidency, SITCEN, the President of the European Council, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy, and now also the EEAS (Art. 5(10) of Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing 
the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service [2010] OJ L 201/30. 
107  The area is not categorised among the TFEU list of competences, however, Art. 5(10) is suggestive of the Union role in 
the area of consular and diplomatic protection, as well as Art. 35(3) TEU. 
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organisations108 and it has definitely not been an overnight change, but the process of a long evolution 
and fervent debate between the Member States and between the Commission and the Council.109  
When the Maastricht Treaty introduced for the first time a Union citizen’s right to protection outside 
the Union’s borders, the only role envisaged for the Union was limited to one sentence in the EU 
Treaty, whereby the consular and diplomatic representations of the Member States and the Community 
delegation were obliged to cooperate so as ‘to contribute to the implementation’ of the Union citizen’s 
right to protection in third countries.110 In contrast with other Union citizen’s rights, the drafters of the 
Treaty did not endow the Council with legislative powers to ensure that the Union citizen’s right 
would be effectively applied and developed, but similar to sensitive foreign policy areas, the Union 
model of consular and diplomatic protection of the Union citizens was kept out of the reach of the 
Union’s legislative and left to the control of the Member States’ executives. The only instruments that 
the Union could have adopted to implement the Union citizen’s right were political acts: CFSP 
measures adopted by unanimous consent,111 though in practice they have never been adopted, or non-
binding Council Guidelines112 adopted in Council’s specific Working Group (COCON) made up of 
representatives of the Member States’ Ministries of F reign Affairs, which have been more popular 
due to their non-constraining effect on the Member States. The latter remained the masters of the field, 
due to their exclusive competence to adopt acts imple enting the Union citizen’s right to consular and 
diplomatic protection.113 And so they did, by way of using a hybrid type of acts - Decisions of the 
Representatives of the Governments of the Member States adopted within the Council, which was not 
designed to affect rights of the individuals, but were usually adopted for making political statements, 
or, even if producing binding legal effects, they were limited to the Member States.114 In light of their 
purpose, the legal nature of these Decisions of international agreements and the limited EU legal 
actions to which they could be subject was not considered an issue. The EC and CFSP Decisions are 
though exceptions from this rule as they directly affect the Union citizens’ right to consular and 
diplomatic protection by restricting the material scope of the fundamental right without even being 
subject to the full panoply of EU legal remedies.115 
The possibility of using the flexibility clause (Art. 308 EC Treaty) by the Union as a legislative option, 
which has though been used for extending the Civil Protection Mechanism to consular assistance of 
the Union citizens in third countries116, arguably, would have never received the unanimous approval 
of the Member States in light of their traditional views that the field should continue its tradition f 
matter reserved to the national State and allow the European integration process only to the extent of 
procedural cooperation without harmonisation. 
                                                   
108  The only situation recognised under public international law when an international organisation can exercise diplomatic 
protection is when it exercises functional protection, namely when the injury is suffered by an agent of an international 
organisation. In the Reparation case, the ICJ limited th  functional protection only to injuries arising from a breach of an 
obligation designed to help an agent in performing his duties (ICJ, Advisory Opinion of 11 July 1949, ‘Reparations for 
injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations’, 1949, ICJ Reports, 182) 
109  See the comments made during the public debate following the Commission Green Paper on the different views of the 
Commission, Council (especially of certain Member States) available at www.careproject.eu/database/browse_eu.php . 
110  Former Art. 20(2) TEU 
111  From all possible CFSP measures, a Joint Action would have probably been the most suited due to their focus on 
operational character. In addition, CFSP Decisions could have served the purpose. 
112  See inter alia, Consular Guidelines on the protection of EU citizens in third countries adopted by the COCON and 
endorsed by the PSC 15613/10, of 5 November 2010. 
113  See former Art. 20 EC Treaty. 
114  E.g. Art. 253 TFEU (ex-Art. 223 TEC), Art. 341 TFEU (ex-Art. 289 TEC). 
115  For instance. the possibility of the Union citizens to bring a direct action of annulment against the Decision 95/553/EC 
before the General Court of Justice is questionable, since the Decision is not a Union act. 
116  Council Decision 2007/779/EC of 8 November 2007 establishing a Community Civil Protection Mechanism [2007] OJ L 
314/9, 9-19. 
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The Lisbon Treaty has brought a salient change to the legal framework of consular and diplomatic 
protection by abandoning the previous logic of inter-governmental sui generis decision making, and 
instead involving the EU with its legislative procedure and the newly created EEAS in a field 
historically dominated by States. In view of achieving its newly inserted objective of protecting the 
Union citizens in the world,117 the Council has been endowed with express legislative power to adopt 
Directives ‘establishing the coordination and cooperation measures necessary to facilitate’ the 
aforementioned protection.118 After consulting the European Parliament, the Council acts by qualified 
majority.119 The involvement of the European Parliament and the replacement of unanimous decision-
making with qualified majority voting is a significant blow to the long defended sovereignty of the 
Member States. On the other hand, it has to be noticed that Art. 23(2) TFEU maintained part of the 
inter-governmental language as the directives the Council is entitled to adopt establish ‘cooperation 
and coordination’ measures, reminding of the pre-Lisbon framework of cooperation and coordination 
among the Member States that governed the field. In light of the wording Art. 23(2) TFEU, the 
directive to be adopted under this provision could be argued to be a legislative measure that cannot 
harmonise the national law and practice on the legal nature, force, material and personal scope of 
consular and diplomatic protection of citizens, but merely establishing a common model for 
operational actions in cases of Union citizens in distress, such as evacuation procedures. 
Additional consequences for the sovereignty of the Member States in this this field may result from 
the fact that they are now sharing their external competence with the Union.120 It seems the Member 
States are already experiencing the consequences, as, in light of the fact that the Member States have 
not started negotiations for third countries with a view to obtain the latter’s consent, the Commission 
proposed to include a consent clause in mixed agreements with third countries. According to a 
Commission Communication of March 2011, ‘the negotiations are on-going’, however, the 
Community does not mention which kind of negotiating framework will be chosen: the Open Skies 
method121 whereby the Member States continue to negotiate and co clude international agreements but 
under the strict supervision of the Commission, or is it the Union that will obtain delegation from the 
Member States to continue the negotiations. 
The newly created European External Service (EEAS) has also been endowed with competence to act 
for the protection of the Union citizens, via the Union delegations in third countries.122 The EEAS role, 
similarly to the general role of the Union, is for the moment only of supporting the Member States’ 
representations in third countries, but has the potntial to evolve according to Art. 13(2) of the EEAS 
Council Decision:  
‘The High Representative shall submit a report to the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission on the functioning of the EEAS by the end of 2011. That report shall, in particular, 
cover the implementation of Article 5(3) and (10) and Article 9.’ 
The Report on the EEAS activity in the field of consular and diplomatic assistance of Union citizens 
may reveal, in a similar way as the Commission Reports n Union citizenship did in regard to Union 
citizenship, the necessity to adopt further actions to respond to problems that occurred in practice. If 
the EEAS role in this area was insignificant, then there would have been no need to include this 
subject matter in the Report on the EEAS' activities.123 
                                                   
117  Art. 3(5) TEU. 
118  Art. 23(2) TFEU. 
119  Art. 16(3) TEU. 
120  Arts. 2(2), 4(2) TFEU. 
121  M Cremona, ‘External Relations and External Competence of the EU: the Emergence of an Integrated Policy’ in Craig 
and de Burca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011) 230-267. 
122  Art. 5(10) Council Decision on EEAS and Art. 221 TFEU. 
123  More on this in the CARE Report, Section 7 of Chapter 3. 
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4. Conclusion 
The right to consular and diplomatic protection of the Union citizens, which was introduced with the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992, has so far remained quite nderdeveloped in comparison with the other 
“citizenship rights”. 
In this paper it was argued that the EU law developed its own autonomous concepts of consular and 
diplomatic protection, which, contrary to public international law, is a right of the individual. 
However, in the case of EU law the right is not recognised to the individual in his relation to his State 
of nationality. The holder of the right is the Unio citizen who does not have an accessible consular 
representation of its own Member State or another State representing it on a permanent basis. 
The holder of the obligation to protection is not the Member State of nationality, but any of the 
Member States that has a consular or diplomatic protecti n in the place from the third country where 
the citizen is located. The term ‘in the place’ hasto be differentiated from ‘in the third country’ since it 
confers the right to the Union citizen to ask for cnsular protection from any of the Member States that 
has a consular or diplomatic representation in a place nearer to where he is located instead of having to 
travel hundreds of kilometres to reach the consular or diplomatic representation of his own Member 
State within the same third country. 
The recent revolutions in the Mediterranean region and Middle East have shown the importance of the 
Union citizen’s right to consular and diplomatic protection and that consular assistance poses a 
growing challenge to the Member States and the Union. There is little doubt that, not even the 
Member States benefiting of the widest external representation network can cope alone with these 
catastrophes. These events have proved that only if both the Union and the Member States cooperate 
on a constant basis, could the Union citizens be effectively evacuated from areas in distress. If, in the 
situations of collective evacuation, the civil protection mechanism124 plays an important role and 
ensures what seems to be an effective modus vivendi between the Union institutional setting and the 
Member States, in cases of individual consular protection, there still is much work to be done in order 
to ensure that the discrepancies existent between the 27 national regulatory frameworks on consular 
and diplomatic protection of citizens will not deprive the Union citizen of his fundamental right. 
This paper presented one modality of ensuring the protection of the Union citizens in the world, 
through the European model of consular and diplomatic protection of unrepresented Union citizens. 
The mechanism was presented and evaluated as an aspect of the EU citizenship. However, consular 
protection can be conferred to the Union citizens in third countries hit by disasters also by ESDP 
missions. Interestingly, the first Decision adopted on the basis of former Art. 17 TEU concerned the 
evacuation of EU nationals whenever they are in danger in third countries. The Decision provided that, 
in these cases, the Council may request WEU to work out the operational plan for the evacuation.125 
The following paper will address this specific issue of whether ESDP missions, specifically the 
ATALANTA mission, play a role in the protection abroad of the Union citizens in distress. 
 
 
                                                   
124  Council Decision 2001/792/EC, Euratom of 23 October 2001 establishing a Community Mechanism to facilitate 
reinforced cooperation in civil protection assistance OJ L 297, p.7. See also, Article 2(10) and recital 18 of the preamble 
of Council Decision 2007/779/EC of 8 November 2007 which extended the Civil Protection Mechanism also to si uation 
of consular assistance of the Union citizens in third countries. 
125  It was adopted as a sui-generis Decision that was not published in the Official Journal. Doc. 8386/96, Decision de 
Conseil du 27 juin 1996, relative aux operations d’evacuations de ressortisants des Etats membres lorsque leur sécurite 
est en danger dans un pays tiers – see more in RA Wessel, The European Union's foreign and security policy: a legal 
institutional perspective (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1999) 133. 
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Abstract 
This paper critically assesses the anti-piracy operation Atalanta, the EU’s first-ever naval mission, in 
the light of the protection of Union citizens. The main question is to which extent a Union citizen 
threatened by pirates off the coast of Somalia could rely on the promise of civis europaeus sum. The 
paper discusses the various legal aspects pertaining to the forceful protection of EU citizens in 
international law, EU constitutional law and the operational parameters of Atalanta. It argues that 
within the particular framework of the international effort to combat piracy in this theatre, the 
protection of citizens by military force would be legal in principle. Moreover, the protection of Unio 
citizens outside the EU forms now one of the legally-binding general objectives of the Union (but it 
does not represent an individual right in the area of CFSP/CSDP). Yet, this objective is not reiterated 
in the operational mandate. This conspicuous absence creates tension and confusion between the 
general objective and the CSDP instrument. The paper concludes that the mandate of Atalanta, by 
focussing entirely on universal objectives, is constitutionally incomplete and shows that the external 
dimension of Union citizenship is still underdeveloped. 
Keywords  
Operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta – Common Defence and Security Policy (CSDP) – Piracy – Union 
citizenship – use of force to protect citizens abrod 
 
1. Introduction: The Civis Europaeus and the Hostis Humani Generis 
The ancient roman dictum ‘civis romanus sum’,1 a pledge of respect for one’s rights as a Roman 
citizen, has remained a powerful concept throughout the centuries. Importantly, the status that it 
indicates was not just relevant within the Roman Empire, but also carried considerable weight beyond 
its borders, instilling fear in the ‘barbarians’ tha  mistreating a Roman would be answered with severe 
reprisals. It is this external dimension of citizen protection with which the present contribution is 
concerned in the context of the European Union, with particular regard to its Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP) as exemplified through the anti-piracy operation Atalanta. 
In the modern age, the phrase resurfaced in the context of protecting a nation-state’s citizens aboard. 
As one of the most (in)famous examples, Lord Palmerston evoked in 1850 before the British 
Parliament ‘the sense of duty which has led us to think ourselves bound to afford protection to our 
fellow subjects abroad’.2 Consequently, according to Palmerston,   
                                                   
*  PhD candidate, European University Institute. The author would like to thank Professors Francesco Francioni and 
Natalino Ronzitti for their helpful comments in the process of writing this paper. Responsibility for any remaining 
shortcomings rests of course with the author. 
1  For an early example from the New Testament, see Acts of the Apostles 22:29. 
2  Lord Palmerston's speech on Greece of 25 June 1850, reproduced in House of Commons, The Parliamentary Debates: 
Hansard. House of Commons Official Report, third series, Vol 112 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office 1943) 380-
444. 
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‘as the Roman, in days of old, held himself free from indignity, when he could say Civis Romanus 
sum; so also a British subject, in whatever land he may be, shall feel confident that the watchful 
eye and the strong arm of England, will protect himagainst injustice and wrong.’3  
Similarly, even though in more aggressive terms, in 1900 Kaiser Wilhelm II told his troops, before 
sending them off to China to quell the Boxer Rebellion, that ‘by its character the German Empire has 
the obligation to provide help to its citizens whenever they are oppressed abroad.’4 Consequently, in 
order to avenge the alleged breaches of international law committed by the Chinese, the Kaiser 
instructed his troops to handle their arms in such a way that ‘for a thousand years no Chinese will dare 
even to squint at a German anymore.’5 Already here, it becomes obvious that there are two sides to the 
concept. Next to the as such laudable idea of the sate extending its protection over its citizens 
wherever they may be to shield them from harm, there is also the negative connotation of disregard for 
other countries’ sovereignty, as ‘a pretext for intervention’6 and generally a sign of ‘imperialism’, 
especially when the use of force is involved. 
Also in the context of the European Union the anciet adage has been drawn upon. Four Advocates 
General have used the expression ‘civis europeus [sic] sum’.7 According to Advocate General Jacobs, 
who originally introduced the phrase into the vocabul ry of the European Court of Justice, a Union 
citizen is ‘entitled to assume that, wherever he gos t  earn his living in the European Community, he 
will be treated in accordance with a common code of fundamental values […]’.8 However, civis 
europaeus sum in these cases concerned the invocation of fundamental rights by Union citizens within 
the EU. The protection of Union citizens abroad is a matter distinct from the legal momentum behind 
consolidation and incorporation of citizens’ rights protection inside the Union’s borders.9  
Still, the introduction of Union citizenship into the primary law by the Maastricht Treaty already 
included an explicit external component, viz. the protection by the diplomatic or consular authori ies of 
any Member State in third countries for Union citizens whose Member State is not represented.10 
Apart from consular and diplomatic protection proper, an innovation by the Lisbon Treaty is the 
inclusion among the objectives of the Union to ‘uphold and promote its values and interests and 
                                                   
3  Lord Palmerston's speech on Greece, reproduced in House of Commons, The Parliamentary Debates, 380-444. 
4  The speech by Kaiser Wilhelm II, known as the ‘Hunnenrede’, at Bremerhaven on 27 July 1900 (translation by author), 
reproduced in M Görtemaker, Deutschland im 19. Jahrhundert. Entwicklungslinien, fifth edition (Opladen: 
Leske+Budrich 1996) 357. 
5  Kaiser Wilhelm II’s speech at Bremerhaven (translation by author), reproduced in Görtemaker, Deutschland im 19. 
Jahrhundert, 357. For other historical examples see A Ianniello Saliceti, ‘The Protection of EU Citizens Abroad: 
Accountability, Rule of Law, Role of Consular and Diplomatic Services’ (2011) 17 European Public Law 91, 91-92. 
6  C Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, third edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008) 159. 
7  Case C-168/91 Christos Konstantinidis v Stadt Altensteig [1993] ECR I-01191, Opinion of Mr Advocate General Jcobs 
of 9 December 1992, para. 46; Case C-380/05 Centro Europa 7 Srl v Ministero delle Comunicazioni [2008] ECR I-
00349, Opinion of Mr Advocate General Poiares Maduro of 12 September 2007, para. 16 (quoting Jacobs); Case C-
228/07 Jörn Petersen v Landesgeschäftsstelle des Arbeitsmarktservice Niederösterreich [2008] ECR I-06989, Opinion of 
Mr Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, para. 16 (quoting Jacobs); Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office 
national de l’emploi (ONEM), Opinion of Mrs Advocate General Sharpston of 30 September 2010, nyr, para. 83 (quoting 
and endorsing Jacobs). 
8  Case C-168/91 Konstantinidis [1993] I-01191, Opinion of AG Jacobs, para. 46. It also appears as the heading for the 
chapter on Union citizenship in a textbook on EU constitutional law, see A Rosas and L Young, EU Constitutional Law: 
An Introduction (Oxford: Hart 2011) 128. 
9  For a pertinent example of this momentum notice the ECJ’s judgement in Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office 
national de l’emploi (ONEM), judgement of the Court of 8 March 2011, nyr (concer ing a situation lacking any kind of 
transnational element, but was based solely on the status as a Union citizen). See also Arts. 20-22 TFEU; and Arts. 39-45 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
10  Art. 8c TEU (Maastricht Treaty version); for the post-Lisbon provision, Art. 23 TFEU; see also Art. 46 Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.  
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contribute to the protection of its citizens’ in its external relations.11 The failed Constitutional Treaty 
did not refer to the protection of citizens abroad as a general Union objective.12 This novelty was 
introduced by the French government at the Intergovernmental Conference of 2007.13 The motivation 
behind this was, it has been argued, to underline that the Union is not a ‘Trojan horse’ of globalisaton, 
but instead acts as a shield for its citizens from globalisation’s challenges and downsides.14 Moreover, 
it could be seen as the constitutional concretization of the EU’s objective, introduced also by the 
Maastricht Treaty, ‘to assert its identity on the international scene’.15 One important aspect of this 
would be the external dimension of Union citizenship, i.e. also ‘to reinforce the identity of European 
citizens throughout the rest of the world.’16 
With the introduction and rapid development of the Common Security and Defence Policy (formerly 
ESDP), the European Union has equipped itself also with military capabilities that can be used to 
pursue its foreign policy (or ‘external action’, to use the post-Lisbon term).17 The extent to which these 
capabilities can also be used to pursue the objective of protecting Union citizens abroad will be 
addressed here in the context of Operation Atalanta, the EU’s first naval military operation. Launched 
on 8 December 2008,18 it will continue at least till December 2012.19 The academic debate surrounding 
Atalanta has thus far focussed on issues pertaining to legal aspects of the detention and prosecution of 
pirates and/or Law of the Sea issues,20 or the geopolitical implications of the operation.21 However, it 
is argued here that the issue of protection of Union c tizens should not be neglected, especially in view 
of both the unique (one might even say sui generis) nature of the concept of Union citizenship as well 
as of the EU as an actor in matters of international security. International organisations such as NATO 
                                                   
11  Art. 3(5) TEU (Lisbon Treaty version). 
12  Art. I-3(4) CT. 
13  E de Poncins, Le traité de Lisbonne en 27 clés (Paris: Lignes de repères 2008) 75-76. 
14  J-L Sauron, Comprendre le Traité de Lisbonne: Texte consolidé int gral des traités (Paris: Gualino 2007) 30. 
15  Art. 2 TEU (Maastricht Treaty version). 
16  Ianniello Saliceti, ‘The Protection of EU Citizens Aboard’ 92 (emphasis added), who states furthermore that this had 
been pursued already as early as 1985 by the ‘Adonnin  Committee’. 
17  For a recent overview see M Webber, ‘The Common Security and Defence Policy in a Multilateral World’ in P 
Koutrakos (ed), European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2011). With the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Union’s CSDP institutional structure has been moved to the European External 
Action Service (EEAS), see Council Decision 2010/427EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning 
of the European External Action Service [2010] OJ L 201/30, Annex. 
18  Council Decision 2008/918/CFSP of 8 December 2008 on the launch of a European Union military operation t  
contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast 
(Atalanta) [2008] OJ L330/19.  
19  Council Decision 2010/766/CFSP of 7 December 2010 amending Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP on a European Union 
military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the 
Somali coast [2010] OJ L327/49, Art. 1(5). 
20  See e.g. A Fischer-Lescano and L Kreck, ‘Piraterie und Menschenrechte: Rechtsfragen der Bekämpfung der Piraterie im 
Rahmen der europäischen Operation Atalanta’ (2009) 47 Archiv des Völkerrechts 481; MD Fink and RJ Galvin, 
‘Combating Pirates off the Coast of Somalia: Current Legal Challenges’ (2009) 56 Netherlands International Law 
Review 367, 384-385 on Atalanta; and F Naert, International Law Aspects of the EU's Security and Defence Policy, with 
a Particular Focus on the Law of Armed Conflict and Human Rights (Antwerp: Intersentia 2010) 179-191. 
21  See e.g. B Germond and M Smith, ‘Re-Thinking European Security Interests and the ESDP: Explaining the EU’s Anti-
Piracy Operation’ (2009) 30 Contemporary Security Policy 573; S Kamerling and F-P van der Putten, ‘Europe Sails East, 
China Sails West: Somali Piracy and Shifting Geopolitical Relations in the Indian Ocean’ in F-P van der Putten and C 
Shulong (eds), China, Europe and International Security: Interests, Roles, and Prospects (Milton Park, Routledge, 
2010); J Holmes, ‘The Interplay between Counterpiracy nd Indian Ocean Geopolitics’ in B van Ginkel and F-P van der 
Putten (eds), The International Response to Somali Piracy: Challenges and Opportunities (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 
2010); and J Larik and Q Weiler, ‘Going Naval in Troubled Waters: The European Union, China and the Fight A ainst 
Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia’ in J Men and B Barton (eds), The EU and China: Partners or Competitors in Africa 
(Aldershot: Ashgate 2011). 
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do not contain any notion of common ‘citizenship’, whereas for individual countries it is a rather 
traditional and uncontroversial issue to protect their own nationals, who are bound by a ‘genuine link’ 
to their state,22 abroad. For some it is even a constitutional objectiv .23 Consequently, these peculiar 
features set the EU and Operation Atalanta apart from the other actors and their respective 
deployments in this theatre. Moreover, and in contrast to other CSDP/ESDP operations, Atalanta 
serves as a well-suited case study for the external protection of Union citizens. Whereas former 
missions were strictly concerned with external objectiv s that could only indirectly or incidentally 
affect the security of Union citizens, e.g. peace-ke ping operations, police missions or security sector 
reform programmes, Atalanta addresses pirates attacks in one of the most heavily-used maritime trade 
routes in the world, through which also large numbers of ships flying flags of EU Member States and 
EU citizens pass.24  
It is against this backdrop that the novel civis europaeus encounters the re-surfacing hostis humani 
generis (as pirates were classically termed). Consequently, the question emerges whether Union 
citizens abroad can also trust here in the weight of the legal concept of civis europaeus sum. Can they 
rely on the assets of Operation Atalanta, i.e. – to use Palmerston’s imagery – the ‘watchful eye’ and 
the ‘strong arm’ of the Union to protect them against the threat of pirate attacks? In order to approach 
this question, the paper will proceed as follows: Section (2.) addresses the international law aspects of 
the of the external protection of citizens by forceful means; section (3.) turns to the EU’s constitutional 
framework and the issue of using the CSDP to pursue the objective of protecting EU citizens aboard; 
section (4.) subsequently scrutinizes to which extent the mandate of Operation Atalanta takes this goal 
into account, observing that in spite of a constitutional objective the operation is not explicitly 
pursuing the protection of Union citizens. Section (5.) points out the implications of this tension 
between the two. The paper concludes that the mandate of Atalanta, by focussing entirely on 
‘universal’ objectives and neglecting the civis europaeus, is – if not unconstitutional – constitutionally 
incomplete. 
2. International Law Aspects  
The deployment of military forces and the use of force in order to protect a country’s citizens abroad 
raise first and foremost the question of legality under international law. For the EU the issue to use 
force for that purpose arises in the context of Atalanta with regard to crew members with Union 
citizenship that are threatened by pirates in the operation theatre.  
In view of the general prohibition imposed on states to use force ‘in their international relations’ under 
Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, we have to address first the general parameters of 
international law in terms of the use of force to protect one’s citizens abroad. Even though 
International Law Commission (ICL) Special Rapporteu  Dugard considered ‘[t]he use of force as the 
ultimate means of diplomatic protection’ in his 2000 report,25 this opinion cannot be regarded as the 
predominant one, and was not even shared by the majority of the ICL members.26 The current ILC 
commentary clearly states that ‘[t]he use of force [...] is not a permissible method for the enforcement 
                                                   
22  For a discussion of the difficult transferability of the ‘genuine link’ of nationality to the EU context under international 
law, see the contribution by Patrizia Vigni in the pr sent edited Working Paper. 
23  Ianniello Saliceti, ‘The Protection of EU Citizens Aboard’ 97. For the EU, see Art. 3(5) TEU (see also infra section 3.). 
24  Germond and Smith, ‘Re-Thinking European Security Interests and the ESDP’ 587-589. 
25  International Law Commission, First report on diplomatic protection by Mr. John R. Dugard, Special Rapporteur 
(A/CN.4/506), 7 March 2000, para. 47; see also C Gray, ‘The Protection of Nationals Abroad: Russia’s Use of Force in 
Georgia’ in A Constantinides and N Zaikos (eds), The Diversity of International Law: Essays in Honour f Professor 
Kalliopi K. Koufa (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 2009) 137. 
26  Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, 137. 
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of the right of diplomatic protection.’27 Beyond the realm of diplomatic protection, international legal 
scholarship either discards any notion of forceful citizen protection as an exception to the prohibition 
to use force,28 or see merely little support in state practice andlegal opinion for it.29  
However, in the present case, we are not dealing with intervention on the territory of another state 
and/or against foreign state agents, but with pirate at acks – that is non-state actors – on ships within 
the territorial waters of Somalia or on the high seas. This is, in the first place, regulated by the 
international Law of the Sea as codified in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS). The convention provides a definition of piracy,30 and allows any state to seize the pirate 
ship on the high seas, arrest the pirates and exercise jurisdiction over them.31 Therefore, on the high 
seas, a state is allowed to use force against pirates without having to invoke any exceptional (and 
controversial) ‘right’ to protect its own citizens or to exercise a humanitarian intervention.32   
Importantly, in this particular case, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has passed a number 
of resolutions addressing the piracy problem off the Coast of Somalia, which supplement, and in view 
of the supremacy of the UN Charter to other internatio l agreements partly supplant,33 he UNCLOS 
framework. This concerns in particular Resolution 1816 of 2 June 2008,34 which in essence makes ‘the 
rules of international law concerning piracy on thehigh seas applicable also to territorial waters’35 of 
Somalia and allows states operating under this legal framework to use ‘all necessary means to repress 
acts of piracy and armed robbery’,36 i.e. also to use force.  
The addition of the term ‘armed robbery’ to the UNCLOS-defined term ‘piracy’ is of some 
significance, as the latter notion might not always be applicable to modern forms of piracy (e.g. the 
requirement that always two ships must be involved). Treves points out that the term is used in the 
context of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and supplements the notion of piracy, 
‘inspired by the aim of including all acts connected with piracy (such as preparatory acts) and future 
possible acts involving only one ship.’37 According to the IMO, ‘armed robbery’ is defined as 
‘any unlawful act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an 
act of “piracy” directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such a ship within a 
State’s jurisdiction over such offences.’38 
                                                   
27  UN General Assembly, Report of the International L w Commission on the work of its fifty-eighth session, Official 
Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-first Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/61/10) 27. 
28  M Bothe, ‘Friedenssicherung und Kriegsrecht’ in W Graf Vitzthum (ed), Völkerrecht, third edition (Berlin: De Gruyter 
2004) 604-605 and further references there.  
29  Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, 156-159; but see N Ronzitti, Introduzione al diritto internazionale, second 
edition (Torino: Giappichelli 2007) 416-417, who con ludes that it might constitute a distinct exception to the prohibition 
to use force based on customary international law and points to changing opinion and practice of state that were 
traditionally opposed to such an exception. 
30  Art. 101 UNCLOS. 
31  Art. 105 UNCLOS. 
32  N Ronzitti, Rescuing nationals abroad through military coercion a d intervention on grounds of humanity (Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff 1985) 137. 
33  Art. 103 UN Charter. 
34  UN Security Council Resolution 1816 (2008) of 2 June 2008, S/RES/1816 (2008) para. 7. 
35  T Treves, ‘Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force: Developments off the Coast of Somalia’ (2009) 20 European 
Journal of International Law 399, 404. For incursions even onto Somali soil, note United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1851 (2008) of 16 December 2008, S/RES/1851 (2008) para. 6. 
36  UN Security Council Resolution 1816 (2008) of 2 June 2008, S/RES/1816 (2008) para. 7(b). 
37  Treves ‘Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force’ 403. 
38  IMO Resolution A 922(22) of 29 November 2001 adopting the Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of 
Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, Annex, para. 2.2.  
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Moreover, even though the Security Council is acting here under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia has to be notified of operations in its territorial 
waters,39 which Naert calls ‘a simplified form of consent’.40 While superfluous in view of the powers 
conferred upon the Security Council under Chapter VII, this could be seen as a supplementary 
invitation by Somalia for states to intervene in the fight against piracy in its territorial waters, which 
could serve to preclude illegality of the use of force as covered by such an invitation.41 The EU has 
notified the TFG of Somalia accordingly.42 
One should distinguish here the use of force against pirates from that in a situation of armed conflict 
between states. As Treves puts it, in contrast to acts of self-defence, counter-piracy should ‘be 
assimilated to the exercise of the power to engage in police action on the high seas on foreign vessels 
which is permitted by exceptions to the rule affirming the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state.’43 
Similarly, but more accurately, Lubell calls for a ‘l w enforcement approach of the scaled use of 
force’, which recognizes that even though we face here a force level below that of armed conflict, 
‘[t]he level of force and types of weapons employed may well rise beyond the usual domestic crime 
scenarios’.44 
In view of the general authorization to combat piracy by the Law of the Sea and its extension ratione 
materiæ (‘armed robbery’) and loci (Somali territorial waters) through UNSC resolutions (and 
affirmed by TFG notifications), a state cannot be se n as violating another state’s rights or territorial 
integrity if it uses force against pirates off the coast of Somalia.45 There is no reason why this 
conclusion should change when the act of repressing piracy was carried out in a situation where the 
state’s own citizens were under threat. As was pointed out earlier, states do not have to invoke an 
exceptional right to protect their citizens to employ forceful measures against pirates. Hence, they can 
use these measures also to that particular end. As states are under no obligation, but are instead 
generally authorized to combat piracy, the protection by the (proportionate) use of force of a state’s 
nationals within these legal parameters is to be considered unobjectionable under international law.46  
As regards the special nature of the EU as an interna ional actor, it follows from the foregoing that in 
any case its Member States would be allowed to use forc  against pirates within the particular legal 
framework concerning Somalia. Only in case of overstepping this framework and breaching 
international law would the question of responsibility between the Member States providing military 
                                                   
39  United Nations Security Council Resolution 1816 (2008) of 2 June 2008, S/RES/1816 (2008) para. 11; see al o the more 
recent United Nations Security Council Resolution 1897 (2009) of 30 November 2009, S/RES/1897 (2009), para. 8, 
which affirms the necessity of the consent of the TFG. 
40  Naert, International Law Aspects of the EU's Security and Defence Policy, 185. 
41  Ronzitti, Introduzione al diritto internazionale 417. 
42  See Council Decision 2008/918/CFSP of 8 December 2008, point 4 of the grounds. 
43  Treves, ‘Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force’ 413. 
44  N Lubell, Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Non-State Actors (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010) 225. 
45  Of course, general principles and basic human rights are to be observed, i.e. ensuring that the use of force is 
‘unavoidable, reasonable and necessary’, Treves, ‘Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force’ 414; also Lubell, 
Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Non-State Actors, 225-226. In other words, the principle of proportionality can be 
applied here by analogy. 
46  See also already Ronzitti, Rescuing nationals abroad through military coercion and intervention on grounds of humanity 
137. Given this express authorization, the arguably more far-fetched line of argumentation according to which pirate 
attacks could be deemed an armed attack by non-state actors triggering the right to self-defence will be omitted here. See 
in detail on this 9/11-related discussion Gray, International Law and the Use of Force 193-253; Lubell, Extraterritorial 
Use of Force Against Non-State Actors 29-36; and earlier on protection of nationals as a form of self-defence D Bowett, 
‘The use of force for the protection of nationals abroad’ in A Cassese (ed), The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of 
Force (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 1986). In the EU contex , note that the mutual assistance clause (Art. 42(7) TEU) 
only applies ‘[i]f a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory’, which therefore does not cover 
attacks on citizens abroad. 
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assets to Atalanta and the EU itself arise. After all, the relevant Joint Action states that ‘[t]he 
European Union (EU) shall conduct a military operation […] called “Atalanta”’,47 not the several 
Member States.  
Such questions of international responsibility of the EU notwithstanding,48 it seems clear that force by 
a Member State operating within Atalanta could be used to protect a Member State’s own citizens. 
There have been already a number of instances where EU Member States contemplated the use of 
force or actually resorted to forceful means to protect their citizens against pirates. According to 
French diplomatic sources, ‘[o]n three occasions French forces have had to intervene to protect French 
citizens taken hostage by pirates’.49 In early May 2009, a rescue operation by German commandos of 
the kidnapped freighter Hansa Stavanger anchored in a Somali harbour was narrowly aborted for 
security concerns.50  
Furthermore, and crucially, this authorization under th  international legal framework also covers the 
protection of non-nationals, which obviously makes sense seeing the often multinational setup of 
merchant ship crews and the general interest of the international community involved. These non-
nationals could therefore also come from other EU Member States. A fitting example here is the 
rescue mission conducted by Dutch forces from the frigate Tromp operating in the framework of 
Atalanta, which saved German nationals from pirates that had hij cked the MS Taipan in April 2010.51 
This – at least in effect – amounts to an act of an EU Member State’s military forces protecting EU 
citizens from pirates. In view of the foregoing this is to be deemed legal under international law. The
extent to which such protection of Union citizens is framed by EU law will be dealt with in the next 
two sections.  
3. EU Constitutional Law Aspects 
From the perspective of EU primary law, as was stated in the introduction, the Lisbon Treaty 
introduced among the objectives of the Union to ‘uphold and promote its values and interests and 
contribute to the protection of its citizens’.52 From the emerging literature on the Union’s objectives as 
a category of constitutional law, it can be concluded that these are binding obligations that commit the 
Union and its institutions to actively pursue these objectives and that frame the use of their discretion 
accordingly.53 In this literature, there is general agreement that also the Members States are bound by 
                                                   
47  Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008 on a European Union military operation to contribu e to the 
deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast [2008] OJ L301/33, Art. 
1(1). 
48  See Naert, International Law Aspects of the EU's Security and Defence Policy, 641-644. 
49  This concerned the vessels Le Ponant, Carré d’As and Tanit, Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations n New 
York, Communiqué : Combating maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia: Action by France, 20 April 2009, 
www.franceonu.org/spip.php?article3803. 
50  See ‘Entführter Frachter “Hansa Stavanger”: Berlin stoppt Befreiungsaktion der GSG 9’ Der Spiegel, 2 May 2009, 
www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,621051,00.html. 
51  EU NAVOR Somalia, Pirated German ship rescued – EU NAVFOR HNLMS Tromp retakes pirated MV Taipan, 5 April 
2010, press release, www.eunavfor.eu/2010/04/pirated-german-ship-rescue-eu-navfor-hnmls-tromp-retakes-pirated-mv-
taipan/. 
52  Art. 3(5) TEU. 
53 See, writing in the pre-Lisbon context, F Reimer, ‘Ziele und Zuständigkeiten: Die Funktionen der 
Unionszielbestimmungen’ (2003) Europarecht 992; M Kotzur, ‘Die Ziele der Union: Verfassungsidentität und 
Gemeinschaftsidee’ (2005) 58 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung 313; and extensively, B Plecher-Hochstraßer, 
Zielbestimmungen im Mehrebenensystem: Die Verzahnung der Staatszielbestimmungen im GG mit den Zielbestimmungen 
im EUV, EGV, EuratomV und EUVV (Munich: Meidenbauer 2006) 105-136; also K-P Sommermann, Staatsziele und 
Staatszielbestimmungen (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 1997) 280-296. For a summary of different theoretical approaches as 
applied to the post-Lisbon external relations objectiv s of the EU see J Larik, ‘Theoretical Approaches to a Peculiar 
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these objectives, in any event indirectly by virtue of the duty of cooperation.54 Even though the 
Union’s Common Foreign and Defence Policy, of which the CSDP is a component, have special 
characteristics (intergovernmentalism, exclusion of jurisdiction of the ECJ),55 there is nothing to 
suggest that external action-related objectives should be treated in a fundamentally different way from 
internal policy-related objectives.  
How, then, do the objectives of upholding and promoting the Union’s values and interests and 
contributing to the protection of its citizens abroad apply to the piracy surge off the Coast of Somalia? 
As far as the (economic) interests are concerned, the s akes for the EU are obvious. The strategic 
economic importance for the EU lies in the fact that the Gulf of Aden is a maritime chokepoint 
through which 90 percent of merchandise and 30 percent of the energy resources consumed in Europe 
pass.56 Therefore, as French vice-admiral Bruno Nielly puts it, ‘il n'est pas question pour l'Europe de 
laisser ne serait-ce qu'un tronçon de cette route menacé par un phénomène tel que la piraterie’ and that 
‘[l]'Europe, d'abord, y défend ses intérêts.’57 Also Germond calls Operation Atalanta ‘the first ever 
ESDP operation that primarily aims at defending Memb r States’ interests (that is, providing security 
to their merchant shipping)’.58 In addition, Europe’s fishing industry should not remain unaddressed, 
which has been very active in the area and has frequently been criticized for taking advantage of the 
lack of effective state power in Somalia.59 Apart from the economic, there are also wider security 
concerns such as the pirates collaborating with terrorist groups, and of course the protection of EU 
citizens,60 a matter to which we will return in detail. Therefore, Atalanta can definitely be seen as a 
measure in the pursuit of the Union’s interests. 
One could also argue that the EU’s approach in Atalanta is framed to safeguard and promote its 
values. Examples for this would be the integrated approach that also aims at improving the situation in 
Somalia itself (above all through the EU Somalia Trining Mission),61 even though the effectiveness 
(Contd.)                                                             
Norm Category: Shaping the International Order as a Union Objective’, paper presented at the workshop ‘The European 
Union’s Shaping of the International Legal Order’ organized by CLEER, Brussels, 27 May 2011. 
54  Plecher-Hochstraßer, Zielbestimmungen im Mehrebenensystem, 114-119; Reimer, ‘Ziele und Zuständigkeiten’ 105-107; 
K-P Sommermann, Staatsziele und Staatszielbestimmungen, 293-296. 
55  Above all Art. 24 TEU; see also D Thym, ‘Foreign Affairs’ in A von Bogdandy and J Bast (eds), Principles of European 
Constitutional Law (Oxford/Munich: Hart/C.H. Beck 2010) 330-338; and P van Elsuwege, ‘EU external action after the 
collapse of the pillar structure. In search of a new balance between delimitation and consistency’ (2010) 47 Common 
Market Law Review 987. 
56  French Ministry of Defence, Piraterie : entretien avec le vice-amiral Bruno Nielly, commandant la zone maritime de 
l'océan Indien (ALINDIEN), 27 May 2010, www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/piraterie/actualites/27-05-10-piraterie-
entretien-avec-le-vice-amiral-bruno-nielly-commandat-l -zone-maritime-de-l-ocean-indien-alindien; see also Larik and 
Weiler, ‘Going Naval in Troubles Waters’ 85-86. 
57  French Ministry of Defence, Piraterie : entretien avec le vice-amiral Bruno Nielly. 
58  B Germond, ‘From Frontier to Boundary and Back Again: The European Union’s Maritime Margins’ (2010) 15 
European Foreign Affairs Review 39, 53. The reference to Member State interests, however, detracts from the notion of 
(autonomous) EU interests that are to be defended. As the worlds leading trade power, it may well be assumed here that 
the EU is also defending its interest in secure maritime trade, not just that of the individual Member States. Germond and 
Smith therefore rightly refer to the interests of the Union and its Member States, which are more directly at stake in 
Atalanta than in previous CSDP/ESDP missions, Germond and Smith, ‘Re-Thinking European Security Interests and the 
ESDP’ 587-589. 
59  See e.g. L Phillips, ‘The European roots of Somali piracy’, EU Observer, 21 April 2009, euobserver.com/9/27966; 
generally on illegal fishing P Lehr and H Lehmann, ‘Somali pirates’ new paradise’ in P Lehr (ed), Violence at Sea: 
Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism (New York: Routledge 2007) 12-13. 
60  Germond and Smith, ‘Re-Thinking European Security Interests and the ESDP’ 580-581. 
61  Council Decision 2010/197/CFSP of 31 March 2010 on the launch of a European Union military mission to contribute to 
the training of Somali security forces (EUTM Somalia) [2010] OJ L87/33. 
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of this approach can be questioned.62 With particular regard to the treatment of pirates, safeguard 
mechanisms to protect their human rights (most prominently, ensuring that they will not be subject to 
the death penalty when tried in third countries),63 as well as fostering multilateral cooperation among 
the different actors in the region,64 can be seen as expressions of European values. 
But what about the potential contribution of Atalanta to the protection of Union citizens, as an 
objective that is stipulated explicitly next to values and interests, i.e. an objective in its own right? 
Here, first of all the question needs to be answered whether, and to which extent, the CFSP/CSDP can 
be used to this specific end. As is also generally greed concerning constitutionally-codified 
objectives, they do not as such establish competenc.65 Especially in the EU as an entity based on 
conferred powers, this competence and the procedures to be followed ought to be specified elsewhere 
in the primary law. 
As a preliminary observation, the objective of citizen protection abroad is not explicitly reiterated or 
linked to competences and procedures in Title V of the TEU or Part Five of the TFEU on external 
action. With particular regard to the objectives of the CFSP, Art. 23 TEU states that the Union’s 
international action ‘shall be guided by the principles, shall pursue the objectives of, and be conducte  
in accordance with, the general provisions laid down in Chapter 1’. However, Arts. 21 and 22 TEU, 
which make up this chapter, do not include a specific reference to the protection of citizens. What is 
made explicit elsewhere is the right ‘to protection by the diplomatic or consular authorities of any 
Member State, on the same conditions as the nationals f that State’ in third countries in which their 
Member State of nationality is not represented.66 This provision is situated under the heading ‘Non-
discrimination and Citizenship’ in the TFEU. This raises the question whether the objective of citizen 
protection abroad is only to be pursued through diplomatic or consular protection as an external aspect 
of citizenship and, a contrario, not through the CFSP/CSDP. 
This would seem too narrow an interpretation. The scope of the CFSP is very broad, as Art. 24(1) 
states that ‘[t]he Union's competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall cover all 
areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security’.67 Also, despite the lack of 
explicit reference to citizen protection there, thegeneral objectives found in Art. 3(5) TEU could be 
regarded as implied under the Union’s ‘fundamental interests’ and ‘security’, which are to be 
safeguarded under Art. 21(2)(a) through EU external action. Therefore, the Union can be deemed 
generally competent to protect its citizens abroad, including through the CFSP. 
Turning now to the CSDP proper, Art. 42(1) TEU provides that ‘[t]he common security and defence 
policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy’. However, citizen 
protection is not explicitly mentioned, as civilian d military capabilities may be used by the Union 
                                                   
62  See ML Sanchez Barrueco, ‘Reflections on the EU Foreign Policy Objectives Behind the “Integrated Approach” in the 
Response to Piracy Off Somalia’ (2009) 5 Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 205. 
63  Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008 on a European Union military operation to contribu e to the 
deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast [2008] OJ L301/33, Art. 
12(2). 
64  Liaising with other organisations is part of the mandate, Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP, Art. 2(f); for the practice 
of the EU as promoter of coordination between the most important actors see Larik and Weiler, ‘Going Naval in Troubles 
Waters’ 93-97. Compare this in particular with Art. 21(2), second indent, TEU . 
65  See for the EU, Reimer, ‘Ziele und Zuständigkeiten’ 995-996; and Kotzur, ‘Die Ziele der Union’ 314. 
66  Art. 23 TFEU; see also Art. 46 Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
67  This includes also ‘the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence’. However, 
as was pointed out above, citizen protection against pirates is not to be construed as collective/commn defence. On the 
broadness as well as ill-defined nature of CFSP competence (Art. 2(4) TFEU), see A Sari, ‘Between Legalization and 
Organizational Development: Explaining the Evolution of EU Competence in the Field of Foreign Policy’ in PJ Cardwell 
(ed), EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era (The Hague: TMC Asser Press 2011), forthcoming 
2011 (draft available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 papers.cfm?abstract_id=1858709). 
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‘on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international 
security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.’68 That would not as such 
seem to include the protection of citizens.  
However, the more precise enumeration of the so-called ‘Petersberg tasks’ in Art. 43(1) TEU 
‘include[s]’, inter alia, ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks’. Even though Union citizens are not 
mentioned, the notion of ‘rescue tasks’ can only reasonably be understood as referring also to rescue 
efforts of one’s own citizens. This follows from the background of this provision. In the original 1992 
WEU Petersberg declaration, the French version referred to ‘des missions humanitaires ou 
d'évacuation de ressortissants’.69 The later omission of this reference to citizens i the Amsterdam 
Treaty has been interpreted as intending to not a priori exclude third-country nationals from being 
rescued through EU missions.70 Any other interpretation would seem to be at odds with the rather wide 
scope of the CSDP. According to Coelmont, ‘apart from collective defence, all kinds of military 
operations one can at present realistically invent in our global world can all be undertaken in a 
European context as an ESDP (or CSDP) operation.’71 Moreover, given the prominent place of the 
protection of citizens among the general objectives of the Union, a systematic-teleological 
interpretation of the Treaties would favour the pursuit of this objective by the entire spectrum of 
external EU policies and capabilities, including those of the CSDP.  
Of course, competence to pursue this objective through the CSDP does not dispense of the legal 
limitations of EU law and international law that will have to be respected in doing so. For instance, a 
rescue operation of EU citizens from pirates, just like any general anti-piracy action, must respect 
basic legal principles such as necessity and proporti nality, and respect the rights of third parties ( .g. 
the sovereign rights of third states into whose territorial waters/territory EU citizens are abducted by 
pirates and the parameters set by the UN Security Council). 
Consequently, the preliminary conclusion is that the EU legal order allows the Union to use the CSDP 
and the assets of the Member States to pursue the objective of protecting its citizens. Furthermore, as 
was concluded earlier, the international legal regime n place also authorizes the use of force to that 
end (n.b. for counter-piracy in general, which includes but is not limited to citizen protection).  
The question arises, then, whether the EU and its Member States are also under a stricter obligation in 
this regard. In particular, is there a right of EU citizens to be protected against pirates by the Union? 
What exists thus far – at most – is the right if EUcitizens to protection by the diplomatic or consular 
authorities of EU Member States in case their Member State of nationality is not represented in a third 
country.72 Legislatively, this has been elaborated upon by Decision 95/553/EC on the protection for 
                                                   
68  Art. 41(1) TEU. 
69  Union de l'Europe occidentale (Western European Union, WEU), Conseil des Ministres de l'UEO. Déclaration de 
Petersberg, Bonn, 19 June 1992, 7 (emphasis added), available at: 
www.ena.lu/declaration_petersberg_faite_conseil_ministres_ueo_bonn_19_jui n_1992-1-14941. Note that the reference 
resurfaced in a factsheet of the now defunct WEU, which states that ‘Battlegroups can be used for the full range of 
missions and tasks listed in Article 43 of the Treaty on European Union (Petersberg missions)’ including ‘the evacuation 
of EU citizens’. European Security and Defence Assembly/Assembly of WEU, Assembly Factsheet No. 12: Battlegroups, 
December 2009, www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/Fact%20sheets/12E_Fact_Sheet_Battlegroups.pdf. 
70  S Graf von Kielmansegg, ‘The meaning of Petersberg: Some considerations of the legal scope of ESDP operations’ 
(2007) 44 Common Market Law Review 629, 632; and P d’Argent, ‘Le traité d’Amsterdam et les aspects militaries de la 
PESC’ in Y Lejeune (ed), Le Traité d’Amsterdam: Espoirs et Déceptions (Bruxelles: Bruylant 1998) 391. 
71  J Coelmont, ‘Europe’s Military Ambition’ in S Biscop and F Algieri (eds), The Lisbon Treaty and ESDP: transformation 
and integration, EGMONT paper 24, June 2008, 6. 
72  See further the contribution by Madalina Moraru to this edited Working Paper. 
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citizens of the European Union by diplomatic and consular representations.73 But given the 
succinctness of the law in this regard it is certainly correct to say that ‘the acquis relating to the 
protection of EU citizens is not well developed’.74 In any event, the reference to ‘third countries’ 
would imply that situations on the high seas are not i cluded, nor would be the protection by naval 
forces as opposed to ‘diplomatic or consular authorities’. Curiously enough though, Ianniello Saliceti 
discusses in this context the example of ‘an evacuation operation from an area of crisis involving 
‘rescue aircraft’.75 It is doubtful whether the notion of consular and diplomatic protection could be 
stretched thus far. At least the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Diplomatic 
Protection or the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations do not include this particular type of 
action,76 and a fortiori acts by military forces on the high seas. At best, chartered civilian aircraft 
might be considered. Therefore, it can be concluded that any rights under EU law in terms of the 
forceful protection of citizens abroad by military means do not exist. In addition, procedurally there is 
no forum to invoke such rights directly vis-à-vis the EU in view of the exclusion of jurisdiction ofthe 
ECJ from the realm of the CFSP.77 
4. The Operational Mandate 
Having considered the EU’s constitutional framework, let us now turn to the mandate proper of 
Operation Atalanta, and see to which extent it lives up to the objectiv  of protecting Union citizens. 
The mandate and operational parameters of are set out in Joint Action 2008/851.78 Art. 1 of the Joint 
Action characterizes the mission as  
‘a military operation in support of Resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008) and 1838 (2008) of the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), in a manner consistent with action permitted with 
respect to piracy under Article 100 et seq. of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
signed in Montego Bay on 10 December 1982 […] and by means, in particular, of commitments 
made with third States […].’79 
Art. 1 then proceeds to set out the operation’s basic objectives, of which there were initially two: First, 
protection of vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP) delivering food aid to displaced persons in 
Somalia, in accordance with the mandate laid down in UN Security Council Resolution 1814 (2008); 
secondly, the protection of vulnerable vessels and the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of 
piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast, in accordance with the mandate laid down in UNSC 
Resolution 1816 (2008).80 A third objective was introduced on 8 December 2009 by amending Art. 1 
of the Joint Action, stating that ‘[i]n addition, Atalanta shall contribute to the monitoring of fishing 
                                                   
73  Decision 95/553/EC of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council of 19 
December 1995 regarding protection for citizens of the European Union by diplomatic and consular representations 
[2005] OJ L314/73. 
74  Ianniello Saliceti, ‘The Protection of EU Citizens Aboard’ 97, referring also to European Commission, Green Paper on 
Diplomatic and consular protection of Union citizens in third countries, Brussels, 28 November 2006 COM(2006)712 
final. 
75  Ianniello Saliceti, ‘The Protection of EU Citizens Aboard’ 97. 
76  Art. 1 of the ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection (see also supra section 2 on the debate within the ILC); and 
Art. 5 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.  
77  Art. 24(1) TEU and Art. 275 TFEU. The two exceptions provided, i.e. patrolling the border between CFSP and other 
Union competences (Art. 40 TEU) and the legality of restrictive measures (Art. 275 TFEU), would not apply in the 
present case. 
78  Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008 on a European Union military operation to contribu e to the 
deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast [2008] OJ L301/33. 
79  Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP, Art. 1(1). 
80  Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP, Art. 1(1).  
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activities off the coast of Somalia.’81 This can be seen as showing awareness of the controversial 
fishing activities by European vessels and the intention to make clear that Atalanta is not there to act 
as a military shield for the illegal exploitation of Somalia’s maritime resources. 
Art. 2 of the Joint Action subsequently provides the specific objectives in the actual operational 
mandate. Essentially, Atalanta shall ‘as far as available capabilities allow’, provide protection to WFP 
vessels (including by placing armed units on board); provide protection of merchant vessels ‘based on 
a case-by-case evaluation of needs’; take the ‘necessary measures’, i.e. also the use of force, to combat 
acts of piracy and armed robbery; detain and transfer piracy suspects for prosecution; ‘liaise and 
cooperate’ with other relevant actors in the theatre; and, at a later stage, lend assistance to Somali 
authorities ‘by making available data relating to fishing activities compiled in the course of the 
operation’.82 
A specific reference to the protection of Union citizens in the mandate is missing. It is clearly tied to 
the international legal framework, above all the rel vant United Nations Security Council resolutions 
and the Law of the Sea. Especially the formulation of the mission as one ‘in support of’ UN Security 
Council resolutions suggests that Operation Atalanta functions as an executing arm of the Security 
Council. The EU is thereby – as the TEU puts it – contributing to ‘multilateral solutions to common 
problems’83 by addressing a threat to international peace and security. Consequently, it is to this 
universal end that it protects WFP ships, secures mariti e traffic and pursues pirates.  
Among the ships that are to be protected, WFP vessels enjoy priority. They are not only mentioned 
first, but are also given the express possibility to have armed units put on board. Most importantly, 
however, is the absence of a reference to ‘a case-by-case evaluation of needs’ which applies to 
merchant vessels. Among the merchant vessels, no distinct on is made between ships sailing under EU 
Member State flags or those with Union citizens on board and the rest. The presentation of the 
operation by the Council further highlights this prioritization. Features like the ‘food count’ tables 
used on the factsheets about the operation, informing us that between the launch of the operation and 
the end of 2010 about 490000 tons of food have beend livered and ‘on average, more than 1600000’ 
Somalis have been fed each day,84 foster the impression that this mission is of a prima ily, if not 
exclusively, humanitarian character. A similar ‘EU citizens rescued’ count is nowhere to be found.  
5. A Mismatch of Objectives? 
The question now arises as to the relationship between the operational mandate and its specific 
objectives on the one, and the constitutional objectiv s of the EU Treaties on the other hand, and how
they each frame the discretion of the EU forces assigned to Operation Atalanta. Even though, as was 
concluded earlier, there exist neither court jurisdiction nor individual rights here, objectives are still 
legally binding and serve as a normative framework f  the actors called upon to pursue them.  
At this point, it is worth drawing an analogy from Ianniello Saliceti’s example for the application of 
the principle of non-discrimination in the context of an evacuation operation of EU citizens (see upra 
                                                   
81  Art. 1(3) of the Joint action as amended by Council Decision 2009/907/CFSP of 8 December 2009 amending Joint Action 
2008/851/CFSP on a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts 
of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast [2009] OJ L322/27, Art. 1. 
82  Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP, Art. 2. Council Decision 2009/907/CFSP added the words ‘and cooperate’ to point 
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83  Art. 21(1), second indent TEU. 
84  Council of the European Union, EU naval operation against piracy (EUNAVFOR Somalia - Operation ATALANTA), 
January 2011, EUNAVFOR/26, 
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/missionPress/files/110104%20Factsheet%20EU%20NAVFOR%20So
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section 3.). He suggests that non-discrimination in such a case requires to ‘take onboard an equal 
number of distressed EU citizens of each nationality’ in a rescue operation by aircraft.85 In this 
example, it seems to be implied that first EU citizens would have to be rescued, leaving only any 
potential spare seats for third country nationals. Even though it is difficult to agree with such a strict 
application of equality among EU citizens, it reveals nonetheless the assumption that the objective of 
citizen protection frames the discretion of the actors in a particular situation.  
Let us assume then a situation in which an Atalanta warship receives distress calls from several 
vessels being attacked by pirates. On one ship, there ar  a number of EU citizens present, on the others 
not. There are no other warships available. For the warship, the distance to the distressed ships is about 
the same, and given time constraints, only one ship can be helped, leaving the others at the mercy of 
the pirates. It is a hypothetical example, but given the vastness of the area covered and the relatively 
little number of warships available,86 it is not entirely far-fetched. In such a situation, depending on the 
features of the other ships, the mandate of Atalanta and the objectives of Art. 3(5) TEU, in particular 
with regard to the protection of citizens, might be at odds.  
As was pointed out, the mandate of Joint Action 2008/851 prioritizes WFP ships, and provides as 
criterion to choose among merchant vessels a case-by-case evaluation of need. Thus, assuming there 
was a WFP ship among the distressed vessels, the operational mandate would unequivocally point to 
the WFP ship to be rescued, abandoning the EU citizens on the other ship to their fate. The general 
objectives of the Union, however, explicitly emphasize the protection of citizens in the EU’s external 
action. This shifts the balance, if not towards favouring the ship with EU citizens onboard, at least to a
less clear-cut priority structure. This result is a (also morally difficult) choice between either 
promoting the universal/altruistic value of ensuring the flow of humanitarian aid to the suffering 
population of Somalia or pursuing the self-interested objective of protecting one’s own citizens.  
What if, alternatively, the choice was between a cargo ship (with no crew members who are EU 
citizens) and a yacht with EU citizens? The mandate’s case-by-case criterion is of little use here, as the 
need is equal in this example. Consequently, the mandate gives no further guidance, leaving it up to 
the commander of the warship to decide.87 Art. 3(5) TEU, in turn, frames it as a choice betwen 
safeguarding the EU’s interest in safe maritime trade by helping the cargo vessel or contributing to 
citizen protection by helping the yacht. Though it is as such also an open choice, the explicit reference 
to citizens as opposed to the wide notion of ‘interest’ might tilt the balance towards EU citizens. 
Arguably, for a nation-state, the choice to give priority to its own citizens in both cases would not be 
objectionable. Universal and economic objectives are not to be discounted, but in this particular case 
they could not be served in view of the imperative of protecting one’s own nationals first. Charity, so 
to say, begins at home. As a states ‘will be placed under extreme political pressure to act to protect the 
safety of their nationals abroad’ and cannot ‘lightly refuse such protection when it lies within [their] 
powers to afford it’,88 one could imagine the domestic political outrage for a case in which the national 
military failed to prevent the kidnapping of nationals by pirates when it had the chance to do so. In the 
EU context, however, this is a more delicate matter. From a Member State perspective, helping 
                                                   
85  Ianniello Saliceti, ‘The Protection of EU Citizens Aboard’ 97. Arguably, this is somewhat reminiscent of Noah’s Arc and 
the divine instruction to save ‘two of every kind’ (Genesis 6:19). Also, whether the EU law principle of equal treatment 
can overrule humanitarian considerations (‘women and children first’) or practical effectiveness (‘first come, first 
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86  The area of operation of Atalanta is about 2 million square nautical miles, i.e. an area comparable to twice that of the 
Mediterranean, and is being patrolled by about a dozen Atalanta warships and two to four reconnaissance aircraft. Even 
by adding the deployments of the other navies, the dispersion remains very thin. 
87  Among the merchant vessels, according to Sanchez Barrueco, the wording ‘on a case-by-case’ basis ‘might suggest that 
ships carrying a European flag would prevail but to date this assumption has not proven to be correct.’ Sanchez Barrueco, 
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another Member State’s nationals is at the outset an act of altruism (e.g. the Dutch navy rescuing the 
German crew from the MS Taipan). But the fact that both of them are EU Member States nd by virtue 
of the over-arching concept of Union citizenship, it becomes a self-serving act from the perspective of 
the outside, non-EU world.89 
How can this tension between the Joint Action and Art. 3(5) TEU be resolved? Even though 
CFSP/CSDP acts are not qualified as ‘legislative acts’,90 they are binding and the primacy of the 
primary law as lex superior applies.91 The introduction of Union objectives of general application (Art. 
3 TEU) by the Lisbon reform bolsters this conclusion. This means, in the absence of a clear conflict, 
that the secondary instrument, i.e. the Joint Action here, must be interpreted in conformity with the 
primary law. Hence, the objectives of the operation as set out in the mandate cannot be interpreted in 
such a way that the pursuit of any of the constitutional objectives as set out in Art. 3(5) TEU is 
undercut. Hence, Operation Atalanta’s mandate is not to be construed as neglecting the prot ction of 
Union citizens. Given its total absence from the mandate, there is in any event potential for 
disorientation or misunderstanding in critical situations where clear guidance from the legal 
framework would be highly desirable. 
One may think about plausible reasons for the conspicuous absence of citizen protection in the 
mandate. One possible explanation may be the participation of third countries in the operation. To 
date, Norway, Croatia, Ukraine and Montenegro have contributed to Atalanta.92 Therefore, one might 
consider it inappropriate to mandate these countries o help protect EU citizens. Here, the same logic 
applies: It would challenge the priority of protecting their own nationals (or interests) by committing 
themselves to Atalanta. Then again, it would not be inconceivable to simply add the protection of 
citizens of participating countries to the mandate s well. As we have seen, the ‘Petersberg task’ of 
rescue operations in Art. 43(1) TEU is deliberately l ft open to rescuing third-country nationals as 
well. 
Another reason might be the political sensitivity of European countries regarding the issue of using 
military force to save their own nationals (and, a fortiori, other EU citizens). Therefore, the emphasis 
is put on the multilateral framework and universal objectives. Germany would be at the forefront of 
such considerations. It should be recalled that Federal President Köhler resigned from office in mid-
2010 following protracted criticism for a statement that for a country like Germany, it might be 
necessary to also defend its interests such as free trad  routes by force.93 Subsequently, German 
Foreign Minister Westerwelle tried to clarify Germany’s stance in a speech before the Bundestag on 
Operation Atalanta in November 2010. Regarding the protection of national interests 
(Interessenwahrnehmung) he underlined that the entire operation had as its rationale the guarantee of 
delivery of humanitarian aid, and only as a secondary goal there was also the protection of 
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international maritime traffic.94 As he put it, ‘foreign policy that is committed to humanitarian values 
can, may, even must also take into account one’s own interests.’95 However, he then softened this 
reference to the ‘own interests’ by stating that freedom of movement on the high seas is a common 
interest of the international community and that Germany was acting under a mandate of the UNSC.96 
While we see here that the pursuit of the national interest is still a contentious issue, the protection of 
citizens did not figure as controversial in the discussion. It was rather the tension between economic 
and universal humanitarian considerations. As was mentioned earlier, the German government had 
planned and only narrowly avoided carrying out an operation of German special forces to rescue the 
partly German crew of the kidnapped container ship Hansa Stavanger.97 
In other Member States, such controversies do not seem to arise at all either. The Swedish foreign 
ministry, for instance, also puts the protection of WFP ships first, whereas the presence of naval forces 
‘is also seen to make it easier for merchant shipping in the area, including vessels that fly the Swedish 
flag and that sail in the area.’98 Here, the protection of Swedish ships serves as an indirect motivation. 
More explicit is the Spanish government’s statement. The ministry of defence points out that ‘the 
problem of piracy represented not just a threat to international maritime security, but also to national 
interests in the area, represented by the fishing activities of the Spanish tuna fleet in the Indian 
Ocean.’99 For the Spanish government, the protection of Spanish fishermen and WFP ships appear side 
by side as motivation for sending ships to that area.100 As was already mentioned earlier, the French 
already have a history of using force to rescue their nationals from pirates captured by Somali pirates.  
Thus, neither third country participation nor political sensitivity plausibly explain the absence of 
citizen protection from the mandate of Atalanta. To the contrary, a look at the national stances of EU 
Member States rather indicates that the forceful protection of nationals is not controversial. But this 
equally shows that citizen protection, especially in the realm of security policy, is still seen from a 
strictly national viewpoint, which remains thus farunaffected by the concept of ‘Union citizenship’. 
The elevation of the protection of EU citizens abroad to a constitutional objective of the Union does 
not seem to have altered this. Illustrative is here again the example mentioned at the outset, i.e. the 
rescue of German crew members of the hijacked MS Taipan by Dutch troops from the frigate HNLMS 
Tromp operating in the framework of Atalanta. Not even the Operation itself regarded this as an act of 
protecting EU citizens by CSDP assets. Instead, the press release by Atalanta on the successful rescue 
operation limited itself to stating that ‘EU NAVFOR HNLMS Tromp retakes pirated MV Taipan’, 
                                                   
94  German Foreign Office, Rede von Außenminister Westerwelle im Deutschen Bundestag zur deutschen Beteiligung an der 
Operation ‘ATALANTA’ am Horn von Afrika, 24 November 2010, www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/DE/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2010/101124-BM-Atalant -Rede.html?nn=339506. 
95  ‘Eine Außenpolitik, die humanitären Werten verpflichtet ist, kann und darf, ja muss auch die eigenen I teressen im Blick 
behalten.’ (translation by author) German Foreign Office, Rede von Außenminister Westerwelle. 
96  German Foreign Office, Rede von Außenminister Westerwelle.  
97  It should be noted that whereas the rescue team for ed part of the German Federal Police, it was stationed on a US navy 
vessel, which was escorted by German warships. Historically, one could also recall here the rescue by German special 
forces of the kidnapped aircraft Landshut in 1977, which, coincidentally, took place on Somali soil as the plane had 
landed on the airport of Mogadishu. 
98  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Sweden to strengthen its commitment in Somalia, press release, 21 January 2010, 
www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/12653/a/138256.  
99  ‘[...] el problema de la piratería en Somalia representaba, no sólo una amenaza para la seguridad marítima internacional, 
sino también para los intereses nacionales en la zon , representados por la actividad pesquera de la flota atunera española 
en el Índico.’ (translation by author) Spanish Ministry of Defence, Operación ‘Atalanta’ de lucha contra la pirateria, 
www.mde.es/en/areasTematicas/misiones/enCurso/misiones/mision_09.html?__locale=en. 
100  See also Spanish Ministry of Defence, ‘Atalanta’ ha permitido detener a más de 1.000 piratas en siete meses, press 
release 8 October 2010, www.mde.es/gabinete/notasPren a/2010/10/DGC_101008_informe_atalanta.html. 
Joris Larik 
144 
thus identifying the warship as part of the EU operation.101 Also in the national media of both 
countries, it was not portrayed in a European perspective.102 Especially telling was the angle taken by 
an Associated Press reporter who subtitled his article on the incident: ‘Dutch marines sidestep EU 
bureaucracy to rescue German container ship from Soali pirates’.103 From this viewpoint, the EU 
does not appear as the actor or even facilitator for the Member States to act, but as an obstacle to 
achieving the goal of mutual protection of nationals. 
6. Conclusion: Civis Europaeus in Foro Interno, Externo Barbarus 
The discussion of this encounter between the civis europaeus and the hostis humani generis off the 
coast of Somali yields the following observations. First, in this particular setting, international law 
allows the protection by the use of force of victims of piracy by virtue of the Law of the Sea and the 
special regime imposed by the UN Security Council. Within this particular framework, states are 
allowed to use force also for the purpose of protecting their own citizens from pirates. Secondly, the 
concept of ‘Union citizenship’ gives us a new perspctive to look at the challenge for the Member 
States to protect jointly their citizens abroad. The altruistic objective of protecting a foreigner is 
transformed into the Union’s constitutionally entreched self-interest to protect its own citizens. Union 
citizenship has now an explicit external dimension, which goes beyond diplomatic and consular 
assistance, and indeed includes also the use of the CFSP/CSDP. Thirdly, the mandate of Operation 
Atalanta clearly prioritizes the pursuit of universal objectives, above all the protection of WFP ships, 
and otherwise lumps together all merchant ships, making no reference to Union citizens at all. 
Therefore, fourthly, while the notion of EU citizenship looms large in the primary law and in Union’s 
internal sphere, it is conspicuously absent in the implementing acts of the operation. This creates 
tension which in extreme situations can lead to putting the protection of Union citizens on the back 
seat. Whereas this would be politically highly contr versial in a national setting, the salience of this
issue appears not to have surfaced at the Union level. 
In view of these observations, it can be concluded that there is a widening gap between the 
increasingly powerful notion of Union citizenship within the Union and its present weakness outside 
of it. Internally, the development of Union law makes it increasingly difficult to construe nationals 
from different Member States as proper ‘foreigners’. The phrase civis europaeus sum carries weight in 
foro interno. Externally, we see that the cives europaei might receive consular assistance in case, for 
instance, they get jailed, are hospitalized or losetheir passport. However, in the face of pirate attacks 
in the troubled waters off the Somali coast, civis europaeus sum remains thus far a call that falls on 
deaf ears. 
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